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Abstract
The traditional method for maintenance of space systems consists in building reliable satel-
lites through redundancy and replacing them in case of failure, or whenever an upgrade is
necessary. On-orbit servicing could change this paradigm. What would be the missions for
which servicing would be most interesting, and what price would they be willing to pay
for the capability to be serviced? The answer to these questions would provide valuable
guidelines as to which servicing technologies to develop, and at what cost.
Assuming that the technologies enabling automated servicing are available, traditional
metrics and models are first proposed to systematically evaluate servicing cost-effectiveness
within a representative trade space of serviceable missions and servicing infrastructures.
It is shown that though it can capture some elements of cost-effectiveness, the traditional
approach tends to underestimate the value of servicing and demonstrate cost advantages
smaller than the cost uncertainty.
This issue is solved by then proposing a new approach to on-orbit servicing. First, the
intrinsic value of servicing is studied separately from its cost. Furthermore, a first framework
to evaluate the flexibility provided by on-orbit servicing to space systems is developed. This
framework is used to define models of the value of servicing for two families of space systems
faced with different types of uncertainty: commercial systems with uncertain market and
military missions with dynamic requirements.
For commercial missions with uncertain market, modeling servicing as an option on life
extension shows that space systems should not systematically be designed for the longest
possible lifetime. Instead, the optimal design life decreases with increasing uncertainty. The
maximum servicing price that would make servicing economically interesting is evaluated as
a function of uncertainty and the value of flexibility is illustrated on two current examples.
For military missions, a small number of satellites with the option to maneuver is consid-
ered as an alternative to global coverage for flexibility with respect to contingency location.
It is shown that while this alternative has little value in the case of a low Earth orbit radar
constellation, it has interesting potential for geostationary communication satellites.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Space systems are still the only complex engineering systems without routine maintenance,
repair and upgrade infrastructure. The Shuttle can access and maintain high value assets
such as the International Space Station (ISS) or the Hubble Space Telescope (HST). But
for the average space systems, maintenance means are limited to launching spacecraft.
Replacement is the only repairing scheme, so that a spacecraft can be lost even if the
majority of its components are still operational. One-of-a-kind, reliable and expensive
spacecraft have been the natural result of this lack of space logistics, as schematized on
figure 1-1. To amortize the high cost of spacecraft, their design lifetimes are made longer,
which in turn makes them more expensive.
The space industry as well as the United States governmental agencies recognize today
the need for a new paradigm of space systems design. Space technologies are mature enough
that pushing the limits of reliability further is becoming extremely expensive. In addition,
A--B means "A drives B up"
+ Spacecrafft Co)st 1
Design Lifetime Replacement Cost
Figure 1-1: Vicious Circle of Traditional Design Methods Leading to Longest Possible
Lifetime
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Figure 1-2: On-Orbit Servicing as Breaking the Vicious Circle: Towards Shorter Design
Lifetimes?
there is concern about the growing gap between space systems, which are often designed
to live more than a decade, and the shorter life cycles of market demand and technology
development. The result of this gap is a considerable risk that a spacecraft will become
technologically obsolete or will stop addressing any actual market before the end of its
design lifetime.
On-orbit servicing, defined as the ability to repair, refuel, replenish, and upgrade satel-
lites on orbit, has long been recognized as having the potential to change the way business is
carried out in space. As a cheap alternative to replacement, on-orbit servicing would make
possible a new trade between design margins and maintenance costs, as schematized on
figure 1-2. This trade is likely leading to less redundant, cheaper spacecraft. As a means of
life extension and upgrade, it would foster shorter design lifetimes, thus enabling spacecraft
to follow the market and technology dynamics more closely. It would also offer the potential
for designing new types of space systems, such as maneuverable spacecraft.
However, the implementation of on-orbit servicing requires a whole new way of designing
and managing space systems. In addition, decision makers perceive it as a significant source
of technological risk. For investments in on-orbit servicing to be actually deemed worth-
while, considerable advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness must be proven. Many stud-
ies have qualitatively explored the potential advantages of autonomous on-orbit servicing.
Several projects developed bottom-line architectures for on-orbit servicing of specific space
missions and demonstrated potential improvements in terms of cost or cost-effectiveness.
However, no advantages have yet been proven that outweigh the perceived risk and cost
uncertainty.
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Before the decision can be taken to make on-orbit servicing the new paradigm for space
systems maintenance, the conditions under which this would be cost-effective still remain
to be explored in detail. The objective of this thesis is to propose new tools to participate
in answering this question.
The typical research path followed by previous work has been to develop a design tailored
to a specific space system and simulate its cost-effectiveness over the mission life. While this
approach has been very successful at demonstrating the feasibility of automated on-orbit
servicing and at proposing realistic designs, it has not yet proved able to yield any general
conclusion about the cost-effectiveness of on-orbit servicing.
One of the reasons may be that such a process overlooks the intrinsic value of servicing
for space missions. This value, defined as the price a space mission would be willing to pay
for the capability to be serviced, should exist independently of any servicing architecture
design. Its systematic study would help identify the space missions that are most likely
to become customers of a servicing infrastructure. It would give valuable directions for
servicing design as to what space missions to target, and at what cost.
In addition, by using traditional valuation tools such as net present value calculations,
previous work has been underestimating an important component of servicing value. The
price that a space mission would be willing to pay for servicing is not limited to the cost
savings it would make by designing spacecraft for shorter lifetimes and smaller reliability.
Servicing would also provide space missions with options in the future to adapt to uncertain
parameters such as random failures,.market dynamics, technological development or chang-
ing requirements. This flexibility is a significant advantage of servicing, and it is important
to take its value into account.
In order to address the holes in previous research, this thesis proposes to step aside from
technology development and design, and assume that an infrastructure for on-orbit servicing
is available. It can then focus on the main research question:
Is there a general way to estimate the value of servicing for space systems,
defined as the maximum price under which servicing improves mission value,
taking into account the options that servicing provides to decision makers?
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As a basis for constructing an answer to this question, we will first define its terms and
implications in slightly more details.
1.1 Definitions and Motivations for On-Orbit Servicing
1.1.1 A Few Definitions
Waltz [Wal93] gives a definition of on-orbit servicing:
On-orbit servicing is work in space. The work, performed by men, machines, or a
blend of both, relates to space assembly, maintenance, and servicing (SAMS) tasks to
enhance the operational life and capability of satellites, platforms, space station attached
modules, and space vehicles. In the broadest context of its definition, satellite servicing
also includes the in-space launching, reboosting, and retrieval of space systems. Growth
versions of some servicing functions involve space debris capture or containment and
emergency operations for crew rescue and return to an in-space safe haven or to the
Earth.
He divides the set of functions performed by on-orbit servicing into three categories:
Assembly is the fitting together of manufactured parts into a structure; it occurs
before a space system is operational.
Maintenance is the upkeep of facilities or equipment; it can be scheduled or on-
demand; it is performed after a system has become operational and includes any
on-orbit activity performed for the purpose of extending the operational life of a
space system, except replenishment of consumables.
Servicing is the broader term encompassing the replacement of expended consumables
and the logistics required to strategically locate supplies; it can be performed
before or after a system becomes operational.
In the framework of this thesis, we will refer to on-orbit servicing as any on-orbit activity,
including refueling, performed after a system has become operational, for the purpose of
extending the operational life of the system, or modifying some of its components. The
tasks included in this definition are indicated by a cross (X) in table 1.1. We will often use
the word servicing alone to refer to on-orbit servicing.
Traditional classifications of servicing functions, such as the one proposed by [Wa193]
and summarized by table 1.1, have been considering on-orbit servicing from the point of
14
Table 1.1: Servicing Functions Classification from [Wa193]
Servicing Tasks Task Functions In this thesis
Assembly Space station assembly
Space Station upgrade / modification X
Large spacecraft assembly
Deployment of appendages
Orbit Transfer Delivery to final orbit X
Retrieval from orbit
Earth return
Resupply Fluids X
Materials X
Film / Tape X
Maintenance and Repair Module changeout / replacement X
Refurbishment / retrofit X
Modification X
Decontamination X
Cleaning / resurfacing X
Test and checkout X
Unplanned repair X
Special Space debris control
Emergency operations X
view of designing a servicing architecture. For example, resupply and repair are two very
different tasks from a servicing mission point of view; while the former is a one-way mass
transfer, the latter can require taking out an old module before inserting the replacement
module, which is a two-way mass transfer and presents different technological challenges.
From the serviced mission point of view, the relevant distinctions are different. For
example, refueling or replacing batteries both aim at extending the lifetime of the existing
spacecraft design, while upgrading a module leads to a spacecraft with new or enhanced
capabilities. Taking the point of view of the serviceable missions, we will therefore group
the servicing functions into only three main categories: life extension, upgrade, and modi-
fication.
Life extension includes any on-orbit servicing operation aimed at extending the opera-
tional life of the system in its original design; this involves refueling, refurbishing and
repairing.
Upgrade includes any on-orbit servicing operation aimed at improving the performance
of the operational system in meeting its original mission goal; it involves insertion of
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more recent technology into the design, through adding or replacing components.
Modification includes any on-orbit servicing operation aimed at meeting new mission
goals; examples include design changes through payload replacement, as well as refuel
to maneuver into a new constellation configuration.
A last important class of distinction concerns the timing nature of the servicing opera-
tions. They can occur either on an on-demand or an a scheduled basis.
On-demand on-orbit servicing is performed as needed; this is well suited for example to
repairing after random failures. It requires all servicing material to be constantly
available.
Scheduled on-orbit servicing involves setting in advance future servicing times; this is well
suited for example for life extension at the end of a design lifetime. Although the time
of servicing is set, the components to be delivered can be chosen at the time of service;
the decision can also be made not to service at that time after all.
1.1.2 Motivations for On-Orbit Servicing: Traditional Views
On-orbit servicing can enhance the design process by extending the possibilities available
to mission designers and the opportunities for trade-offs. It has been recognized to offer
many ways of increasing the achievable mission cost-effectiveness, in particular:
Enable Missions Certain missions are simply not viable without servicing because their
baseline lifetime is short and the cost of replacement is too high. This is the case
for very high value assets such as the International Space Station (ISS) or the Hubble
Space Telescope (HST), and all spacecraft that must be assembled on-orbit.
Reduce Initial Mission Cost The ability to refuel and repair satellites offers an alterna-
tive to replacement for trading initial spacecraft costs with mission lifetime costs. For
example, long-term consumables and redundant parts make up a mass on satellites
that is not immediately useful. The need for corresponding additional structures and
fuel increases this mass penalty. Satellites designed for servicing could therefore end
up being much smaller than their traditional counterparts.
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Improve Lifetime Performance/ Reduce Risk On-orbit servicing can increase mis-
sion lifetime performance by offering cheap and timely ways of mitigating risk [BP91).
This applies to risk in the launch phase (a satellite launched into the wrong orbit could
be refueled to maneuver to its desired orbit), risk in the physical life of components
(repairing for random failures instead of replacing the whole satellite) and risk in the
technological life of components (upgrading a component instead of designing a new
satellite).
Most previous work on servicing cost-effectiveness has been considering on-orbit ser-
vicing as an alternative to replacement for maintenance of a space system. The typical
approach adopted by such studies can be summarized as being made up of the following
steps:
1. Choose a specific space mission and analyze its serviceability,
2. Identify one or a trade space of, servicing architecture designs for this mission,
3. Simulate maintenance events over the lifetime of the mission, both for the serviceable
case and for a baseline case in which satellites are replaced,
4. Compare lifetime costs and some measure of lifetime performance (such as a utility
function, or constellation availability) for the serviceable and the baseline cases,
5. Draw conclusions on the percentage cost advantage, and possibly on the performance
advantage, of the chosen on-orbit servicing method.
1.2 A New Approach to On-Orbit Servicing
1.2.1 Defining the Value of Servicing for a Space System
When the approach described above is undertaken, whether on-orbit servicing proves
more interesting than traditional methods is actually the result of a trade-off between two
main effects: the cost savings from servicing on the one hand, and the price the space
mission is going to pay for servicing on the other hand. The cost savings from servicing
depend mainly on the satellite design and the elements to be serviced, while the price to pay
for servicing depends not only on the cargo to be delivered to the satellites, but also and
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principally on the assumptions, design choices and cost models for the servicing architecture.
Therefore the conclusions yielded by such a method are valid only for the specific mission
and servicing infrastructure considered.
A first possible approach to solve this issue consists in defining a general trade space
of space missions and servicing architectures, and systematically exploring the trade space
using general metrics for cost-effectiveness.
Another interesting consideration is that since the infrastructure for on-orbit servicing
does not yet exist, results which would give some guidance as to what types of technologies
to develop, what space missions to target, and what cost cap not to exceed, would be very
valuable. From a theoretical as well as from a conceptual point of view, it is therefore
interesting to study the value of servicing for space missions separately from its cost.
Both approaches will be considered in turn in this thesis.
1.2.2 Flexibility through Servicing: Turning Uncertainty into an Asset
Serviceable missions have options But the value of servicing is not limited to the
potential cost savings incurred when designing a system for a shorter design life. The
capability to be serviced in the future is also a great source of flexibility for space missions.
A serviceable mission would have options to react to the future resolution of parameters
that are uncertain at the time of launch. Examples include the option to refuel or repair
for life extension, the option to upgrade to avoid technological obsolescence, or the option
to modify to meet new requirements.
On uncertainty and risk By not taking flexibility into account, traditional decision
making often confuses uncertainty and risk. There is uncertainty in a mission if one or
several future mission parameters cannot be predicted exactly; uncertain parameters are
typically modeled as having a probability density function, and the standard deviation of
this distribution is a measure of uncertainty. There is risk in a mission if there is uncertainty,
and if the results of this uncertainty can have negative outcomes; a typical measure of risk
would be the expected negative outcome. For a mission that has no way to react to the
resolution of uncertainty, there is often a one-to-one relationship between uncertainty and
risk.
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Range Range
of of
possible possible
0 ncertainty outcomes 0 ncertainty outcomes
S s ture ture
4iRisk
a) Without options: uncertainty means risk b) With options: uncertainty means
higher expected outcome
Figure 1-3: The Cone of Uncertainty - Inspired from [AK98]
The cone of uncertainty Options de-couple risk and uncertainty. A good way to con-
ceptually capture this effect is the notion of cone of uncertainty proposed by real options
theory [AK98] and illustrated on figure 1-3. Decision makers consider the future as seen
from the apex of the cone (present). As they look further and further into the future, there
is more and more uncertainty associated with their forecast. This is what the cone repre-
sents, its angle being a measure of the level of uncertainty. If no option is available, then
an increasing uncertainty translates into an increasing probability of a negative outcome;
thus uncertainty means risk. But if options are available to react to uncertainty, then neg-
ative outcomes can be avoided and a higher uncertainty translates into a higher expected
outcome. Thus, for flexible missions, uncertainty is not a source of risk any more, but a
source of value.
Giving options to space missions is a significant advantage of on-orbit servicing. It is
important the capture the value of this flexibility.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis proposes to develop a new framework to yield general results for the value of
servicing for space missions, taking flexibility into account. Three main steps are necessary
to accomplish this goal: first, analyze the traditional approach and identify its limitations;
then based on these limitations, develop a general theoretical framework that fills some
holes in previous research; finally, validate the framework on practical examples. These
steps are organized into the following chapters:
Chapter 2 summarizes a few results from previous research that are particularly relevant
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to this study. Previous work from three complementary areas is presented: the design and
evaluation of servicing infrastructures, the impact of servicing of spacecraft design and cost,
and the state-of-the-art in valuation methods.
Chapter 3 extends on previous work by defining general metrics to estimate cost-
effectiveness on a wide trade space of space missions and servicing infrastructures. It shows
how the cost uncertainty yielded by traditional approaches generally outweighs the advan-
tages of servicing in terms of cost-effectiveness.
Recognizing the need to study the full value of servicing independently from its cost,
chapter 4 proposes a new approach to on-orbit servicing. Building and expanding on decision
tree analysis and real options theory, it defines a framework to embed the value of flexibility
into the valuation of space missions faced with uncertainty. The framework relies on the
definition of a few building blocks, the most important being a model of the uncertainty, a
set of reachable operational modes, a sequence of decision points, and a definition of mission
value.
Chapter 5 uses this framework to develop a general model for the valuation of commercial
space missions with uncertain revenues. The linearity of mission value makes this simple case
very similar to real options valuation. The model is first used to estimate the value of the
option to abandon, which is available to all space mission but has never yet been accounted
for. The option to service for life extension is then considered. The optimal design life is
studied as a function of market uncertainty. The maximum servicing price under which a
serviceable design is optimal is mapped into a market level/market uncertainty space and
illustrated on two current examples from the satellite communications world: the Iridium
and Globalstar constellations.
Chapter 6 considers the more complex case of military missions with dynamic theater
locations. It shows how valuation models can be developed from the same framework in
spite of the continuity of the decision points and the non-linearity of the value function,
which make both real options theory and decision tree analysis impractical. The value of
refueling to make a constellation of satellites maneuverable is studied for two cases: a low-
Earth orbit radar constellation taken on the example of the Discoverer-II project, and a
geostationary fleet of communication satellites taken on the example of the Defense Satellite
Communications System (DSCS).
Chapter 7 concludes on the contributions and limitations of this work.
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Chapter 2
Relevant Previous Work
This chapter summarizes and discusses a subjective selection of previous research efforts
that have been found particularly relevant to the question of evaluating the value of on-orbit
servicing for space missions. There are three main elements in this question: value, on-orbit
servicing and space missions. Our discussion of previous work is accordingly divided into
three main areas of research. Section 2.1 summarizes some of the research about on-orbit
servicing architectures, which includes historical on-orbit servicing, technology development,
and cost-effectiveness studies. Section 2.2 deals with several aspects of the satellite design
changes in the presence of on-orbit servicing: the cost savings from designing for a shorter
design life on the one hand, and the penalty to design for serviceability on the other hand.
Finally, section 2.3 presents and compares three important ways of estimating value for
decision making: net present value (NPV), decision tree analysis (DTA) and real options
valuation.
2.1 Previous Work on On-Orbit Servicing
2.1.1 History Highlights
Waltz [Wa193] makes the point that although on-orbit servicing is sometimes perceived as
revolutionary, it has had an evolving history; maintenance considerations have always been
part of spacecraft design and systems engineering.
Space maintenance has been practiced since the beginnings of spaceflight in 1961, when
few missions were completed without crew intervention to correct malfunctions. But before
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1980, the demonstration of servicing in space had been limited to manned spacecraft such
as Skylab or Apollo in the United States, and the space station program in the USSR.
The Skylab missions (1973-1974) included scheduled maintenance activities [Wal93],
but also experienced, from the very launch, failures that required major maintenance efforts:
release of a solar array, deployment of a parasol and a twin-pole sun shield, installation of
a rate gyro package, servicing of the coolant system, and repair of a microwave antenna.
Almost all of the 53 Skylab experiments experienced various degrees of maintenance activity
during the mission. This maintenance was systematically performed by astronauts.
The Russian space stations program * started in the same years and lasted until the
death of the MIR space station. An extensive history of on-orbit servicing started with
the Salyut 6 space station, launched in 1977. Salyut 6 had two docking ports: the Soyuz
spacecraft docked to one port, leaving the other port available for visiting crews or Progress
resupply vehicles. A total of 12 Progress spacecraft, each of length 7 m and weight 7 tons,
delivered more than 20 tons of equipment, supplies and fuel during the station's lifetime;
the docking and fuel transfer were performed automatically. The latest version, Progress-
M, performed more than 40 servicing operations of the MIR space station. Its autonomous
docking system failed only three times at the first attempt: two Progress missions docked at
the second attempt, while one (the Progress M-24) crashed into the station and had to be
maneuvered by hand. In spite of this accident, the program has been a great demonstration
of the feasibility of routine autonomous docking and refueling.
The Solar Maximum Mission (SMM) spacecraft was the first unmanned spacecraft to
be serviced [Wal93]. The spacecraft underwent failure of three of its momentum wheels and
of its coronograph/polarimeter instrument ten months after it began collecting spectacular
data about the solar activity. After a year-long test program of high fidelity simulation on
the ground, astronauts on board the Shuttle Challenger were able to retrieve the spacecraft,
replace its attitude control module and repair its coronograph electronic box. Amounting
to a total estimated cost of $60 million, this repair mission proved less expensive than a
$230 million replacement. Some people believe that it proved the usefulness of the Shuttle
*http://www.nauts.com
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and ended the era of the throw-away spacecraft. Since then, there have been numerous
examples of unscheduled maintenance on Shuttle missions.
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST)t is probably the most striking example, as it
has been the most extensively serviced unmanned spacecraft is history. Immediately after
deployment of the telescope, scientists realized that its primary mirror had a major flaw:
a spherical aberration resulting in fuzzy images. The telescope would never have given its
revolutionary images of the Universe without the first servicing mission, HST 1 in 1993.
Although the overall servicing cost was as high as $500 million, it proved cheaper than
manufacturing a new $1 billion spacecraft. Hubble is also a good example of the power of
upgrading. The second servicing mission, in 1997, installed new instruments, multiplying
by 30 the spectral resolution and by 500 the spatial resolution of the imaging spectrographs,
and allowing the infrared camera to detect even more distant objects. At the same time, new
solid state recorders made possible the storage of ten times more data. The next servicing
mission, scheduled for November 2001, is expected to provide a tenfold improvement in the
Hubble's survey capability.
On-orbit servicing by the Shuttle is so expensive that it makes sense only for very high
value assets such as Hubble. Even in this case, the cost of the three servicing missions have
already outweighed the cost of the spacecraft itself. Therefore, recent efforts have been
focusing on developing technologies for servicing of the average spacecraft. Only unmanned,
autonomous on-orbit servicing can be cheap enough to make this a viable option.
The SAMS project (Space Assembly, Maintenance and Servicing) (Wal93] is a good
example of such an effort. It was a joint study between the Department of Defense (DoD),
the strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO), and NASA. Its primary objective was to
define, where cost-effective, SAMS capabilities to meet requirements for improving space
systems capability, flexibility, and affordability. The 7-year program consisted of three
phases: (1) study, under contract with TRW and Lockheed Martin, (2) concept development
and (3) implementation. The goal was to lead to a national SAMS capability in 2010.
The study identified five orbital regimes and constructed generic design reference mis-
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thttp://hubble.gsfc.nasa.gov/
sions (DRMs) to create servicing scenarios for various types of satellites in each regime. It
studied the cost-effectiveness of servicing compared to replacing. One of its most interest-
ing results is the identification of breakpoints in the curves of potential cost savings from
on-orbit servicing, defined as places in the curve when a significant slope change occurs.
These breakpoints indicate that on-orbit servicing is most interesting under the following
conditions:
" When the cost of orbital replacement units (ORU) is lower than 50% of the satellite
replacement cost,
" When servicing equipment charges are lower than 50% of the total satellite replace-
ment cost,
" When servicing time intervals are shorter than 4 to 5 years,
" When servicing time intervals are shorter than on third of the time required to replace
the satellite.
2.1.2 Enabling Technologies for Autonomous On-Orbit Servicing
The two basic requirements for autonomous on-orbit servicing to be possible are the ability
to access the spacecraft with a maintenance capability (or the capability of the spacecraft
to access a maintenance capability), and the ability of the spacecraft to be maintained. The
technological prerequisites to meet these requirements can be divided into the functions
described below, where the the time sequence of a servicing operation is followed.
" Orbital access (launch) and orbital transfer from an orbit to another are mature
technologies, although some argue that a cheaper access to space would be necessary
for the success of on-orbit servicing.
" Proximity operations can be defined as two spacecraft sustaining joint actions within
93 km of each other; they include navigation control, safing, docking, thermal control,
observation, deployment, and retrieval. Many of these technologies are currently being
developed or demonstrated.
" Orbital assembly, modification and upgrade are being demonstrated on the Inter-
national Space Station in the context of close human supervision. Technologies for
routine autonomous operations still need to be developed.
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" Safety monitor, defined as the continuous assessment of critical equipment data, and
emergency operations and procedures still need to be defined.
" Jettison, defined as the separation of subsystems from a space vehicle with disposal of
the separated element on orbit, is being developed as part of the proximity operations
research effort.
" Space debris control is becoming a great concern, and mitigating methods are being
researched [AHOO]. Although servicing can be perceived as a way of reducing the
space debris problem by re-using existing resources, it will also create more space
debris from launches, remains of servicer vehicles, and disposal of used spacecraft
parts.
One of the technologies currently undergoing the most intense development in the United
States is autonomous rendezvous and capture (AR&C). A commonly accepted design for
AR&C, which uses flight proven technologies, is well described by Polites [Pol99]. A chase
spacecraft with both attitude and translation control capability actively navigates to a
target vehicle, which is passive in the rendezvous process but has attitude stabilization.
This means that spin- and gravity-gradient-stabilized satellites could not be serviced, but
also that components critical to the attitude control system could not be replaced, with
today's technology. The minimum payload to carry on the chase spacecraft consists of an
integrated GPS and inertial guidance sensor (GPS/INS), a video guidance sensor (VGS),
AR&C software, grappling mechanisms and possibly an autonomous formation flying sensor
(AFF); in the rest of this thesis we will call this the active AR&C payload. The target must
at least carry a docking interface equipped with retro-reflectors; we will hereafter call this
the passive AR&C payload.
Other enabling technologies include procedures for operations and ground override, mech-
anisms and actuators for capture and line connections, and fuel transfer gauges and proce-
dures. In addition, thermal management and attitude control for the docked configuration
remain important issues.
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2.1.3 Highlight on a Current Project: Orbital Express
The space industry as well as the U.S. governmental agencies have been recognizing more
and more clearly the need for a change in paradigm for space systems design, and the
potentials offered by on-orbit servicing to change the economy of space. As a result, sev-
eral technology demonstration projects are underway, among which the Defense Advanced
Research Agency (DARPA) Orbital Express program is probably the most extensive 1.
One of the goals of the study is to demonstrate in space an Autonomous Space rans-
porter and Robotics Orbiter (ASTRO) servicing spacecraft. ASTRO will autonomously
conduct operations such as inspection, docking, and satellite pre-planned electronics up-
grade, refueling and reconfiguration. The demonstration spacecraft will be launched with a
companion satellite that it will service on-orbit. The long-term vision is a servicing space-
craft capable of accessing satellites at all orbital altitudes (LEO-to-GEO-to Lagrangian
points) and of performing significant plane changes, using ascent-change plane-descent ma-
neuvers, and/or aero-assisted maneuvers.
Research is also underway on other important concepts such as on-orbit storage space-
craft, methods for large-scale on-orbit storage and handling of liquid and/or gaseous con-
sumables, and required changes to serviced spacecraft operational status while servicing.
2.1.4 Previous Work on Unmanned Servicing Cost-Effectiveness
Although the development of on-orbit servicing enabling technologies is well underway, the
cost-effectiveness of the concept remains to be proven before the final development steps
can be taken. This has been the subject of several research projects, of which this section
summarizes a subjective sample.
The SMARD study
The spacecraft modular architecture design study (SMARD) [DCAJ97] has been an ex-
tensive research effort making significant steps in both servicing architecture design and
cost-effectiveness assessment.
In the area of design, the work categorized different levels of on-orbit servicing in terms
of spacecraft serviceability level. It showed that at least 30% of a spacecraft mass would
$http://www.darpa.mil/tto/programsfrm.html
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be readily serviceable, and that this percentage would increase if spacecraft were designed
in a modular fashion, with on-orbit servicing in mind. Taking the example of a specific
surveillance constellation, it suggested alternatives to the current spacecraft design to make
servicing possible. It finally developed a point design for a rendezvous and docking space-
craft tailored to service the baseline constellation, and a concept of servicing operations.
One of the most interesting aspects of this design is that functional replacement is preferred
over physical replacement: failed components are not removed but simply unplugged from
the main spacecraft data bus. This simplifies the task of the servicer vehicle significantly.
This design was detailed enough to make a bottoms-up cost estimate possible. Combined
with a Monte-Carlo simulation of the performance of the constellation for various servicing
scenarios (scheduled / unscheduled), this estimate yielded reliable cost-effectiveness results.
It showed that the proposed architecture could be up to 38% less expensive than satellite
replacement for the baseline space mission.
Upgrading the GPS constellation
Two interesting companion studies published in 1999 addressed the question of autonomous
on-orbit servicing for upgrading the satellites of the global positioning system (GPS): one
considered the necessary structural modifications on the satellites themselves [HP99], and
will be discussed in section 2.2. The other presented a trade study for the best servicing
architecture [LWKM99],[LW99].
The goal of the latter work was to determine if the GPS Joint Program Office (JPO)
should view a satellite management system of on-orbit servicing as an alternative to its
current system of phased upgrade through replacement. The authors elaborated a large
two-dimensional trade space of design choices based on existing technology. The first di-
mension described possible on-orbit servicing architectures in terms of servicer capacity (de-
livered mass), capability (number of satellites serviced), design life, and propulsion scheme.
The second dimension consisted of maintenance strategies varying in time and space. The
authors chose a representative sub-set of thirty alternatives from this trade matrix and
compared them in terms of cost and value.
The cost was estimated by basing each servicer on a scaled version of an existing
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bottoms-up design and using the NASA/Air Force Cost Model'96 (NAFCOM'96) . The
value was expressed in terms of what is usually called a utility metric. It was developed
using decision analysis (DA) methods in close relationship with the actual GPS decision
makers. The value of each architecture was a linear combination of scores along the main
areas of concern for the decision maker: life cycle costs (recurring, non-recurring), perfor-
mance (availability, flexibility) and program viability (shareability, implementability).
This value does not account for the flexibility during the mission lifetime in a direct way.
The score for flexibility is made up of three scores dealing with how important the decision
makers deems the cycle time, the upgrade frequency and the mass capacity of an servicing
scheme. Such a value model is a good, general way of modeling the perception of flexibility
a decision maker has at the start of a mission; however, it does not account directly for the
options that will be available to decision makers after the system is operational.
The thesis concluded on six best alternatives, all comprising one servicer spacecraft per
plane, with high to medium capability and capacity, and long design lives. These would
deliver orbital replacement units (ORUs) carrying 150 kg to 30 kg of payload, four times
over a period of 15 years; the total cost of these four servicing mission would amount to
around $300 M. Although these alternatives would cost more that the baseline maintenance
scheme of staged upgrade, they would also score higher on the chosen value metric, due to
their reduced time to upgrade or repair; and they are an order of magnitude cheaper than
the "brute force" method of lumped replacement for upgrade.
In addition to research about on-orbit servicing design solutions, another main contri-
bution of this work has been to recognize the advantage of on-orbit servicing for upgrading
satellites, as a means of solving the conflict between the trend towards longer lifetimes and
the need for flexibility to technology development. Stressing the importance of flexibility,
the authors even mention the possibility to have satellite platforms in space: the upgrade
capability would "make it possible to market their satellites as platforms for customers
other than their traditional ones".
5As most existing cost models, this model is based on a historical database of satellite costs.
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Cost Penalty to Design for a Given Lifetime
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Figure 2-1: Cost Penalty to Design for a Given Lifetime. Adapted from [SHN01]
2.2 Impact of Serviceability on Satellite Design
2.2.1 Cost to Design for a Given Design Lifetime
One of the advantages of on-orbit servicing is to make a new trade between spacecraft design
lifetime and maintenance costs possible, as mentioned in introduction and illustrated on
figure 1-2. Before being able to quantify this trade, an analysis of the relationship between
design lifetime and spacecraft cost is required.
Saleh & al [SHN01] carried out the exploration of this relationship by systematically
estimating the impact of the design lifetime requirement on each spacecraft subsystem.
The main direct effects of a longer design lifetime requirement are: design margins on solar
arrays to outweigh the expected degradation, additional batteries to account for a capacity
that decreases with number of cycles, increased electronics redundancy to achieve the same
reliability at end of life, and additional fuel mass for station keeping. Indirect impacts on the
structures, thermal, and propulsion subsystems only multiply the resulting mass increase.
Using standard cost models, this mass increase can be translated into a cost penalty.
For parameters typical of current spacecraft design practices, the final results indicate
a cost than increases almost linearly with design lifetime, as illustrated by figure 2-1. For
example, designing for 15 years instead of 3 years results in a 35% cost penalty. But the cost
is not proportional to lifetime, so that the cost per operational day decreases with required
29
design lifetime. In the absence of any other design driver, this explains and justifies the
traditional approach of designing spacecraft for the longest possible time.
However, the authors note that other factors, such as technology obsolescence and mar-
ket dynamics, should be taken into account in the decision regarding the design lifetime
requirement. In addition, the cost-per-operational-day results would change if, instead of
implicitly assuming replacement, servicing for life extension was considered. This first es-
timation of the cost to design for a given lifetime will prove useful in our quantification of
the trade illustrated by figure 1-2.
2.2.2 Cost Penalty to Make Satellites Serviceable
The impacts of serviceability are not limited to the positive aspects of designing for a shorter
lifetime. Design changes would be required, at least for accessibility of the components.
Few papers have addressed the cost penalty to design a spacecraft for serviceability.
An interesting study by the Aerospace Corporation [HP99] concerned the necessary design
modifications to make the GPS satellites upgradable. Although this investigation was inde-
pendent of servicer architecture, it had to depend on the interface with the servicing system;
the assumption was that systems designed in [LW99] would be used. The study focused on
possible satellite upgrades through the addition of new components, which were assumed to
consist primarily of electronic boxes. It was therefore assumed that specific upgrade slots
would be added to the baseline design and launched empty, ready to receive any additional
module. Some thermal mass, data handling capacity and power would be added in the
initial design in order to allow for this upgrade.
The authors evaluated several design alternatives. For upgrades only, the best alterna-
tive appeared to be the addition of a separate compartment on top of the spacecraft. For
a combination of upgrades and repairs, a concept of replaceable panels on the spacecraft
sides offered more potential. The corresponding percentage mass penalties on the 1300-kg
baseline spacecraft are summarized in table 2.1.
According to this study, the mass penalty to design for upgrade through the addition of
new components is of the order of 10% of a spacecraft total mass. Since it would not require
any extra spacecraft compartment, designing for repairing and refurbishing should incur an
even smaller mass penalty. Furthermore, the penalties described above refer to modifying an
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Table 2.1: Average Mass Impact for Serviceability. Adapted from [HP991
Serviced Mass Added Power Mass Penalty
Upgrade 3.5% (50 kg) 125 W 9%
Upgrade 7% (100 kg) 250 W 15%
0 W 7%
Upgrade+Repair 7% 100 W 15%
0 W 12%
Upgrade 14% 500 W 25%
0 W 11%
existing design. If an infrastructure for on-orbit servicing of space systems were available,
spacecraft could be designed for serviceability in the first place. In addition, technologies
for increased modularity would be developed. The mass penalty for serviceability is likely to
be smaller in such a world than any study that uses the current spacecraft design paradigm
would estimate.
With the information available so far, it is therefore not unreasonable to assume that
the cost penalty to make a design serviceable is negligible compared to the cost penalty
to design for a longer lifetime. However, further research into the design of serviceable
spacecraft will be required before this assumption can be proven valid.
The previous sections set the technological stage for the thesis by depicting the current state
of research into technologies, designs and baseline cost impacts of on-orbit servicing. Before
exploring the cost-effectiveness of on-orbit servicing for space systems, we still need to set
the economic stage by investigating the current state of research into valuation methods.
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2.3 Estimating Value: Capital Budgeting Methods
This section reviews the three main families of methods to estimate project value: net
present value (NPV) calculation, decision tree analysis (DTA), which is becoming popular
among space managers, and the relatively new field of real options theory, which to the
author's knowledge has not yet been directly applied to space systems.
In order to fully capture the differences between these three approaches and how they
address the valuation problems relevant to space missions, this section will consistently
apply them to the simple following example:
A stock has the current value S = $ 200 and its price after one period is un-
certain: it can either go up to $400 = uS or down to $ 100 = dS (where we
implicitly assumed u = 11d = 2). Shareholder A ("the seller") holds one stock
and gives shareholder B ("the buyer") the option, but not the obligation, to ac-
quire this stock after one period for the set exercise price E = $200. What is
the value of this option? In other words, what price for the option are A and B
likely to agree upon?
Note that this case is analogous to a service-or-abandon real option, where S would be the
uncertain expected revenues from the market after the possible date of servicing, and E
would an agreed-upon servicing price.
2.3.1 Traditional Method: Net Present Value
The traditional method for capital budgeting has been to calculate the net present value
(NPV), which is the sum of future discounted cash flows (expenses and revenues). This
method is still the most widely used to evaluate and compare space mission architectures
[WL99]. An NPV calculation assumes that a fixed sequence of cash flows will be followed,
and accounts for the time value of money by weighting them with a fixed discount factor.
If for example, a yearly rate d is used to discount a discrete sequence of cash flows Ci over
N periods, the net present value is:
N
NPV(N) - .d (2.1)(1 + d)i
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For cash flow rates that are continuous in time, this translates into:
T
NPV(T) = C(t) e-rt dt (2.2)
0
where the equivalence of the formulas is ensured if r = ln(1 + d).
Example of net present value calculation Let us look at our example from an NPV
point of view. Traditional valuation would consider that the stock will be bought whatever
its value. The NPV of buying the stock would therefore be:
uS-E dS-ENPV = p 
- +(1-p)1+ r1+1:r
where p is the probability that the stock price goes up, and ^r is the estimated discount rate
over one period. The NPV of not buying the stock would be zero.
Taking for example p = 1/4 and r = 0, we would have:
NPV={x200+Ax-100=$ -25
From an NPV point of view, deciding to buy the stock is not interesting, and the option
would be discarded from the start.
Advantages of Net Present Value
A great advantage of NPV is that it can be easily generalized to non-monetary values.
The goal of a space mission is not always to earn revenues; the case is obvious for
scientific as well as military space missions. Instead of being compared to the revenues, the
costs of the mission are therefore weighted against what is often called a mission utility of
a Function. Utility describes the metric of performance that is of prime interest to mission
decision makers. For an imaging mission for example, this could be the total number of
images taken during the mission lifetime that meet a certain resolution requirement.
The approach of NPV calculations, which is to make a best estimate of future benefits
and sum them up, can be directly generalized to such value metrics, and has been in the
past. We will refer to this type of generalization as traditional valuation. A good example is
the GINA methodology [Sha99], which proposes a Cost per Function CPF = C/F metric.
33
Whenever there is uncertainty about a future cash flow, the expected value of the NPV
E{NPV} is usually considered. This same approach is easy to generalize for a cost per
function metric, where either E{C}/E{F} or E{C/F} are directly available to calculation.
Shortcomings of Net Present Value
If there is little uncertainty about the future, a net present value calculation is a valid method
to capture the value of the project. In the presence of uncertainty however, traditional
valuation lacks accuracy for two main reasons: its does not account for flexibility, and it is
faced with uncertainty in the discount rate.
The main downside of traditional valuation is its failure to account for the flexibility in
managerial decisions. In the real world managers do not actually have to set their decisions
for years ahead, but can instead adapt future decisions to future conditions. Therefore
cash flows are not fixed, but will depend on the resolution of some uncertain parameter(s).
Some negative cash flows will be avoided, while some good opportunities will be seized. Net
present value calculations underestimate the value of this managerial flexibility, compara-
tively giving too much importance to less flexible projects.
What about the appropriate discount rate to account for the time value of money? A
sum of money earned today can be placed in Treasury bonds, which are guaranteed to offer
appreciation at the risk-free interest rate r, so that after T years the initial sum C would
be worth erT C. Receiving the money later can be interesting only if it has an internal
rate of return at least equal to r, in other words its value is growing at a rate faster than
r. Symmetrically, paying an amount sooner is interesting only if its internal rate of return
exceeds r. The appropriate discount rate, defined as the one that captures the value that
people attach to time, is therefore exactly r.
Consider now the opportunity to invest in a project which is risky, i.e. that offers no
guarantees on its expected revenues. If the expected return a on the project equals the risk-
free interest rate, then it is more interesting to invest directly in Treasury bonds, since they
are risk-less. Therefore the project is worthwhile only if is offers a risk premium p = a - r
that outweighs its risk.
Thus whenever there is uncertainty, the appropriate discount rate a = r +p depends on
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the level of project risk. Risk is a function of external uncertainty as well as the internal
ways to react to this uncertainty. It is not only difficult to estimate, but also varying with
time. Whenever the conclusions drawn from a net present value calculation depend on the
discount rate that was used, they should therefore be taken cautiously.
2.3.2 Accounting for Managerial Flexibility: Decision Tree Analysis
Exercise /
Service ? YES|
uS - E = $ 200
u = 400 E = $ 200
Stock price/ p NO $0M
Market level
S = $ 200 Exercise /
1-p Service ? dS - E = $ - 100
E = $ 200
d S = $ 100 44 $0M
Figure 2-2: Example for Comparison of Net Present Value (NPV), Decision Tree Analysis
(DTA) and Real Options Theory
Decision tree analysis (DTA) is a tool to describe a sequence of decisions that are not
set from the start but can depend on the resolution of some uncertain parameter(s). Figure
2-2 is the simplest possible example of a decision tree. DTA takes flexibility into account
by using the following concepts:
Event nodes are used to represent future events that have an uncertain outcome. In the
lifetime of a mission, there can be several such events. In our example, the event is
the evolution of the stock price and the event node is represented by a circle.
States of nature represent all the possible outcomes of an event. In our example, each po-
tential future value of the stock is a state of nature. They are represented by branches
shooting up from the event node. Decision tree analysis attributes a probability to
each possible state of nature after each event node.
Decision nodes represent the times in the lifetime of the mission when a decision can be
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taken. Alternative decisions shoot up as branches from the decision node. In our
example, the two possible decisions are to buy or not buy the stock and the decision
node is represented by a square.
Decision analysis tree is the term used to describe the structure built up from decision
and event nodes and all their associated branches. Time flows in the tree from left to
right.
Decision path is the term used to define one particular sequence of decisions and states
of nature going from the origin of the tree to one of its possible ends. Summing the
cash flows (or the utility function) along one decision path determines the outcome of
this path. In our example, a decision path could be: the stock goes down and B buys
the stock (outcome +$100-$200 = -$100); there are four decision paths in this tree.
Backwards valuation The valuation starts from the outcome of each path and moves
backwards into the tree. Combining the outcome with the probability of the states
of natures gives the expected value of each decision at the last decision nodes. Only
the decision with the highest value is considered at each node, and taken as the new
outcome to continue moving backwards into the tree up to the initial decision or event.
The value thus yielded is often called the expanded net present value (eNPV).
Example of DTA calculation DTA takes the flexibility of decision maker B into account
by adding the cash flows that actually correspond to the optimal decision for every possible
evolution of the stock price, as illustrated on figure 2-2. The value of the option under these
conditions becomes:
max(uS - E, 0) + (1 - ) max(dS - E, 0) (2.4)
VDT = 1 + (1 - p+ i-dDAP +r 1+r~
which under the same numerical assumptions as above (^r = 0, p = 1/4) gives:
VDTA = - x 200 + 1 x 0 = $ 50
This shows that a flexible decision maker would actually find the option so interesting that
she would be ready to pay as much as VDTA = $50 for it.
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The difference between NPV and VDTA can be interpreted as the value FDTA of the
flexibility in having the right, but no obligation to exercise the option:
FDTA = x (200 - 200) + 1 x (0 - (-100)) = $ 75
Advantages of Decision Tree Analysis
Similarly to net present value, decision tree analysis is easily generalizable to situations in
which value is not monetary. DTA is actually a part of the Decision Analysis framework,
which is also active in developing Utility function approaches. This makes the method
particularly suited for space missions.
But unlike NPV, DTA considers only the optimal decision after each possible state of
nature. Thus, it takes into account the possibility to adapt future decisions to the unfolding
of uncertain parameters, which solves the main shortcoming of traditional valuation.
Shortcomings of Decision Tree Analysis
However, this valuation of flexibility is limited. For DTA to remain practical, there must
be a finite number of decision nodes, occurring at set decision times. Thus DTA cannot
account for continuous flexibility such as on-demand servicing. Similarly, there must be a
finite number of possible states of nature after each event node. Thus, DTA cannot account
for uncertain parameters that can take values in a continuous interval, such as market
demand.
In addition, DTA does not solve the problem of the discount rate faced by NPV. On our
example, table 2.2 shows that both NPV and DTA are a strong function of the probability
p that the stock goes up, and therefore a strong function of the investment risk. This effect
should however be counteracted by the use of the appropriate discount rate. The more
likely the stock price is to go up (which increases the option value), the riskier it is to by an
option instead of buying the stock today, and therefore the higher the appropriate discount
rate (which decreases the option value).
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Table 2.2: Results of Net Present Value, Decision Tree Analysis and Arbitrage Pricing
Theory on a Simple Numerical Example
Case bigtrisngleright r = 0 r = 0 r =10% r = 10%
MethodV p=1/4 [p=1/2 p =l1/4 p= 1/2
NPV $ -25 $50 $ -22.73 $45.45
DTA $50 $ 100 $45.45 $90.91
APT $ 66.67 $ 66.67 $ 72.73 $ 72.73
2.3.3 A Leap Forward in Valuing Active Management under Uncertainty:
Real Options Theory
Real options theory is the only method that solves the problem of the discount rate. Its
principle is to extend the results from financial options theory to capital budgeting for real
assets. Options pricing has been building on an initial seminal paper by Black & Scholes
[BS73] about the exact situation we describe in our example. The first sentence of their
abstract lays down the fundamental principle of option pricing:
'If options are correctly priced in the market, it should not be possible to make
sure profits by creating portfolios of long and short positions in options and their
underlying stocks.'
Example of option valuation
Options theory cannot be summarized in one paragraph, but some insight into options
pricing can be gained by directly applying the above principle to our example.
First consider the decision tree of figure 2-2, but with p = 1/2. Decision tree analysis
gives VDTA = $ 100. Assume A offers B the option for this price. Before accepting the
offer, B wants to make sure that there is no other investment she could make with the same
amount of money, that would have a greater pay-off. For example, she considers buying
N = 2/3 stocks of the underlying asset at S = $200 and borrowing from a bank the missing
money B = NS - VDTA = $33.33. At the end of the period, she could sell the stocks
for either N.uS (if the stock price goes up) or N.dS (if the stock price goes down) and
reimburse the amount (1 + r)B to the bank, where r is now the risk-free interest rate. For
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r = 0, the pay-off would be:
N.uS - (1 + r)(NS - VDTA) = $233.33 if stock goes up
N.dS - (1 + r)(NS - VDTA) = $66.67 if stock goes down
By buying the option instead of the stock, the pay-off would have been:
max(uS - E, 0) = $ 200 if stock goes up
max(dS - E, 0) = $ 0 if stock goes down
Therefore, spending VDTA to buy the option on the stock is actually less interesting than
investing in the stock directly, no matter what the future state of nature. Thus, VDTA does
not accurately represent the money that B would be willing to pay for the option. The
actual value, VAPT, should be smaller.
Similarly, now consider p = 1/4, and assume that B offers to buy the option from A for
the price VDTA = $50. Instead, A could sell N = 2/3 stocks, and place the money difference
B = VDTA - N.S in a bank. After one period, A would buy the stocks and retrieve from
the bank the amount (1 + r)B so that his pay-off would be:
-N.uS + (1 + r)(NS - VDTA) = $ - 183.33 if stock goes up
-N.dS + (1 + r)(NS - VDTA) = $16.67 if stock goes down
By selling the option, A would have had to pay to B:
-max(uS - E, 0) = $ - 200 if stock goes up
-max(dS - E, 0) = $ 0 if stock goes down
Therefore, getting the amount VDTA for selling an option on the stock is in this case less
interesting than investing in the stocks directly, no matter what the future state of nature.
Thus, VDTA does not accurately represent the money that A would be willing to receive for
the option. The actual value, VAPT, should be higher.
From these two examples, we can infer that there must exist an equilibrium probability,
p, and an equilibrium option value, VAPT # VDTA, that make investing in the option
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equivalent to investing in the stock directly. In this equilibrium, the portfolio comprised of
N stocks and B = NS - VAPT in the bank has the same pay-off as the option, no matter
what the future state of nature. Therefore by hedging the portfolio against the option (i.e,
buy the equivalent of one portfolio when you sell one option, and vice-versa), you can create
a risk-free situation in which the payoffs are zero no matter what the state of nature . This
is what is called an arbitrage. The equilibrium value of the option given by this arbitrage
pricing theory (APT) is obtained by solving for (N, VAPT) the system:
N.uS - (1 + r)(NS -VAPT) = max(uS - E,0) if stock goes up (2.5)
N.dS - (1+r)(NS -VAPT) = max(dS - E,0) if stock goes down
which results in:
max(uS - E, 0) max(dS - E, 0)
VAPT = 1+r +(1- ) =+r -$66.67 (2.6)
where
(1 + r) - d
S= d 1/3 (2.7)
is called the risk-neutral probability. It is the probability value for which decision tree
analysis and arbitrage pricing yield the same option value.
Advantages of Real Options Theory
Similarly to DTA, real options theory considers only the optimal decision as a function of
the outcome of the uncertain parameter(s), thus taking flexibility into account. In addition,
options theory was initially developed for stock markets, which are continuous both in
time and in possible values. Therefore it developed models that account for continuous
probability density functions, as well as for continuous decision making.
Furthermore, real options valuation uses risk-neutral equivalent probabilities. This
makes results independent of the risk level p, as shown by the numerical example in ta-
ble 2.2. This allows to discount money at the risk-free interest rate r, which is usually
available to observation and reasonably constant with time. Thus, there is no need for
modeling the appropriate discount rate, which can actually be considered as a by-product
of the valuation.
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Shortcomings of Real Options Theory
Real options theory has never yet been used directly outside of the commercial world. One
of its baseline assumptions is that the goal of every company is to increase the wealth of its
shareholders. It has therefore never been interested in capturing non-monetary values.
Furthermore, real options theory applies the principles of options pricing to real in-
vestment situations. As we saw on the example, option pricing solves the problem of the
discount rate by carrying out calculations using risk-neutral probabilities. This relies on
the possibility to create risk-free, hedging portfolios of the option and its associated stock.
In order to apply options pricing methods to real situations, there must therefore exist
what is called a twin security, whose behavior on the stock mimics the value of the un-
derlying investment. Thus, real options theory cannot be directly applied to all kinds of
investment-making situations, in particular not to most space missions.
Chapter 4 is an attempt at developing a framework that applies decision tree analysis to
space systems while capturing some of the advantages of real options theory.
2.3.4 Problem of the Discount Rate
A Measure of Risk-Aversion: The Capital Asset Pricing Method
There is no easy way to determine the discount rate given the risk on a project. But under
certain simplifying assumptions, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) [Mer73] can give
an indication. According to the CAPM, if the risk associated with a project is independent
on the overall risk of the market, then investors can "diversify away" this risk by investing
in many different projects. Investors will only ask a risk premium for the part of the risk
that cannot be diversified away, which is the part that is correlated to the overall market.
The risk premium p is therefore given by:
p = (E{rm} - r) ,3 (2.8)
where E(rm) is the expected return on the market, and r the risk-free interest rate. The
"beta" # of the project is a metric commonly used by economists. It represents the sen-
sitivity of the project's returns to the market's returns and can usually be evaluated by
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performing least-squares regression on historical data.
cov(a, rm) (2.9)
oam
where a is the rate of return on the project and -m the variance of the market returns.
This risk premium can also be written:
p = A cov(a, rm) (2.10)
where the market price of risk A is a function of the global market conditions only.
Generalizing the Real Options Theory Approach
As in decision analysis, in this thesis we want to determine the optimum decision path as
a function of certain uncertain outcomes, and calculate a modified net present value given
the probability of each outcome. But we also want to capitalize on the notion of continuous
probability distribution for the uncertain parameter and solve as far as possible the discount
rate problem. The assumption of close link to the stock exchange is not valid for most space
systems, so that we cannot use the results of real options theory directly. Furthermore, we
would like to define non-monetary values. The framework we will propose in chapter 4 can
be seen as a generalization of the real options theory approach for space systems. It is in
essence equivalent to a decision tree analysis with an infinite number of branches and two
distinct treatments of the discount rate as described below.
Risk-neutral investors are investors that do not require a risk premium, such as govern-
mental agencies. All costs for government projects can therefore be discounted at the
risk-free interest rate r.
Risk-averse investors are investors that do require a risk premium, such as private in-
vestors. For commercial projects, we will therefore use two discount rates.
" Costs and revenues that are certain can still be discounted at the risk-free interest
rate r.
" Costs and revenues that are uncertain require a risk-premium assumed to verify
the CAPM given by equation 2.8. This requires to make an estimate of the # of
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the project on the one hand, and of the global trends of the market E(rm) - r
on the other hand. This also assumes that these values are constant over the
time frame of the mission; though clearly a bad approximation, this is at least
an improvement over discounting everything at the rate r. We will describe
uncertain costs and revenues by their total rate of return a = ap - p, where a, is
the expected rate of appreciation (for example, the expected market growth rate).
This artifact embeds the risk premium into the growth rate of the parameter. It
can then be discounted at the risk-free interest rate r, so that some results of
real options theory can remain valid.
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Chapter 3
Cost-Effectiveness of On-Orbit
Servicing: A Traditional Approach
Few studies have quantitatively addressed the costs and benefits of on-orbit servicing. Sav-
ings of up to 40% have been asserted. This was insufficient to outweigh the perceived cost
and performance uncertainty for on-orbit servicing, which is often considered a risky new
technology. Furthermore, most previous work has been focused on very specific case stud-
ies, so that no general conclusions about the cost-effectiveness of on-orbit servicing have yet
been drawn.
A solution to this problem would be to systematically explore a wide trade space of
servicing infrastructures and space missions, using cost models as a relative tool combined
with risk assessment, in search of servicing cost-effectiveness. In a limited time such an
approach could not reach the level of detail achieved by previous work. Only first order-
of-magnitude approximations would be made possible. But this could help identify the
conditions under which servicing makes the most sense, and the directions that would be
most interesting for future research to investigate. This chapter proposes to develop a
minimal model to make such an approach practical.
To this goal, section 3.1 sets up a general trade space of space missions and servicing
infrastructures, defines the minimum parameters necessary to describe a generic on-orbit
servicing situation, and proposes metrics for on-orbit servicing cost-effectiveness. Section
3.2 describes a minimal model to estimate these metrics on the trade space. Finally, section
3.3 illustrates the typical results that can be obtained by such an approach and concludes
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on its usefulness.
3.1 The Trade Space
The trade space is made up of mission types on the one hand, and maintenance types on the
other hand. It should be as large as possible so as to yield general results, but also detailed
enough to capture the main drivers for the optimal maintenance type. The ultimate goal
is to determine under what conditions the optimal servicing scheme is significantly more
cost-effective than a traditional maintenance type. Thus, we need a first-order-of-magnitude
model of the serviced and servicing missions that captures the most meaningful cost and
performance trends.
3.1.1 Missions
Possible Missions The potential customers for on-orbit servicing can be divided into
five main types of missions, which are summarized on figure 3-1:
A. A high value asset: servicing is the only alternative for maintenance of the Interna-
tional Space Station (ISS). For such a high value asset, manned servicing with the
Shuttle is clearly cheaper than replacement. It has also been the option chosen for
the Hubble Space Telescope, even though the total cost for the so-far three servicing
missions exceeded the initial spacecraft cost. These examples suggest that there may
be a minimum spacecraft cost over which on-orbit servicing is the optimal solution.
B. New missions: on-orbit servicing would make new types of space missions possible.
For example, refueling would enable satellites to become truly maneuverable; this
could help reduce the number of satellites in a radar constellation, as will be further
discussed in section 6.1. It is also a vital technology for replenishment of reactants in
a Space-Based Laser (SBL) system*.
C. A low-Earth orbit (LEO) constellation: for systems such as the Big-LEO commercial
communication systems, the high number of satellites can help amortize the non-
recurring cost of servicing.
*http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/sbl.htm
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Orbital regime
F. Multiple missions
Multiple in multiple planes
GEO D. One GEO
mission
A. One high B. New C. LEO
LEO value asset missions constellation
~..Number
Small Large ofsatellites
Figure 3-1: Trade Space Part I: Types of Missions
D. One geostationary orbit (GEO) mission: for GEO systems, not only is replacement
very expensive, but the required satellite availability is often very high. For example,
operators of GEO communication satellites are concerned about the potential loss of
market share after any down-time. Servicing would offer a new alternative to trade
availability versus cost.
E. The whole ring of GEO satellites: geostationary satellites are very numerous into
the same orbital plane and at the same altitude. Thus, not only could their number
help amortize the non-recurring servicing costs as for the LEO constellation. The
incremental velocity to maneuver between all of them would also be relatively low,
which would make servicer vehicles even cheaper.
F. Several missions in several orbital planes: the cost to develop an infrastructure for
on-orbit servicing is likely to be much more expensive that what a single space mission
could afford. It may be that on-orbit servicing becomes cost-effective only on a big
scale, when each mission pays only the marginal cost of servicing. This situation has
been compared to the national highway system in the United States, which could
never have been developed by a single citizen or company [HLWS01].
Model of a Mission The wider the trade space, the more limited the level of detail
that can be achieved in describing each mission. A minimum set of parameters is however
necessary to yield meaningful results about the cost-effectiveness of servicing; at least the
baseline cost and performance of the mission must be evaluated.
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Figure 3-2: Trade Space Part II: Types of Maintenance Infrastructures
Important factors for cost at the constellation level include the number of orbital planes
(Np), the number of satellites per plane (Npp), the orbital altitude (ao) and inclination
(io), plus the development (CD) and yearly operations (op) costs. At the satellite level,
the serviceable part (subscript C for cargo) must be distinguished from the non-serviceable
part (subscript N). For each part we consider the failure rate ( AC, AN) or the mean time to
failure (TC = 1/Ac ,TN = 1/AN), the mass (MC, MN), and the production cost (Cc, CN).
Mission performance depends on the probability that the minimum mission requirements
are met. In order to evaluate it, at least the required number of operational satellites per
plane (N,,pp) must be known.
Finally, the impact of serviceability must be captured. In the rest of this chapter, we as-
sume that all satellites are attitude-stabilized and carry either passive or active autonomous
rendezvous and capture (AR&C) equipment. Whenever existing satellites are considered,
this equipment must be added to their payload cost and mass.
3.1.2 Infrastructures
Changing orbital planes in Earth orbit requires a high incremental velocity. The majority of
the reasonable servicing infrastructure designs can therefore be captured by restricting the
trade space to launching servicing material separately into each serviceable orbital plane.
Two types of parameters are necessary to describe a maintenance (replacing or servicing)
infrastructure. The first type consists of parameters that are uncertain today, but would
be set if the technologies for on-orbit servicing were available. It includes production and
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launch rates, maximum time allowed for a maneuver (A/Tmax), probability to crash when
attempting an AR&C maneuver (PC), and minimum servicer dry mass (Mo, corresponding
to the AR&C payload with the power and structures to support it). Parameters of the
second type describe the design choices for the maintenance infrastructure and are therefore
subject to optimization. Possible maintenance choices can be classified into five families as
summarized on figure 3-2:
1. Without on-orbit servicing, which is considered as the baseline, satellites are re-
placed if they fail, run out of fuel, or need an upgrade. The number of spares kept
on the ground or on orbit, and the level of redundancy carried on-board, are sub-
ject to optimization. The number of spares increases mission cost but also mission
availability. The level of redundancy increases initial cost but reduces replacement
costs.
2. Disposable servicer carrying all cargo corresponds to the minimal servicing capa-
bility. The orbital replacement units (ORUs) to be delivered are launched on board a
servicer vehicle with active AR&C capability. The servicer is disposed of after it has
delivered all its cargo. The potentials for optimization include the number of satellites
to visit with one servicer, the level of redundancy on the satellites, and the timing of
launches.
The last three families correspond to cases when ORUs can be stored in orbit. They can be
stored floating freely on their own, each carrying passive AR&C payload (depot); or they
can be attached on an orbiting structure (station). In both cases the depot/station altitude
(ai) is subject to optimization.
3. Satellites traveling to depot/station If equipped with active AR&C and maneuver
payload, the satellites can travel to the depot or station orbit to get serviced. Each
ORU must then be attitude-stabilized and carry passive AR&C payload, which can
represent a significant increase in mass and cost. This option has two further disad-
vantages. First, the down-time in mission availability while the satellites maneuver
to the station can be unacceptable. Second, capability for full maneuver and AR&C
on the satellites may not be available if they have failed or ran out of fuel.
4. Servicer roundtrips corresponds to the case when servicer spacecraft can be re-used
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by going to the depot/station and loading new cargo. They perform roundtrips from
the depot/station to the satellites orbits until they run out of fuel. Parameters for
trade include the total number of satellites to visit per servicer (N.P.), the number
of satellites to visit during each roundtrip (N), and the number of ORUs to keep on
orbit.
5. Refuelable servicer is the same as 4 except that the servicer vehicles can be refueled
at the station. This implies at least launching fuel tanks with passive AR&C payload.
A new parameter for trade is the number of roundtrips that each servicer performs
before being refueled (L).
Though they amortize the cost of a servicer over a longer lifetime, options 3-5 are
also more risky. They indeed increase the number of autonomous rendezvous and capture
maneuvers that are performed by each servicer. In practice, there will be many possible
failure modes for a servicing operation, with various degrees of severity. For example, several
AR&C attempts may be necessary before successful docking; this could push the servicing
time over the required time, but would have no catastrophic consequence. But a failure
could also consist of a crash between a servicer vehicle and a satellite, potentially leading to
a complete loss of both spacecraft. Whatever the exact risk of the various servicing tasks,
increasing the number of AR&C performed by each servicer increases the probability that
something can go wrong, and thus decreases the servicer availability.
In the rest of this thesis, servicing risk will be described by only one failure mode: crash
with total loss of the two spacecraft, having a constant probability PC to occur at each
AR&C attempt. This is the most that can be done before more technological data becomes
available.
On-Demand versus Scheduled Each of the schemes 1 to 5 can be carried out either on
an on-demand or on a scheduled basis. In the scheduled case, a maintenance period (Ts )
is defined. This method is well suited to service components with quasi-deterministic time
to failure, such as fuel tanks for station keeping. In the on-demand case, components are
serviced as they fail. This is well suited to components with a probabilistic time to failure.
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Figure 3-3: Trade Space Matrix Summary
3.1.3 Metrics for Cost-Effectiveness
The Generalized Information Network Analysis [Sha99]
The Generalized Information Network Analysis (GINA) methodology was proposed by Shaw
& al [SMH01] as meaningful tool to evaluate space mission cost-effectiveness. It relies on
the premise that most satellite systems can be represented as information transfer networks.
Their quality of service is measured by four capability metrics:
Isolation characterizes the system's ability to isolate and identify the informa-
tion signals from different sources within the field or regard.
Information rate measures the rate at which the system transfers informa-
tion between the sources and the sinks. This is most familiarly associated
with the data rate for communication systems. The revisit rate is the
corresponding parameter for imaging systems.
Integrity characterizes the probability of making an error in the interpretation
of an information symbol based on noisy observations. For communica-
tions, the integrity is measured by the bit error rate. The integrity of a
surveillance radar system is a combination of the probability of a missed
detection and the probability of a false alarm.
51
Availability is the instantaneous probability that information symbols are be-
ing transferred through the network between known and identified origin-
destination (0-D) pairs at a given rate and integrity. It is a measure of
the mean and variance of the other capability parameters, not a statement
about component reliabilities.
The Cost-per-Function Alternative architectures designed to meet the same mission
requirements are compared by means of a Cost-per-Function (CPF) metric. The CPF
amortizes the total lifetime cost over all satisfied users of the system during its life. The
total lifetime costs include costs to initial operating capability (IOC) as well as operation
costs and expected failure compensation costs. The Function is the expected total number
of times the system will meet the minimum user requirements, expressed in terms of the
four capability metrics. The CPF is therefore a meaningful quantitative measure of cost-
effectiveness.
GINA has been successfully used to analyze the personal communication systems of Irid-
ium, Globalstar and ICO; the broadband systems of Spaceway, Astrolink, Cyberstar and
Teledesic; the Air Force TechSat 21 space based radar experiment and the NASA Terri-
torial Planet Finder (TPF) system based around interferometry from separated spacecraft
[JMSOO].
Servicing Cost-effectiveness
A servicing mission is not an information transfer network in itself. It is rather a mass
transfer network. However, the final goal of the mass delivery is to enhance the capabilities
of the serviced mission. Therefore on-orbit servicing of an information transfer network
is defined as cost-effective if it reduces its Cost-per-Function compared to a traditional
approach. The major effects that servicing can have on the CPF are:
" A decrease in the initial cost because less redundancy (or smaller fuel tanks) can be
built into each satellite,
" A change in the failure compensation costs, which will not only include routine re-
placements and servicing, but also satellite and servicer replacement after potential
AR&C crashes,
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* A change in mission performance, because the probability to meet the requirements
depends on the failure compensation scheme. Through failure compensation costs and
mission performance, risk assessment is embedded in the mission Cost-per-Function.
Hypothesis
Given this definition of cost-effectiveness, a few hypotheses can serve as guides in the ex-
ploration of the design matrix summarized on figure 3-3:
HI. There is a minimum required incremental velocity per unit time over which it is cost-
effective to refuel a spacecraft.
H2. There is a minimum cost to initial operating capability over which is it cost-effective
to service a high-value asset.
H3. Limits can be drawn in a (serviceable part cost/ serviceable part mass) space as to
whether redundancy, replacement, or servicing is most cost-effective.
3.2 A Model to Evaluate Cost-Effectiveness on the Trade
Space
Testing these hypothesis requires a model to estimate the impacts of servicing on the various
components of mission cost and mission performance. This section proposes a general model
to capture the relevant first-order-of-magnitude effects.
3.2.1 Serviceable Spacecraft
Cost Savings from Repairing
One of the main advantages of a repairing capability is to decrease the initial spacecraft cost
by designing space systems for a shorter design life. The cost savings incurred by shortening
the required design life have been studied by Saleh & al [SHNO1], and summarized in section
2.2.1. A linear fit to their final result gives the cost to initial operating capability CIoc as
a function of the design life TD in the form:
C0oc = 1+ , (TD - 3 T) (3.1)
C3
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A-±B means "A drives B up"
Figure 3-4: Feedback Effect Concerning Fuel Mass
where C3 is the cost to design for an arbitrary reference of 3 years and i ~ 2.75%/yr.
Cost Savings from Refueling
If a spacecraft can be refueled, it does not have to be designed for the total velocity increment
expected over its lifetime, but rather for the maximum total velocity increment between two
refueling operations. The corresponding cost savings may be greater than what is suggested
by [SHNO1] because of a feedback effect between the fuel mass and the propulsion system
dry mass. As illustrated on figure 3-4, the fuel mass is not proportional to the spacecraft
baseline dry mass as usually assumed in the literature. As fuel mass increases, the propulsion
system dry mass and the structures mass to carry it increase too. This increase in total dry
mass in turn increases the fuel mass.
This feedback loop is usually taken into account numerically on a case-by-case basis
by spacecraft designers. A simple mathematical description would not only be insightful,
but also very useful for the implementation of a general model. Let us consider what this
formula would be by making first-order-of-magnitude assumptions.
Mass budget as a function of design- AV Let us call design-AV and note AV the
maximum total incremental velocity a spacecraft's propulsion system is designed to provide
between two servicing operations.
Recalling the rocket equation (see for example [WL99]) the fuel mass a spacecraft has
to carry increases exponentially with its design-AV :
M e Vd
J dry 
- )(32
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where Mt, is the total spacecraft dry mass and Is, the specific impulse of its propulsion
system.
Increasing the fuel mass also increases the propulsion system dry mass. For a given type
of spacecraft design (a given type of fuel, a given shape of the fuel tank), the dry mass of
the propulsion system is roughly proportional to its fuel mass:
M" = f, Mfuel (3.3)
where f, can be called the propulsion dry mass factor.
Similarly, the structures mass can be taken to be roughly proportional to the total
spacecraft mass at launch: let us call structures mass factor and note fat the constant of
proportionality. Finally, if servicing is available, the spacecraft does not have to be launched
with all its fuel: let c be the fraction of the total fuel mass that is carried on the spacecraft
at launch. Then:
Mt = ft( Mry + e Mfuel) (3.4)
Combining equations 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 gives a linear equation for the total spacecraft dry
mass:
Md = Mdase + f Mfuel + fst fp Mfuel + fat E Muel
/ AVd
OtM = M base+(1+fp+fst fp+ffst) e 1 Mtotdtry dry dry
where Mbase is the baseline spacecraft dry mass without its propulsion system and the
structures to support it during launch.
Solving this equation shows that the total spacecraft dry and wet masses behave as the
following functions of the design-AV :
Mbase
M t dry
1 -(fp + fatfp + e ft) (e S ) 9
Mlaunch = Mj 1 + e e4 - ) ]
(3.5)
(3.6)
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FAA. Physical Upper Bound on A V (I = 320 s, f = 15%)
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Figure 3-5: Physical Upper Bound on Design-Incremental Velocity for f, = 15%, I,p = 320 s
A linear analysis would have given:
Mto -Mbase Nip
dry dry 1 + (fP + fstf, + E fat) (e -
Comparison with equation 3.5 shows that this is a valid approximation only when the dry
mass factors and the incremental velocity are very small: fat, f, << 1 and AVd << g Isp.
Upper bound on design- AV Equation 3.5 places a physical upper limit on the satellite
maneuverability:
AVma < Isp g ln [1 + (Efst + fp + fpfst) 1 ] (3.7)
Figure 3-5 plots this upper bound as a function the structures mass factor fst in the special
case f,, = 15% and I,, = 320 s (chemical propulsion). Wertz & Larson [WL99] show that
current design practices typically lead to fat ~ 20%. State-of-the-art technologies could give
f,t ~ 10%. In either case, figure 3-5 shows that launching the satellites dry (e = 0), and
refueling them after launch, increases their maximum maneuverability AVmax significantly.
This is due to the fact that any mass present at launch increases the structures mass required
to protect the spacecraft from launch stresses.
Design-AV as a function of design life Let us further explore how the above mass
budget changes when a spacecraft is made refuelable. A typical spacecraft AV-budget is
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Figure 3-6: Mass Savings from Refueling and Launching Dry for r = 3 yr, f, = f't = 15%,
A4Ts = 100 m/s, AVtk = 30 m/s/yr, and AVD = 200 m/s
made up of three components:
1. An incremental velocity for initial orbit insertion A14n,
2. An incremental velocity for regular station keeping, which can be described as a yearly
required AVtk,
3. And an incremental velocity for de-orbiting at end of life AVD.
If a spacecraft is designed for a lifetime TH without refueling, then its design-AV must be
AV = A~In + AVtk TH + AVD and it must launched carrying all its fuel, so that e = 1.
If on the other hand a spacecraft can be refueled every -r years, its design-AV is reduced to
AV = max (Alin,, A Vtk r, AVD). In addition, it could be launched without its fuel and
refueled right before final orbit insertion, so that e = 0.
Figure 3-6 shows the corresponding mass savings for numerical assumptions typical of
a satellite in low-Earth orbit (LEO). As the design lifetime increases, the fuel for station
keeping makes up a larger and larger fraction of the satellite mass, which makes refueling
more and more interesting. Even for design lives as short as 3 years, up to 20% of a
spacecraft mass can be saved by making it refuelable.
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3.2.2 Maneuver Modeling
Maneuver modeling is key to sizing the spacecraft that moves in the servicing process, be it
the serviceable satellite itself or a servicing spacecraft. Servicing maneuvers are of at least
four kinds as described below:
Changes in inclination Even if the servicing material is launched into the satellites
orbital plane, a slight difference in inclination (Ai) may have to be compensated for. The
corresponding incremental velocity for an impulsive burn is:
AVinc = 2 Vo sin (3.8)(2
where Vo is the orbital velocity at the satellite's altitude ao.
Transfers from an orbital altitude (ao) to another (ai) In order not to impinge
on the mission, the servicing material will be stored at a slightly different altitude. In the
case of impulsive burns, a simple Hohmann transfer can be used to maneuver between two
coplanar circular orbitst. Defining a = al/ao:
V 1 2 2a
A iVa 1 + a 1 (3.9)V ' 1 +0a 1 + ae
A Hohmann transfer is also used for de-orbiting any spacecraft at end of life, requiring an
incremental velocity AVD. In the case of a LEO satellite or servicer, the transfer brings the
spacecraft into an altitude at which it will quickly burn into the atmosphere (typically 150
km). A GEO satellite is instead boosted into a higher altitude, at which it will not impinge
on any future mission.
Phasing maneuvers within one orbital plane Circular phasing is useful for a servicer
to go from a satellite to the next. It can be performed by slightly raising the apogee
and waiting for the difference in period to cancel the difference in phase. The impulsive
incremental velocity for changing the phase by an angle # in less than a maximum allowed
tMore details are provided in appendix B.1.1
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time ATmax ist:
2
A =Vph = 2 2- 
- 1 (3.10)
V Kl -7027r
where 1 = Integer part of ATmax + -
To 27r
-1 if # > 0 and apocenter is raised
and c = 1 if 4 < 0 and pericenter is lowered
(0 otherwise
When the time allowed for the maneuver is much larger than an orbital period, then this
incremental velocity becomes inversely proportional to ATmax:
___ I TO _when To << ATmax (3.11)
Vo 27r ATmax
Fine maneuvers for the AR&C proximity and final phases These maneuvers are
made up of very small velocity increments, whose sum (AVf) depends on the AR&C control
algorithms. The higher the required AR&C reliability, the higher the necessary AVf. As
a first-order approximation, let us use a conservative AVf = 150 m/s and assume a high
AR&C reliability.
3.2.3 Servicing Infrastructure
Consider a servicer that has to visit Np, satellites at an altitude ao and has the capability
to load more cargo and to be refueled at an altitude a1 . This is the most general case as
defined in section 3.1. Instead of looking for the optimal maneuver scheme by numerical
simulation of all possible scenarios, this section proposes a mathematical representation
of the servicer mass budget as a function of its maneuver scheme. This will fasten the
exploration of the servicing trade space.
Servicer Maneuver Scheme For all infrastructure types but type 3, the servicer's ma-
neuver scheme can be described in terms of three integers (N, L, K).
IMore details are provided in appendix B.1.2
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Phasing
N satellites visited during each roundtrip
L roundtrips performed before refueling
Figure 3-7: Schematic of Servicer Maneuver Scheme
* N is the number of satellites that a servicer visits before loading more cargo. In the
most typical case, these satellites are equally spaced within the same orbital plane, so
that the maneuver from a satellite to the next always involves the same incremental
velocity: AVp = AVh + AVf. We call vp the normalized velocity increment required
to go from one satellite to the next:
_A Vh + AVfVp = A1 p + (3.12)
I, g
After visiting N satellites, the servicer returns to the station/depot altitude where it
loads more cargo, then maneuvers back to the constellation altitude to visit the next
N satellites. We call VH the normalized velocity increment required to go from the
servicer orbit to docking with one satellite. This is typically the same as the incre-
mental velocity to go from the satellites up to docking with cargo, and is performed
using a Hohmann transfer:
AVH + AVf (3.13)
I= p g
* L is the number of sets of N satellites a servicer visits before running out of fuel.
* K is the number of times a servicer is refueled to service N L more satellites. Thus
the total number of satellites per servicer is N,,, = N L K.
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Finally, VD is the normalized velocity increment to de-orbit:
VD = AVD (3.14)
Isp g
This maneuver scheme is reminded by figure 3-7.
Servicer mass budget The effective dry mass of a servicer decreases over time as it
delivers a mass MC to each satellite. Appendix B.2 shows that its fuel mass is a function of
its dry mass M vicer, the delivered mass Me, and the maneuver scheme (N, L) as follows:
Mservicer = A Mjsevicer + B MC (3.15)
f uel (3r15
where A = exp[L(N-1)vp+2LvH +vD-I
and B = exp[L(N -1)vp+2LvH - 1 (eNvp -1 vHN
exp [(N -1)vp+ 2vH -1 evP _ 1
Adding to the servicer minimum dry mass (Mo) the propulsion system dry mass and the
structural mass to carry the propulsion system and the cargo yields:
Mservicer = Mo + (fp + Efst + f, ) Mservicer + fstc N MC (3.16)dry Pft fuel (-6
where fstc is a structures mass factor corresponding to cargo mass (fstc > fst because
the cargo has to be moved for delivery). Solving the linear system given by the above
two equations gives the servicer dry mass as a function of its maneuvering scheme and its
specific impulse:
Mservicer - Mo + fstc N Mc + (fp + E fst + fstfp) B Mc (3.17)
dry 1-A(fp+efst+fstfp)
We note that this places a physical upper limit on the extent of the servicer maneuvers in
the form:
L (N - 1) AVp + 2L/AVH + AVD <Ispg ln 1 + fp + f st + fst 1,
Optimizing the servicing infrastructure The total number of servicer vehicles and
the dry mass of each servicer are the two main drivers of the total servicer cost. For a given
number of satellites per servicer Nsps, equation 3.17 makes it possible to find the servicer
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maneuver scheme that minimizes servicer dry mass. A cost model will be the tool to trade
this dry mass against the number of servicers Nerv = Nspp/Nsps = N8,,/NLK.
3.2.4 Markov Model
Random Failures Satellite failures that are not deterministic are usually modeled by a
failure rate A(t) such that probability Pf to be failed at t + dt is only a function of the
probability to be failed at t: Pf(t + dt) = Pf(t) + [1 - Pf(t)] A(t)dt. This is a Markov
process. Constellation performance, defined as the probability to meet the requirements as
a function of time, is therefore modeled in the GINA framework via a Markov matrix Am.
Am contains failure rates such that the vector of state probabilities (P) is described by:
P= AMP (3.18)
On-Demand Maintenance On-demand maintenance can be modeled by a repair rate
p such that the probability for a failed device to be repaired/replaced during t and t + dt is
pdt. If the failure rates and the repair rates are all constant, the system remains a Markov
process; the Markov matrix now contains both A's and p's.
Deterministic Failures Satellite failures that are quasi-deterministic, such as fuel con-
sumption for station keeping, cannot be modeled by a failure rate. We take these failures
into account by incorporating a change in the Markov model initial conditions at the ex-
pected date of failure.
Scheduled Maintenance A simple change in the initial conditions is not adequate for
scheduled maintenance because of two kinds of risks. First, the time of maintenance is not
perfectly deterministic; a repair rate is a simple way of modeling this uncertainty. Second,
there is a certain probability of failure (for example AR&C crash). A way to take both these
effects into account while keeping a Markov process is to multiply the number of states in
the model. If Nsched is the number of scheduled events, each state is divided into (1 +Nsched)
sub-states, going from never maintained until maintained Nched times. At each scheduled
time, the Markov matrix is changed to incorporate new repair rates for transition to the
next sub-state.
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Table 3.1: Markov Model Cases Summary
Probabilistic Occurrence Deterministic Occurrence
Failure Failure rate A Change in the conditions
appears in matrix at time of failure TF
Maintenance Repair rate y Repair rate y appears
appears in matrix at time of repair Tsched
Number of Failures The expected number of times that a system has to be "repaired"
(serviced or replaced) from a state k is simply:
TH
Nrep/serv,k = J yk Pk(t) dt (3.19)
0
where Pk(t) is the probability to be in the failed state k (result of the Markov model),
and pk is the repair rate from this state. This relation is valid for the expected number of
satellite replacements as well as for the expected number of servicing operations over the
mission lifetime TH.
Number of Satisfied Users The mission's Function is the result of the Markov model
on the one side and a market model for the information transfer network on the other side.
Let Mj(t) be the instantaneous number of satisfied users per unit time in the operational
state j. Then the Function is:
TH
Fn=Z P(t)Mj(t)dt (3.20)
S0
3.2.5 Cost Modeling
Three spacecraft cost models are publicly available: the unmanned spacecraft cost model
(USCM7), the small satellite cost model (SSCM8) and a rule-of-thumb industry model.
These models are based on cost-estimating relationships (CERs), which are equations relat-
ing cost to given design parameters. These relationships were derived from historical data.
Their validity is therefore limited to a range of application, and is not exact but associated
with a standard deviation.
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" The CERs for the unmanned spacecraft cost model 7th edition (USCM7) are repro-
duced in [WL99] (tables 20-4 and 20-5, p 795-796). For each spacecraft subsystem,
this model provides CERs for the theoretical first unit (TFU) cost, which represents
the recurring part, and for the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E)
cost, which represents the non-recurring part. The applicability ranges correspond to
the traditional way of designing satellites.
" The CERs for the small satellite cost model (SSCM8) are reproduced in [WL961. This
model is more suitable to small, lightweight spacecraft designed with an aggressive
cost-reducing approach. For convenience of use, each CER gives the total (recurring
plus non-recurring) costs as a function of only one or two design parameters; when
more parameters are known, the CERs can be combined to improve the accuracy of
the cost estimate.
" The rule-of-thumb (ROT) industry model is convenient when very little information
is available about the design. It relies on the premise that spacecraft dry mass is
the main cost driver. The theoretical first unit cost CTFU is simply proportional to
dry mass and the development costs scale with CTFU by a technological factor F. A
typical numerical scale is CTFUMdry = 77, 000 FYO0$/kg [GVH+97].
In the case of a servicer vehicle, the different subsystems fall into the applicability
ranges for different cost models. While the payload, communication, and power subsystems
correspond to SSCM8-type satellites, the propulsion and attitude control systems require
the use of USCM7. This is due to the fact that cost models are not valid for such a
spacecraft because it differs too much from the historical data that was used to derive
them. Figure 3-8 illustrates this problem. Since a bottoms-up cost estimate is not possible
when exploring a large trade space, the most that can be done to mitigate the problem
is to use a combination of the three cost models. The total standard deviation o- is then
obtained from the individual standard deviations according to:
I =(3.21)
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Figure 3-8: Comparison of 3 Cost Models for 4 Typical Servicer (MC = 200 kg)
An uncertainty OTRL = 25% linked to the low technology readiness level (TRL) of on-orbit
servicing must be added to the servicing cost uncertainty obtained from the cost models:
os = U2 + aTRL (3.22)
The total production costs are obtained from the TFU cost by applying a standard
learning curve factor:
Cp = NB CTFU (3.23)
ln (100%/S)
with B = 1- 2
where as recommended in [WL99], S = 95% when less than 10 units are produced, S = 90%
when the number of units produced is N E [10; 50], and S = 85% for more than 50 units.
Launch costs are minimized by a look-up-table method as a function of spacecraft mass,
number of spacecraft, number of orbital planes, and launching nation; (WL99], table 20-18
p 812 is used as reference.
The same first-order model of operations costs [BL96] is used for the serviced mission
and the servicing infrastructure. Operations for scheduled servicing are considered to occur
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Figure 3-9: LEO 66 Market Forecast as Adapted from [GVH+97 (1997)
within the year of the event only. For on-demand servicing, a minimal operations team is
considered to be constantly available.
Initial costs are spread to yield a funding profile ([WL99] equation 20-3), which is added
to yearly operations, replacement, and servicing costs. Total costs are finally discounted
to account for the time value of money and calculate the net present value of the total
expenses.
The model is now ready to be applied throughout the trade space matrix (figure 3-3).
Although several applications were considered, only one result will be analyzed here, chosen
for its representative features.
66
2002 2004 2006 2008
3.3 A Typical Result: LEO Constellation of Communication
Satellites
Problem Statement
Let us consider refueling a LEO communication mission, taking mission parameters on the
example of the Iridium constellation [FRGT98], hereafter called LEO66. As seen by decision
makers before the launch of the mission, the market was expected to grow quasi-linearly
as described in [GVH+97] and illustrated on figure 3-9. If the actual market had followed
this forecast, then it would have been interesting to extend the mission lifetime beyond its
initial requirement of 8 years.
Three design alternatives The goal of this case-study is to compare three design alter-
natives, all aimed at achieving an effective lifetime of 16 years:
1. Keep the baseline required lifetime of 8 years and replace the satellites after 8 years,
2. Keep the baseline required lifetime of 8 years and refuel the satellites after 8 years.
The non-recurring costs of building an on-orbit station are too high for only one
mission. The mission cannot afford to move the satellites to a depot because mission
availability is critical for market capture. The only choice is therefore infrastructure
type 2, where servicers are launched with their cargo into each orbital plane. The
refueling can be scheduled because fuel consumption is quasi-deterministic. The main
servicing design parameter is the number of satellites to be refueled by each servicer.
3. Design the spacecraft propulsion system for 16 years of operation. This increases the
cost to initial operating capability, but requires no scheduled maintenance.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 summarize the numerical assumptions.
Results in the Baseline Case
In the baseline case, the satellites propulsion requirements are dominated by the fuel to
de-orbit, which accounts for almost a third of their total mass. Servicing makes it possible
to do away with this weight by refueling at end of life.
The Cost-per-Function is here the lifetime cost per billable minute as defined in [GVH+97.
Figure 3-10 compares several servicing schemes with the two traditional alternatives; total
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Table 3.2: LE066 Constellation Assumptions
Parameter Description Name Value Source
Constellation altitude ao 780 km [FRGT98]
Satellite launch altitude aoo 650 km [FRGT98]
Number of orbital planes N, 6 [FRGT98]
Number of satellites per plane Nsy, 12 [FRGT98]
Sats per plane to meet the reqs Nnsp, 11 [FRGT98]
Satellite specific impulse Isps 320 s Chemical
Sat mean time to failure (MTTF) 1/A 9.18 yr [FRGT98]
Time to replace one satellite 1/p 3 months Spare available
Satellite development cost factor FS 4 State-of-the-art
Discount factor d 7% Observed
Ballistic coefficient BC 50 kg/m 2  Assumed
Table 3.3: LE066 Servicing Assumptions
Parameter Description Name Value Source
Probability to crash at AR&C PC 0.1% Parameter
Servicer specific impulse Ispo 320 s Chemical
Servicer launch altitude al 700 km Assumed
Error in servicer inclination Ai 10 Conservative
Time allowed for approach A Tmax 2 days Typical
Final approach time ATf 1 day Typical
Docked time ATdocked 1 day Typical
Final approach AV AVf 120 m/s Conservative
Attitude control AV A Vy, 30 m/s/yr Typical LEO
Servicer development cost factor F 6 New technology
Structures mass factor fst 0.1 Optimistic
Propulsion dry mass factor f, 0.1 Optimistic
Structures mass factor for cargo fstc 0.2 Estimated
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Figure 3-10: LE066: Baseline Case Costs
costs are indicated in place of Cost-per-Function because the Function adds up to almost
the same amount for all cases. The most striking result is the extent of the uncertainty
bars, which outweigh the cost differences; we will return to this issue. Without considering
uncertainty bars, the optimal servicing scheme appears to be 6 satellites per servicer, which
corresponds to two servicers per orbital plane). First suppose that we want to improve
flexibility, defined here as the ability to extend the mission life as a response to unexpected
market growth; then refueling after 8 years is hardly more cost-effective than replacing the
whole constellation. If 16 years was the initial desired lifetime, refueling is even less inter-
esting. The satellite's AV requirements are low enough that they can carry fuel for 16 years
without significantly increasing lifetime costs.
Allowing the parameters to vary and studying the response of the Cost-per-Function
indicates what are the key parameters for servicing cost effectiveness.
Most Relevant Sensitivities
Sensitivity to Nominal Failure Rate In the baseline case, the satellites failure rate
is so high that even with refueling, 75% of the constellation has to be replaced before end
of life. At lower failure rates, empty fuel tanks become the dominating reason for satellite
failure, increasing the relative advantage of refueling. Figure 3-11 illustrates the results for
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Figure 3-11: LE066: Costs for a Higher Reliability
four times the nominal satellites mean time to failure.
Sensitivity to altitude The lower the constellation altitude, the higher the AV, needed
to compensate for atmospheric drag. Under an altitude of around 400 km, it becomes
prohibitive to carry fuel for 16 years. The advantage of refueling thus increases as altitude
decreases, even though shorter refueling periods or bigger servicers become necessary. Figure
3-12 illustrates the results at an altitude of 400 km.
Sensitivity to AR&C Risk The cost-effectiveness of refueling is sensitive to the prob-
ability to crash when attempting AR&C. Increasing PC both decreases the mission perfor-
mance and increases its failure compensation costs. Figure 3-13 shows how for PC higher
than one percent, the mission performance, which is the probability that the minimum
number of satellites necessary to meet the requirements are available, drops below 70% just
after each refueling event. This is an unacceptable risk when market capture is at sake.
Conclusion
This example is typical of all the results that can be obtained with the model we proposed,
and that have been obtained by previous work on other special cases. Although situations
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can be found for which servicing proves cost-effective, the cost advantage always remains
smaller than the cost uncertainty. This uncertainty is made up of two parts: the uncertainty
in the constellation cost and the uncertainty in the servicing cost.
The uncertainty in the constellation cost arises from the standard deviation in the
CERs used. CERs are designed from historical data to model the way costs depend on
various design parameters. Their standard deviation reflects an uncertainty in absolute
cost, but the relative cost difference between various designs are usually well captured.
Thus cost uncertainty is only a minor limiting factor for the conclusions in terms of relative
constellation costs.
However, we saw that a servicer spacecraft would be very different from historical satel-
lites, so that cost models would not be directly applicable. Therefore, the uncertainty in
the servicing price is here an absolute limiting factor, which makes any definitive conclusion
about the cost-effectiveness of servicing impossible. This has also been one of the major
problems faced by previous work on on-orbit servicing.
It is however interesting to note that at least one conclusion can be drawn by considering
figure 3-10: if servicing were free, the lifetime costs for a serviceable design would be 10%
lower than for a 16-year design. Whatever the price of servicing, the potential cost savings
for this case cannot exceed this limit. This is an indication of the intrinsic value of servicing.
It suggests a new perspective on on-orbit servicing, which we will now explore in more detail.
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Chapter 4
A General Framework for the
Value of Servicing Under
Uncertainty
This chapter proposes a general framework that represents a new perspective on on-orbit
servicing for space systems.
Based on the issues faced by the traditional methods to study on-orbit servicing , sec-
tion 4.1 identifies the need for two major changes of approach as suggested by Saleh & al
[SLH01]. First, the value of servicing should be evaluated separately from its cost. Second,
a framework should be developed to account for the value of the flexibility provided by
on-orbit servicing.
Section 4.2 constitutes a first attempt at proposing such a framework. It lays out
fundamental principles for the valuation of flexibility, which will be used in the next chapters
to develop models for the value of servicing in various special cases.
4.1 Motivation and Approach
4.1.1 Model Motivation: Inadequacies of Previous Methods
Separating Servicing Value from Servicing Cost
In the common approach used by previous work and expanded in chapter 3, whether on-
orbit servicing proves more interesting that traditional methods is the result of a trade-off
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between two main effects that we may summarize as: the cost savings from servicing versus
the price the space mission is going to pay for servicing.
The cost savings from servicing depend mainly on the satellite design and the elements
to be serviced. For any given space mission, they can be estimated with reasonably good
accuracy. Using typical design assumptions and cost models based on historical data, their
order of magnitude can even be estimated on a large trade space of missions. For example,
we saw how Saleh & al [SHN01} estimated the cost penalty to design a typical spacecraft
for a given lifetime.
On the other hand, the price that a space mission will have to pay for servicing depends
on two factors that are both still very uncertain:
1. The cost of servicing depends not only on the cargo to be delivered to the satellites,
but also on the technologies, design choices and cost models assumed for the servicing
architecture. Servicing mass depends a lot on orbital dynamics and therefore on the
specifics of the constellation to service on the one hand, and on the specifics of the
servicing propulsion scheme on the other hand. Any conclusion can only apply to the
type of infrastructure that was assumed, not to on-orbit servicing in general. More-
over, chapter 3 showed that cost models are not adequate for such an infrastructure.
Therefore even these limited conclusions bear a very high uncertainty.
2. Furthermore, the price of servicing is not necessarily equal to its cost. The price
also depends on the development policy for the infrastructure: the cost of the whole
architecture could be paid by one space mission, or shared among several missions.
Even better, an infrastructure could be developed by a governmental organization, so
that only the marginal cost of servicing would be charged to individual space missions
[HLWSO1].
Estimating the cost savings from servicing separately from the servicing price would
therefore present several major advantages. From the conceptual viewpoint, it could serve
as a good indicator of the maximum price that a space mission would be willing to pay for
servicing. This would correspond to the intrinsic value of servicing, independently of the
servicing architecture. Missions for which servicing could make sense would be the ones for
which servicing value is significant compared to total mission value. Furthermore, it would
significantly reduce the uncertainty in the conclusions drawn.
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Since no infrastructure for on-orbit servicing exists yet, results which would give some
guidance as to what types of technologies to develop, what space missions to target as
potential customers, and what cost cap not to exceed, would be very valuable. This is the
type of results that can be obtained when studying the value of servicing separately from
its cost.
Accounting for the Flexibility Provided by On-Orbit Servicing
One of the main advantages of on-orbit servicing is that it gives decision makers options to
react to sources of uncertainty in the future.
The most obvious source of uncertainty consists of "random" failures; for example, a
satellite launched into the wrong orbit could be refueled to maneuver to its design-orbit; or
electronic components victim of single event upsets could be replaced. But another major
source of uncertainty is becoming more and more problematic. Spacecraft design lifetimes
are typically much longer than the time scales on which markets and technologies evolve.
By the time a spacecraft is launched, there is a fair probability that it will be obsolete or
not respond to any actual market. With on-orbit servicing, spacecraft could be designed
for shorter lifetimes with an option on life extension if market demand is high, and/or with
an upgrade option to avoid technological obsolescence. More generally, on-orbit servicing
provides decision makers with the option to modify their mission to respond to changes in
its requirements after the system has been fielded. This is a perfect example of flexibility
as defined by Saleh & al [SHOO].
Thus the price that a space mission would be willing to pay for servicing is greater than
the potential cost savings incurred if choosing servicing instead of replacing. It may even
be that a serviceable mission is more expensive in a strict sense, but provides the mission
with so much flexibility that it is more interesting than a traditional design. The value
of servicing should therefore account for the value of flexibility. This important advantage
of on-orbit servicing over traditional methods has never been quantified by previous work,
which relied on traditional valuation.
Building on decision tree analysis and real options theory, this chapter proposes a frame-
work to account for the value of flexibility in modeling the value of space missions faced
with external sources of uncertainty.
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Table 4.1: Examples of Options Available to Space Missions
Source of Option for Additional Option for
Uncertainty Traditional mission Serviceable mission
Operations cost Abandon
Random failures Replace Refuel, Repair
Market demand Abandon-or-replace Abandon-or-service
Technology Upload software Upgrade
Replace (e.g. computer)
New requirements New mission Modify
4.1.2 Example of Options Available to Space Missions
All space missions are at least flexible to some extent: the course of action for future
operations and maintenance is never perfectly set on the day the mission it launched. In a
way, the value of space missions has always been underestimated by not taking this flexibility
into account.
The option to abandon if operational costs turn out to be to high compared to mission
benefits is an example of option available to all space missions and that has been exercised in
the past. Recent examples include the Iridium constellation, which was abandoned because
its market turned out to be too low; or the NEAR (Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous)
spacecraft, which was abandoned though operational in order to save money. Section 5.2
studies the value of this option for the case of commercial missions.
The option to replace for life extension or after a random failure is another type of
option available to all space missions. This expensive option has been exercised for very
successful missions only, such as key scientific and military missions, or in-the-money geo-
stationary communication satellites. For missions with high uncertainty, the value of the
option to replace for life extension should be traded against the cost to design for a long
lifetime. This trade has rarely been performed in the past, because of the high cost of
replacing, but also the lack of a way to quantify flexibility.
The option to service for life extension would only be available to serviceable mis-
sions. Traditionally seen as an alternative to replacement, this option also offers an in-
teresting potential to trade spacecraft design life against flexibility. We will see in section
5.3 how this trade leads to short optimal design lives for commercial missions with highly
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uncertain markets.
The option to upgrade would be available to serviceable spacecraft to avoid technologi-
cal obsolescence and improve their performance with respect to their baseline requirements.
The same type of option is also often exercised by traditional systems when they upload
new software to their satellite. Another example is the periodic upgrade of the Hubble Space
Telescope's components.
The option to modify would make it possible for serviceable spacecraft to respond to
changes in their requirements. For a commercial mission, this could mean addressing new
markets, such as data communication instead of voice. For a military mission, an example
of an uncertain requirement is the location of the main theater of action; chapter 6 explores
this option.
4.2 Servicing as Providing Options for Space Missions under
Uncertainty
The next chapters will propose models to estimate the value of on-orbit servicing for different
types of missions (commercial, military), having different types of options (abandon, replace,
service, upgrade, modify) to react to different sources of uncertainty (market, requirements,
technology, random failures). These models all deal with the same abstract goal: estimate
the value of having options to react to the future resolution of uncertainty.
This section lays out fundamental principles that are common to any option valuation.
These underlying principles, which apply to real options theory as well as decision tree
analysis, can be seen as a general framework to embed the value of flexibility into the
estimation of space mission value.
4.2.1 Basic Elements of the Framework
This subsection defines the basic elements required to fully describe a situation where op-
tions are available to adapt to the resolution of uncertainty. These elements are the building
blocks of the framework. Their particular values and behaviors must be defined for each
case under study as the first step in the valuation process.
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Uncertain parameter X In a world of certainty, options have no value. Therefore the
cornerstone of any option valuation is modeling the uncertainty in the future states
of nature. At least one uncertain parameter is required, which can be modeled as an
instantaneous stochastic process X*. This is a generalization of decision tree analysis
to account for continuity in the possible states of nature. If several parameters are
uncertain, X can be taken to have several dimensions: X = (X 1 , ..., Xn).
The most fundamental assumption on this source of uncertainty is that it should be
external to the mission and not be affected by decisions taken after the system has
been fielded. This is a valid assumption when desiring to capture how the availabil-
ity of options reduces risk not by reducing uncertainty, but rather by affecting the
consequences that uncertainty has on the mission.
In the following, we will also assume that the uncertain parameter follows a Markov
process: the distribution of X at time t > to knowing the path X([O; to]) is only a
function of X(to); in other words, only the latest information about X is relevant.
We will note pt(xlxo) the probability density function of X at t knowing X(to) = xo.
The main reason for this assumption is that it greatly simplifies the valuation process
while allowing to capture some aspects of flexibility. It is reasonably valid for sources
of uncertainty such as market dynamics, military contingency location, or random
failures.
Mission horizon TH In order to evaluate alternative mission scenarios on a fair basis,
their costs and benefits should be compared over the same elapsed time [0; THI, where
TH will be called the mission horizon. For example, satellites can be designed for
lives shorter than the mission horizon, in which case they may have the option to
be serviced or replaced at the end of their design lifetime. This option must be
considered in order to fairly compare them with satellites designed for a lifetime equal
to the mission horizon.
The mission horizon must be long enough for the options to have a chance to be
exercised. It must also be short enough to represent what is actually of interest to
decision makers at t = 0.
*Appendix A has a few more details on stochastic processes
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Decision points Tk The valuation of options relies on the existence of decision points,
which are times in the future when decision makers will have the option to choose
between several alternative decisions. For example in the case of an option on life
extension, the first decision point would occur at the end of the design lifetime, then on
a periodic basis. In the case of on-demand servicing, decision makers have the option
to continuously revise their strategy. This can be captured by modeling decision
points as periodic with a very short period. It corresponds to a generalization of a
decision tree to account for continuity in the decision points.
The time To = 0 can be considered as the first decision point, at which there is a
choice between doing nothing or building and launching a space system. The decision
points are finally To, ...TN with 0 = To < Ti < ... < TN < TH. For each Tk let us call
the next period and note Tk the time to the next decision point:
Tk = Tk+1 - Tk
with the convention TN = TH - TN. For simplicity of notation, for any variable Y we
will note Yk the quantity of Y incurred during the kth period: Yk = Y[Ta;T+1
Modes of operation (m) At each decision point, alternative decisions can be represented
as several possible modes of operation as suggested by rigeorgis [Tri96). Typical
examples of modes of operation that could be available to space missions are: (0)
abandoned, (1) operational in its initial design, or (m) operational with modification
m. We will mark the value of any variable Y in mode of operation (m) by an up-
perscript: Y(m); the value of any variable linked to a switch from mode (n) to mode
(m) by Y(n-+m); and any variable linked to a history of successive modes of operation
(Mi1,m2, ... mn) by Y(m,m2 ... m.n)
Utility metric U The utility metric is a generalization of the notion of revenues encoun-
tered in real options for commercial missions. For ti < t 2 , U([ti; t 2]) is a measure of
the aggregated benefits from the mission over the time interval [t1 ; t 2]. These benefits
are not necessarily monetary.
In most non-commercial cases, there can be several choices for the utility metric. For
example, the benefits from a space-based radar mission could be the total number of
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kilometer squared protected, or the total time a given area has been protected. The
right choice should be the one that most describes what is of importance to decision
makers. It must be such that, among several architectural alternatives with the same
cost, decision makers would choose the one offering the highest utility function.
The utility metric can be a function of the uncertain parameter X; for example,
market returns are a function of market demand. In such a case, U is a stochastic
process.
Utility rate u For any meaningful model, mission benefits are an increasing function of
time. In any given state of the system, there is be an instantaneous utility rate u such
that u = dU/dt. If this utility rate depends only on the present state of the system,
then we can say that utility is time-additive, i.e. total utility is the sum of past and
future utility.
For example, the utility rate of a commercial mission would be its revenues per unit
time. For an information-disseminating network, it would be the number of satisfied
users per unit time. In both cases, the utility incurred over two years is the sum of
utility incurred over the first year and the utility incurred over the second year.
Matrix of switching costs C The cost metric is the sum of all the expenses associated
with the mission and its options. For ti < t 2 , C([ti; t 2]) is the present value of the
aggregated costs of the mission over the time interval [ti; t 2). Costs are always time-
additive. Certain cost components may be a function of the uncertain parameter X:
in such a case, C is a stochastic process.
Three types of costs are associated with any mission:
1. The initial cost to develop, produce and launch the space system. This cost is
commonly called cost to initial operating capability (IOC), and will therefore be
noted Cwoc. It is a function of the mission type, the design life of the system,
and the required reliability at end of life.
2. The cost to operate the system, which can often be represented by a constant
operations cost per unit time oM). In this case the present value at Tk of the
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cost to operate in mode (m) during the kth period is:
O(") = cd(rk, r)o() (4.1)
where we define the cumulative discount function cd by
Ir i f r= 0
cd(r, r) = (4.2)
(1 - e-") /r otherwise.
3. The present value Cs"~" of the costs to transition from mode (n) to mode (m).
These are the cost incurred at a given time when the current mode is (n) and
the decision to choose mode of operation (m) is made. Servicing and replacing
costs are typical examples. Note that deciding to remain in the same mode of
operation can also incur a cost, so that Cs(n-n) 0. For example, in order
to stay operational at the end of its design lifetime, a spacecraft needs to be
serviced. The fact that a certain mode (1) may not be accessible from mode (m)
is taken into account by setting Cs* = oo; for example, a mission cannot be
re-initiated once its spacecraft have been de-orbited.
We define the total switching cost C ,m) from mode (n) to mode (m) at a decision
point Tk as the sum of all costs incurred during the kth period after deciding to switch
to mode (m). This includes not only servicing costs, but also operations cost during
the next period. Thus:
Cn-m) Cs(n-m) + O(")
k kmk
The various switching costs from any mode of operation to any other mode of operation
make up a matrix of switching costs Ck = (Cm-n)
Note on discounting costs Two types of discount rates are necessary for the valuation
of non-financial options such as space systems, as was discussed in section 2.3:
* Costs and revenues that are not subject to uncertainty, or that mimic the behav-
ior of a twin-security that is traded on the stock exchange, can be discounted at
the risk-free interest rate r, but
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Table 4.2: Examples of Possible Value Functions
Commercial Military Scientific
Utility U Revenues Utility f" GINA Function
Mission value V U- C U/C U/C = 1/CPF
(U - C)/C max(U; C < cost cap) max(U; C < cost cap)
Source of uncertainty Revenues Requirements Funding
* Costs and revenues that are uncertain and not linked to a twin-security must be
described by a rate of return a' = r + 6.
Value metric V The value of a mission is a trade-off between its benefits and its costs:
V([ti; t 2]) = f {U([ti;t 2]), C([ti; t22)}
The value metric should be chosen such that among several alternatives, decision
makers would systematically choose the one that maximizes the future expected value.
Examples of possible value metrics are given in table 4.2. For a commercial mission,
value is often simply the difference between benefits and costs: V = U - C. For
information-disseminating missions (which includes communications, scientific and
most military missions), Shaw [Sha99] introduced the notion of Cost-per-Function
(CPF). Capitalizing on this framework, utility can be taken to be the same as Func-
tion, in other words the total number of satisfied users over the mission lifetime. Value
can then be the utility per cost: V = U/C = 1/CPF.
It is important to note that although costs and utility are time-additive, value is not
necessarily. This means in particular that unless f is linear, maximizing future value
is not equivalent to maximizing lifetime value t .
The relevant uncertain parameters and decision modes are the ones that can affect the
mission value. Therefore, value will always be a function of the uncertain parameter
X. Value is thus a stochastic process.
Decision model The decision model describes how the decision should be taken at a
tThe condition on the value function f for these goals to be equivalent is:
f(U1, C1) > f(U 2 , C 2 ) 4=> f (U + U1 , C + C1) > f(U + U2 , C + C 2 ) (4.3)
which is not met by f(U, C) = U/C
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decision point Tk as a function of the current mode of operation and the current state
of the uncertain parameter Xk = X(T). If the value metric has been correctly defined,
the decision will be to chose the mode of operation that maximizes future mission
value. Let us call EV4"k-m)(xk) the expected value of the mission after Tk knowing
the current mode (n) and the current state of the uncertain parameter x = X(Tk)
and assuming that mode of operation (m) is chosen:
EVnm) (x) = E V(n-m)([Tk; TH]I | X(T) =x
The cornerstone of the valuation process is to consider only the optimal decision at
each decision point. The optimal mode of operation rnk(n, x) at Tk is given by:
nk (n, x) : max EV4nm) (X) (4.4)
The total mission value that needs to be evaluated is:
V = EV 0 (xo)
4.2.2 Valuation Process Illustrated on a Simple Example
Once the building blocks described in the previous section have been properly defined, the
expected value of the mission at time t = 0 can be deduced from an iterative backwards
process. This section describes the simple case when there is only one decision point and
two modes of operation, and the value metric is monetary. Building on this case, the next
section will describe the valuation process in its most general setting.
The Simple Option on Life Extension
Consider a space mission designed for TD = T with the option to be serviced at T, thus
increasing its lifetime up to TH. At T decision makers will choose between two modes
of operation: (0) not operational or (1) operational. Choosing (0) would incur the cost
C(1O) = 0 and choosing (1) would incur the cost C(-1*) = C' + Op = E, where C' is the
cost of servicing and Op is the cost to operate the system from t = T until t = TH. We
note this cost E because it is similar to the exercise price of a stock option: whereas a stock
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Service ? YES S-E>0
$ 0
Market level NO
MService ? YES S - E <0
E = $ 100
S<E 4 $0
NO
Figure 4-1: The Simple Option on Life Extension for a Commercial Mission
trader can buy an option on a stock, here the decision maker can buy an option on a life
extension.
What source of uncertainty would make this option interesting? Let us consider a
commercial mission. The revenues after time T are uncertain at the time of launch; we will
call these S because they are similar to the stock price for a stock option. S is a stochastic
process and at time t = 0 its value So is observed. The uncertain parameter can be defined
as the ratio X = S/So. Suppose we can observe the value x = X(T) at time T: then
staying operational is interesting only if it incurs more revenues than expenses, i.e. only
if x > E/So. The decision model will thus define the intervals of possible values of x for
which each decision should be taken:
Abandon 4=> x E I(0) = [0; E/SoJ
Service +=> x E IP1) = [E/So; +oo]
This situation is illustrated on figure 4-1. It is very similar to the example given in section
2.3 to compare valuation methods. The difference is that the possible values of the uncertain
parameter are now the continuous range [0; +oo].
What is the probability distribution function of these revenues? If the market behaves
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... ...............  . ...... . .............. .........  ......
as a stock, its rate of change can be described as a diffusion process with volatility 4 :
dS
S=adt+o-dB (4.5)
where
* B is the Brownian process with unit volatility and zero mean.
* a represents the expected rate of return of the revenues. For a risk-neutral financial
investment, this is simply the risk-free interest rate r. In a more general setting, this
can be written as a = r + 6.
With these assumptions, the uncertain parameter at T follows the log-normal probability
density function:
1 1 1 [ln(x) - (a - a2/2)T]2 (p(x) = - {x - 2oTf(4.6)
y -2-i o,-v/T x 2u.2 T
Derivation of the Black-Scholes Equation
For this commercial mission, the utility function U is equal to the revenues and the value is
simply V = E{U - C}. This value being time-additive, the value at t = 0 of the option on
life extension is simply the expected present value of the potential benefits incurred after
time T. For risk-neutral investors, this is:
V = V"' 1 (x) p(x) dx + J V0' (x) p(x) dx
I(0) I(M
E/So 00
= 0 x p(x) dx + e-rT(x So - E) p(x) dx
0 E/So
The definition can be found in appendix A.
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Making the changes of variables w = inx-(a /2)T and y = w - ovT and defining
- In(E/So)-(a-a 2 /2)T.
00 00
V = e(" 2 /2)T S0  1 e2 dw - e-rT E f e2 dw
d2 -d2
oo
= ea-r)T So J dy - e-T E N(d 2 )
-d 2 +oV
The option value is finally:
V = e6 ISo N(di) - e-rT E N(d2 ) (4.7)
where:
" N is the cumulative normal distribution function N(x) = fx. e2 dt = 1-N(-x)
* di = [ln(So/E) + (a + O2/2)T] /cv T
* d2 = di - ov7
When 6 = 0, equation 4.7 is identical to the Black-Scholes equation, which was a key
result in the foundation of options pricing theory in 1973 [BS73]. The generalization of
this equation for 6 # 0 is useful for cases when the underlying option does not behave as a
financial asset [MS85].
Numerical example
Let us illustrate this result on a typical numerical example. Consider a mission designed
for T = 10 yr with the capability to be serviced to extend its life until TH = 20 yr for a
service-and-operations price E = $100 M. Let us assume for this example that the forecast
revenues after T are So = $125 M, and that r = 5%/yr and 6 = 0. Figure 4-2 plots the
value of the option to be serviced for life extension and compares it with the net present
value after time T, as a function of the volatility a.
A few general trends, which result from equation 4.7, are worth noting:
* When there is little uncertainty on the revenues, the option value equals the net
present value of the project tV = e6T So - e-T E. This occurs when the volatility
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Figure 4-2: Simple Option on Life Extension for a Commercial Mission: Case TH = 20 yr,
E = $100M, So = $125M, r = 5%/yr and 6=0
is very small (- -+ 0), or when the valuation is performed very close to the decision
time (T -- 0). It shows that traditional valuation is valid in a world of certainty.
* The option value increases with uncertainty. This is a direct illustration of the uncer-
tainty being turned into an asset when having options.
* When there is high uncertainty in the forecast, the option value equals the net present
value of the revenues alone: V -+ e6T So. This occurs when the volatility if very
high (o- -- o) or when the valuation is performed very long before the decision time
(T -- oo). The amount e6 T So is the worst possible difference between actual revenues
and forecast revenues. It is therefore a statement that the value of an option cannot
exceed the value of the potential losses it helps prevent.
Comparison with Net Present Value: Flexibility Value
A net present value calculation would not take into account the existence of an option.
For e6T So < e-rT E, it would consider that the spacecraft will never be serviced, and
therefore that there is no value in the servicing option. This corresponds to neglecting the
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probability that the mission be more successful than expected, thus being over-pessimistic.
For e 6T So > e-rT E, it would assume that the spacecraft will be serviced whatever the
market level S. Therefore it would be over-optimistic, and overestimate the future expenses;
the net present value incurred after time T would be:
00
NPV = tV = J erT(S - E)p(S) dS
0
which corresponds to underestimating the value of serviceability by an amount that can be
defined as the flexibility value:
E
F = -tV= e-rJ(E - S)p(S)dS > 0 (4.8)
0
Figure 4-3 is general plot of the option value and the flexibility value as a function of the
cumulative volatility o-v T, for various values of the revenues forecast So and the servicing
price E. Two additional general trends are worth noting on this plot:
" As could be expected, the option value increases with decreasing servicing price or
increasing forecast revenues.
" On the other hand, the relative flexibility value F/V decreases with increasing forecast
revenues. This is due to the fact that the higher the forecast revenues, the lower
the probability that the actual revenues will drop below the threshold level E, and
therefore the lower the losses that can be prevented by having an option.
This example presented a situation that is realistic while simple enough to be solved
analytically. Is showed general trends that will remain valid for almost all option valuation
situations. The rest of this chapter proposes to build on this example to construct an
options valuation process valid in the most general setting.
4.2.3 Valuation Process for a General Compound Option
Now consider the general case when there can be several decision points in the mission
lifetime, at times 0 < Ti < T 2 < ... < TN < TH, several modes of operation (0), (1), ... (NM),
and a non-linear value metric V = f(U, C).
88
Value of the Simple Option on Life Extension
300
Volatility a T1/2 [
Flexibility Value for the Simple Option on Life Extension
0 50 100 150 200 250
Cumulative Volatility a T1/2 [%]
300
Figure 4-3: Simple Option on Life Extension: Value from Black-Scholes Equation. Case
TH = 20yr, r = 5%/yr and 6 = 0
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Figure 4-4: Schematic of Decision Situation at Node k
Choosing a certain mode of operation at time Tk gives the option to choose other modes
of operation at time Tk+1. For example, a spacecraft that has been serviced once has bought
not only a life extension, but also the option to be serviced once again. This corresponds
to an option on an option, which is called a compound option. The value of this future
option must be taken into account in estimating the value of the first option. The valuation
process therefore starts off with the last option and proceeds backwards in time. It is very
similar to working backwards in a decision tree, except that the finite number of branches
is now replaced by a continuous density probability function.
Figure 4-4 is a schematic representation of this valuation process. The valuation is
performed at t = 0, when only the initial value Xo of the uncertain parameter is known.
For each step Tk in the backwards process, the decision maker at t = 0 imagines:
"When I observe the uncertain parameter at Tk and look into the future, what
mode of operation uill I choose if I see X(Tk) = x
Last decision
The last decision gives the "initial" condition of the induction process. At t = 0, both the
uncertain parameter X(TN) and the mode of operation (n) in which the mission will be at
TN are unknown. The decision model must therefore determine for each possible entering
mode (n) the sets In,,) of values of the uncertain parameter at TN for which a switch to
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mode (m) will maximize future value:
X C IN 4-= max (EVN (x) = EVM)(x) = f (U(m) (x), C~nn)(x))N ~~I U 
-)()
Thus, while traditional valuation assumes only one possible mode of operation for the period
[TNI TH], with the new process the decision maker at t = 0 must think:
"If the previous mode of operation was (n) and X(TN) = x E IN occurs,
then I will choose to switch to mode (m)."
Induction Relation
Now consider decision point TN-1. A future mode must be chosen on the basis of the
previous mode of operation (1) and the observed value of the uncertain parameter x =
X(TN-1). In making the decision to switch to a mode (n), two things must be traded off:
" The cost C 1I") (x) and the utility Uhn) (x) that will be incurred during [TN-1, TNI
as a result of choosing (n), and
* The cost and the utility that will be incurred after TN, given that the decision point
TN will be entered in mode (n) and that the uncertain parameter y = X(TN) will
follow the density probability function pTN1 (ylx).
The choice of mode of operation that will be made at TN is known as a function of (n) and
y through the sets I>nm) determined at the previous step. Thus the value to maximize is:
N
EV>N_"l(x) = E f (UNi(x) + U" (y), C-l (x) + C1 " "")(y)) p(N-1
m=1-)
N
This determines the sets 193) of values of the uncertain parameter at TN-1 for which
a switch to mode (1) maximizes future value.
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* Mode switch
Figure 4-5: Decision Model
At decision point TN-2, the future value in turn writes:
Nm
EV (T)N- 2 (ylx)dy J PN(zly) dz ...
n,m=1 
nN-1 N
f (UY_ 2 (x) + U!(n) + Uf"(z), C,_~*)(x) + C~i"(y) + Ch"m)(Z))
(4.9)
The same principle can be applied according to a backwards iterative process up to
To = 0 where it gives the total mission value as seen from the initial point.
Thus, the decision process maps the (time / uncertain parameter value) space into re-
gions corresponding to different optimal modes. A mode switch will occur at each decision
point when a boundary in this space has been crossed. Figure 4-5 is a conceptual represen-
tation of this mapping. Traditional valuation would assume that the forecast sequence of
events would occur (straight line), overlooking the possibility of unlucky scenarios for which
the mission would have to be abandoned, or lucky scenarios for which (for example) the
spacecraft would undergo several upgrades. The proposed valuation process on the other
hand recognizes the ability of decision makers to adapt to the resolution of uncertainty and
make optimal decisions in the future. It therefore considers the optimal sequence of events
for each possible evolution of the uncertain parameter with time.
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4.2.4 Determination of a Maximum Servicing Price
In this chapter, we saw the different types of options available to space missions and pro-
posed a general framework to embed this flexibility into the valuation of space mission
architectures.
This framework can now be used to derive three types of information about the market
base for servicing:
" The cost penalty that a space mission would be willing to pay to design for service-
ability is directly given by the value of the option on life extension; an example is the
Black-Scholes equation for the simple option on life extension seen in section 4.2.2.
* The value of a serviceable mission is a function of the price of servicing. Compar-
ing this function with the value of a non-serviceable mission will give the maximum
servicing price T that would make a space mission choose a serviceable design:
Serviceable > Traditional 
- Cservice < T
* Determining the flexibility value relative to traditional value:
F V-tV
tY tv
will indicate by how much traditional valuation underestimates mission value, and
therefore to what extent this framework is interesting.
The rest of this thesis applies this framework to find the value of on-orbit servicing and
the maximum servicing price for two types of space missions. Chapter 5 builds a general
model to deal with commercial missions faced with uncertainty in their future revenues.
As examples of non-commercial missions, chapter 6 considers military space missions faced
with uncertainty in the occurrence and location of contingencies.
But before jumping into the applications, let us consider the limitations to keep in mind.
4.3 Limitations of the Framework
The framework we proposed in the previous sections is only a first attempt at defining a
general framework for the valuation of options for space missions faced with uncertainty.
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Although it can account for many practical cases of space options, some simplifying as-
sumptions had to be made, which limit its generality as described below.
4.3.1 Non-Fundamental Limitation
Discrete decision times For the sake of clarity, the previous sections implicitly assumed
a finite number of set decision points. By setting the period to be infinitesimal, the frame-
work can easily be generalized to continuous decision points. However, it is clear that
an iterative backwards process such as described by equation 4.9 becomes impossible as
the number of decision points tends to infinity. A solution to this problem is to alter the
definition of value, defining
V' = f (E{U}, E{C})
instead of
V = E {f (U, C)}
This makes no difference for linear valuation functions as the one used for commercial
missions in chapter 5. It does for utility-per-cost metrics, and chapter 6 gives an example
of a continuous-time model using V = E{U}/E{C}.
Finite number of modes of operation For the sake of clarity, the previous sections
described the possible modes of operation as a finite set. This is not a fundamental assump-
tion and the same framework can directly be generalized to the case of a continuous range of
possible modes, such as a whole interval of possible orbital altitudes. The implementation
would however become more complex.
4.3.2 Fundamental Limitations
Exogenous uncertainty The framework applies for cases when the uncertainty is ex-
ogenous, i.e. the source of uncertainty is external to the mission and cannot be affected by
decisions taken after the system has been fielded. The presence of options reduces risk by
affecting the consequences that uncertainty has on the mission.
This assumption can be an adequate description of the option to service to react to
random failures, market and technology dynamics, or changing requirements. It can not
be used to describe the interactions between the source of uncertainty and the mission's
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decisions, such as the dynamics of competitive markets.
"Describing" the uncertainty The proposed valuation process relies on the availability
of the information necessary to define the building blocks of the framework. For many
practical cases, this information is not observable. In particular, the probability density
function p(xjxo) of the uncertain parameter in the future, which describes the uncertainty
in the parameter's forecast, is usually very uncertain itself. Assumptions have to be made,
and the sensitivity of the results to the assumed distribution must be estimated. As we
will see in the following chapters, there is usually a threshold uncertainty over which the
conclusions change. No conclusion can be drawn in situations where the uncertainty is
estimated to lie close to this limit.
Forms of flexibility This framework describes flexibility as a known set of possible modes
of operation available to decision makers. It can therefore not account for the most general
form of flexibility, which lies in the ability to define new, unpredictable modes of operation
to respond to unknown sources of uncertainty.
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Chapter 5
Value of Servicing for Commercial
Missions with Uncertain Revenues
One of the most typical situations in which a significant source of uncertainty affects a space
system is the case of a commercial space mission with uncertain revenues. In the light of
the framework developed in the previous chapter, this chapter proposes to study the value
of on-orbit servicing as a way to provide options to react to this source of uncertainty.
Section 5.1 describes the form taken by the building blocks and develops a general
valuation model for the commercial case. It shows how a monetary definition of value
simplifies the valuation process by making the model linear and very similar to the situations
encountered in real options theory. The section concludes with a convenient method for
numerical implementation of the model.
Section 5.2 uses this model to isolate and study the value of the compound option to
abandon, which the rest of the thesis will consider available to all space missions.
This serves as a preliminary study for the crux of the chapter, section 5.3, which considers
the value of servicing as a option on life extension to be traded against the cost to design
for a certain lifetime. It shows that the framework can prove a powerful tool to define a
new decision making approach regarding the choice of a design lifetime requirement when
servicing is available. After identifying the general conditions under which servicing has the
highest value, the section illustrates the value of flexibility on two case-studies with very
high market uncertainty, inspired from the constellations ITidium and Globalstar.
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5.1 General Model for Commercial Missions with Uncertain
Revenues
The general valuation process presented in chapter 4 becomes relatively simple when con-
sidering the case of a commercial mission with uncertain revenues, for which the linear
models and methods developed for real options theory apply almost directly. Section 5.1.1
sets up the model by defining the particular form taken in this case by the main basic
framework elements. Using these baseline assumptions, section 5.1.2 lays out the valuation
process for commercial missions with uncertain revenues is its general mathematical form.
Section 5.1.3 finally describes a convenient numerical method to put this valuation process
into practice.
5.1.1 Basic Elements of the Model
Section 4.2.1 defined the basic elements necessary to describe any option situation. For the
case of a commercial mission with uncertain market, a few of these building blocks take a
particularly simple form.
Uncertain Parameter X: Market Forecast
Definition Most commercial missions start off with a theoretical forecast for their ex-
pected market demand. Let us call M (t) the revenues per unit time that would be
incurred based on this forecast if choosing mode of operation (m). Two typical examples
are: a constant expected market Mth(t) = Mo; or a market base linearly increasing with
time Mth(t) = M 0 + at.
Market demand cannot be predicted perfectly: it is an uncertain parameter. The un-
certainty in market demand translates into uncertainty in mission revenues, which is the
parameter of direct interest to decision makers. We will take the ratio of the actual poten-
tial revenues in each mode of operation (m) over the theoretical market as our uncertain
parameter(s):
X(m) - M(m)()
M (t)
With this definition, there can be as many uncertain parameters as there are modes of
operation. This is necessary to take into account possible spacecraft modifications to address
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new markets.
The exogenous uncertainty assumption In the real world, managers can make de-
cisions that affect the revenues. All such decisions should be modeled as possible modes
of operation, so that each uncertain parameter X(m) remains an external source of uncer-
tainty. For example, X(m) can represent the number of people who would be interested in
the service provided by the space system if it were upgraded to a certain mode (m). This
number, which corresponds to potential revenues, varies as the result of external sources
of uncertainty, such as global economical growth and the action of competitors. Only the
actual revenues depend on the choice made by decision makers as to whether to upgrade the
constellation or not. Thus, as soon as the modes of operation have been properly chosen,
it is a fair assumption to assume that the uncertain parameter is an exogenous stochastic
process, i.e an external source of uncertainty.
The geometric random walk assumption In order to describe the uncertainty, an
assumption on its probability density function must be made. A convenient assumption used
by real options theory is the geometric random walk process with drift am and volatility
Um*, which is a good description of the behavior of stocks values. Under this assumption,
if X(m)(t) is known then x = X(m)(t + -r)/X(m)(t) has a log-normal probability density
function with mean e"-' and variance omifd:
1 1 1 (ln(x) - (am - ol/2)r)2
P ( ) =exp - (5}(x = m2= x 2 o2 -r
The drift am is typically used to account for the time value of money.
This assumption presents two advantages in addition to its simplicity. First, the nor-
mal distribution (here used to describe the rate of deviation from expectation) is a usual
assumption when the form of uncertainty is unknown. It is a valid approximation when the
observed uncertainty is the sum of many independent uncertain parameters, which is often
the case for the market dynamics that make revenues vary. Second, the variation of the
standard deviation as V/t is a good description of the increase in uncertainty as one makes
predictions further away in time. Examples of practical cones of uncertainty obtained form
*Defined in appendix A.
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this assumption are given on figure 5-1.
The greatest shortcoming of the random walk assumption is the symmetry in the un-
certainty, which gives equal probability to revenues that exceed expectations as to revenues
that are lower than expectation. Though this would be a reasonable assumption for an ideal,
unbiased forecast, in the real world space mission revenues rarely explode significantly over
their forecast.
Cross-correlation In order to keep the model simple without sacrificing the main effects
of uncertainty, we will further assume that we are in one of the two following extreme cases:
1. The various components of the uncertain parameter (X(m)) are proportional. This
corresponds to only one effective uncertain parameter X = X( 1) with X(m) = (m) X.
This is a good description of a situation where potential modifications increase the
level of performance for the same market. Or,
2. The various components of the uncertain parameter (X(m)) are completely indepen-
dent. This is a good description for a situation where potential modifications address
different markets.
Utility Metric
Utility rate u For a commercial mission, the utility rate simply corresponds to the po-
tential mission revenues per unit time. It is therefore equal to the uncertain parameter X
times the revenues Mth predicted by the market forecast, and can depend on the current
mode of operation (m):
U(M) = M(M) (t) = M (M)(t) X(Mn (t) (5.2)
We will note Xkm" the value of the uncertain parameter observed at decision points Tk:
Xkk
xk" = X(")(T ).
Expected utility U The utility is simply the present value of the aggregated revenues.
If its internal rate of return a' has been defined as described in the introductory financial
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section (2.3), it can be discounted at the risk-free interest rate:
t2
U([ti; t 2]) = Je u dt (5.3)
ti
At a decision point Tk, the potential revenues rate u(m) (m) M(m) (Tk) will be observedUk Xk th
for each mode (m). According to the probability density function 5.1, the revenues rate
expected at any latter time t' = Tk + t will then be E{u(m)(t')} = eam A4 (mM (t'). The
value at Tk of the expected utility EUm) (Uk) over the next period if choosing mode (m)
will therefore be:
EU m) (Xk) = E ert M (m (Tk +t) X ()dt
k (i)JMW(T t) h ~ rtd0
= x (M) fM ()(Tk + t) e("m--r)t dt
0
Define the forecast incremental revenues:
Rn) = M )(Tk ± t) e(am-r)t dt (5.4)
0
Rkm) is a deterministic parameter. It is a function of the market forecast and the sequence
of decision points only. It corresponds to the value at Tk of the revenues that would be
incurred in mode (m) between times Tk and Tk+1, if the market followed its initial forecast.
The utility expected if choosing mode (m) in the kth period is the corrected prediction once
the uncertain parameter Xk is observed:
EUM m)(Xk) = x(m) Rm) (5.5)
Value Metric V
For a commercial mission, value is simply the difference between benefits and costs: V =
U - C. This linearity is extremely satisfying from a conceptual as well as from a practical
point of view. For example, total mission value is the sum of past and future value. Similarly,
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the expected future value is the sum of the value incurred in each of the future periods. It
also ensures that:
" Maximizing future value is consistent with maximizing total mission value, and that
* The obtained value V is greater than the net present value of the mission: V > tV.
This is a necessary condition to define a flexibility value F = V - tV.
5.1.2 Expanded Net Present Value
Last Decision point Now consider the decision model at the last decision point TN. The
expected future value if switching from mode (n) to mode (1) given X(O (TN) = x is:
EV " 0() = EU(' (x(O) -C" = Xi') R) -- "
Maximizing EV nl (x) gives the sets I(nm) of values of x = (x(0 ), ... x(Nm)) for whichN N
the optimal mode switch is (m) if the previous mode was (n). For example, if choosing
between an abandoned state with X(0) = 0 and a serviced state with X(1) = X, then
there is a minimum value 11l = C /R to choose mode (1), so I = [1(1). +oo] and
1(0) - [0; II(). This is exactly the situation encountered in 4.2.2 with IIfl = E/So.
The expected future value if entering the decision point TN is mode (n) is then given
by:
V X E I " " EV(n) (x) = x(m) R(m) - C (nm) (5.6)N N N %-N
Induction Relation Now consider any decision point T entered in mode (1) observing
the uncertain parameter x = (xm)). The future value EV>7) 1 (x) of the mission after the
next decision point is known for each possible entering mode (n). The values of the uncertain
parameters at t = Tk+1 have the joint probability density function pyk(ylx). The expected
future mission value if switching from the current mode (1) to mode (n) will therefore be:
Nm
EV (x) = R - C(I-n) + e-" (3 EV "7l (y) pTk (ylx) dy (5.7)
m=1 I (n m)
Maximizing EV1k (x) in turn gives the sets I+1f3) Thus, knowing the functions EV>k+l(),
equation 5.7 gives the functions EV>k+1(x). This relation is much simpler than the general
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case described the previous chapter, for which a cascade of integrals on all future periods
was necessary (equation 4.9).
The backwards iterative process finally gives the expected value of the mission as seen
from t = 0:
V = EV>%(1) (5.8)
Since it is the difference between the present value of the expected revenues and the present
value of the expected costs, V is similar to a net present value (NPV). But unlike what is
traditionally done when calculating an NPV, the calculation of V takes into account the
optimal choices at each decision point as a function of the resolution of the uncertainty in
X. For this reason, we may call this value expanded net present value, and abbreviate it
eNPV.
Flexibility Value The flexibility value is here simply the difference between the expanded
net present value and the net present value:
F=V-tV=eNPV-NPV (5.9)
An NPV calculation would assume a set sequence of modes of operation (mo, MN) ac-
cording to the market forecast at t = 0, which simply gives:
N
tV = NPV e-rTk E n() R m) - C(mk_1-mk) (5.10)
k=O
where by convention m_1 = 0 (not operational).
We can note that NPV and eNPV are equivalent when there is no uncertainty, in other
words when the volatility of the market is null:
tv = V { =(m)  0 (5.11)
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5.1.3 Calculating Expanded Net Present Values: Numerical Analysis
Method
The previous section defined the expanded net present value (eNPV) for commercial mis-
sions faced with a geometric Brownian source of uncertainty in their revenues, and gave the
backwards induction relation to calculate this value (equation 5.7).
This section presents the numerical method we chose to implement this equation. This
convenient method is an application with only slight modifications of the log-transformed
binomial lattice method proposed by Trigeorgis for the valuation of real options [Tri96].
For simplicity, we will here assume that there is only one uncertain parameter X, which
follows a geometric Brownian motion process with expected drift a and volatility a.
Log-transformation
The log-transformation consists in defining the intermediate variable Y = In X. Then
dX/X = a dt + a dB translates intot:
dY = (a--- dt + adB (5.12)
which means that Y is a Brownian motion with mean drift a - o2/2 and volatility a-. Thus
X, which has an exponential drift, is replaced by Y, which has a linear drift. This ensures
the stability of the numerical method.
Discretized Brownian Motion: the Random Walk
The Brownian motion is the limit of a random walk as the size of the steps in the walk
tend to zero. Since numerical methods require discretization, it is natural to discretize Y
"back" into a random walk process. Let ot be the time step of the simulation. During
each time step, Y will change by a probabilistic amount 6Y. The discretization reduces the
continuous probability density function of 6Y to a probability P that 6Y = +AY and a
probability 1 - P that 6Y = --AY. The appropriate values of AY and P are the ones that
tdY cannot be obtained through standard calculus because B is not differentiable. The demonstration
of this formula can be found in appendix A
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Figure 5-2: The Log-Transformed Binomial Lattice
conserve the mean drift and volatility of the process. They must therefore verify:
E{6Y} = a-- 6t= PAY + (1 - P)(-AY)
Var{SY} = a2 t = (P AY 2 + (1- P)(-AY) 2 ) - E{6Y} 2
which requires:
AY = o.2 6t+ a- 2)2 & 2  (5.13)
P = 1 (1(a 2)6t) (5.14)
The lattice is the two-dimensional grid representing the time flowing in Nt increments
of the time steps 6t, versus the possible values of the log-transformed uncertain parameter
Y in increments of AY. The values of Y that are reachable through the random walk fill
up only half of a rectangular grid (in other words, a triangle) as illustrated on figure 5-2.
Backward Iterative Process
The last time step corresponds to TN = Nt 6t. At that time Y is a vector taking values in
[Yo - Nt AY; Yo+Nt AY] with increment 2AY; its length is Ny = 1 +Nt. The values of the
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Figure 5-3: Main Matrices Used in the Numerical Simulation
uncertain parameter are given by Xi = eY. To each of these values corresponds the matrix
of size NM x NM containing future mission values if switching from mode (n) to mode (1):
EVN t (Xi) = X RN - C (5.15)
Determining the optimal mode switch (1) for each value of X and each entering mode (n)
gives the value after step Nt as a matrix (EVNe)i,n of size Ny x NM.
Now consider any two times j6t and (j + 1)6t which are not decision points, in other
words at which the mode of operation cannot be changed. For each value iAY of Y at j6t ,
Y can move either up or down by AY. Thus the present expected value at jot is determined
from the present expected future value at (j + 1)6t by:
(EVj)i, = e-r6t [P (EVj+1 )i+1,n + (1 - P) (EVj+1)_1,n]
This can be applied on each of the modes of operation (n), i.e. on each of the rows of
EVj+1-
Trigeorgis [Tri96] recommends an iterative backward process in j. But with computer
languages that allow for efficient matrix manipulation (such as MATLAB) it can be useful
to note that k time steps can be reduced to one operation with the following consideration.
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]
First note that EVj is a matrix of size (1 + j) x NM that verifies:
EV = Aj EVj+1  (5.16)
where the matrix A3 has size (1+ j) x (1+ j+ 1) and is such that
(Aj)i,= e- 6t p
(Aj),,i+1 = r11 (1 - P)
Using this induction relation, it can be proven that:
EVj = Aj<(j+k) EVj+k where (5.17)
[Aj-(j+k) i,i+ = erk6 t k P (1 - P)kn V i e {1, ..., 1 +j} Vn E {O, ..., k}
(n)
Adjusting Value at Decision Points
Whenever j reaches a decision point T = j6t, the value must be adjusted to account for
the optimal mode switch. If the next decision point is at (j + k)St, then:
EV n') (x) = x(1 R) -C &-1) + J EV1? (y)pj(yIx) dy
translates into:
( EV)nit = Xi Rf ) - C + AJ-(J+k) (EVj+k) (5.18)j 3
Figure 5-3 illustrates these various matrix elements. Choosing the optimal mode switch (1)
for each value i of Y and each entering mode (n) gives the expected future value (EVj),n.
This is particularly convenient with computer languages allowing manipulation of three-
dimensional arrays.
This backwards process can then be iterated up to j = 0 where it gives the value EV
for each possible initial mode of operation.
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5.2 Value of the Compound Option to Abandon
The option most immediately available to any space system is the option to abandon the
mission if the operations cost is considered too high. For the case of a commercial mission
with uncertain market, this will occur as soon as the operations cost exceeds the expected
revenues.
The value of this option has never been taken into account in the literature. Thus, the
value of space missions has been underestimated. The simplicity of the situation makes it
a good candidate for a first application of the model.
5.2.1 Building Blocks
The decision points for the periodic option to abandon with period -r, are Tk = k-r1a. At
each of these decision points, the mission must choose between two modes of operation: (0)
not operational and (1) operational. The revenues rate in mode (0) is X(0) = 0 so that there
is actually only one uncertain parameter X(1) = X.
In order to model the effect of the abandoning option alone, we will here assume a
constant market forecast Mth(t) = Mo. The expected revenues during period k if X(Tk) =
x is observed are then simply:
EU) (X)= 0
EU (x) = x e(a-r)Tk cd(ra, r - a) Mo (5.19)
Assume it costs nothing (or a negligible amount of money) to abandon the mission and
let op be the operations costs per unit time in the operating mode. The matrix of switching
costs will be the same at each decision node:
Ck =(0 op .cd(ra, r) + Cre-iit (5.20)
(0 op. .cd (ra, r)
where Cre-init is the cost to re-initiate the mission once it has been abandoned. Two bounds
on the value of this cost are easy to model:
* For an irrevocable option to abandon, Cre-imit = oo. The value of this option corre-
sponds to a lower bound on the general option to abandon.
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* For a perfectly temporary option to abandon, Cre-mit = 0. The value of this option
corresponds to an upper bound on the general option abandon.
The rest of this section proposes to study these two bounds.
5.2.2 Modeling the Option Value
Value of the Irrevocable Option to Abandon
First consider the case when abandoning is irrevocable. This is typical of a space system
in low-Earth orbit, where abandoning the mission means de-orbiting the satellites. Let's
consider that the mission also loses its licenses, so that even launching new satellites is not
possible.
Consider decision point Tk = k ra. If the system is operational, then there is a decision
to make between abandoning, which will produce no future value, and staying operational,
which will produce the utility EU , incur the cost op .cd(ra, r), and give a further option
at Tk+1. Thus the decision model will be of the form:
EV (x)= x.cd(ra, r - a) - op .cd(ra, r)+ e-ra f EV ()
Abandon <=#> EV j) 1 '(x) < 0
The future value is always an increasing function of the observed market level x. Thus
the decision model will yield a market threshold Uk over which it is interesting to pursue
the mission after time Tk. The total option value is then determined from the backwards
iterative process:
EV>k(x) = x.cd(ra, r - a) - op .cd(Tra, r) + e-ra f EVik+l(y)p(ylx)dy
rHk+1
EVk (Hk) = 0 defines Ilk (5.21)
V = EVro(1)
Value of the Temporary Option to Abandon
Now consider the case when abandonment is temporary and the mission can be re-initiated
at no cost. This is an approximation of the case of a system in geostationary orbit, for
which the satellites need not be de-orbited but simply boosted to a slightly higher orbit.
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Table 5.1: Irrevocable Option to Abandon: Numerical Assumptions
Parameter Notation Baseline Value
Mission horizon TH 10 yr
Risk-free interest rate r 5%/yr
Appreciation rate a 0%/yr
Operations costs $5 M/yr
Market forecast Mo $8 M/yr
Volatility 0- 30%.yr-2
Number of abandon options THITa 10
In practice, there will be a cost to maneuver the satellites back and possibly regain the
licenses; the results of this section can therefore only serve as an upper bound on the value
of the option to abandon.
When Cre-init = 0, the decision whether to operate in the next period is independent
on the entering mode of operation:
EV3(x) = x.cd(ra, r - a) - op.cd(ra, r) +
+e-re f EV?)+1(y)p(yIx) dy + e-rr f EV8+ 1(y)p(yIx) dy
rk+1 00
EV (x) = e-ra f EV+1(y) p(ylx) dy + e-"r f EV4e)+1(y)p(ylx) dy
>k()0 
rlk+1
EV 1 (U) = EVQ(I)(lk) defines [I
5.2.3 Study of the Option Value
Numerical Example
Figure 5-4 plots the resulting value and compares it with a net present value for the nu-
merical assumptions summarized in table 5.1. These numbers include all costs after initial
operating capability (IOC); they do not include the cost to produce and launch the system.
The plot shows that mission value increases almost linearly with uncertainty. For very high
uncertainty, the value incurred after IOC becomes twice what would have been estimated
from a net present value calculation.
General Case
Figures 5-5 and 5-6 illustrate the results in the general case. The plots use non-dimensional
parameters so as to be readily applicable to any special case. As for the Black-Scholes
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Figure 5-4: Value of the Compound Abandon Option for the numerical assumptions in table
5.1
equation (4.7), the results depend on costs in a relative fashion only, and depend on time
only through the products o-v t, at and rt. The option value V can therefore be written as
a function of only five variables:
V= ffl (MO TH (.2
tV ( Op Ta' I O TH , r TH, a TH (5.22)
Value as a Function of Decision Period Figure 5-5 shows that the value of the option
to abandon increases with the number of decision points available over the lifetime of the
mission. In other words, it increases with the frequency at which a decision to abandon
can be taken. This result is intuitive since more frequent decisions represent an enhanced
flexibility. However, the losses that are prevented by increasing the decision frequency,
decrease as the abandon period decreases; this explains why the option value quickly reaches
an upper bound.
The upper bound is reached as soon as at least 6 options are available over the mission
lifetime. In order to take a continuous option to abandon into account, it is therefore
sufficient to assume a yearly abandon option for a mission horizon longer than 6 years, or
a quarterly option to abandon for a mission horizon of a few years.
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Figure 5-5: Value of the Compound Abandon Option r = 5%/yr and a = 0: (a) As a
function of number of decision points for several values of volatility and for Mo/op = 1.2
(b) As a function of uncertainty for several market levels and for ra = 1 yr.
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Value as a function of market level The bottom part of figure 5-5 plots mission value
as a function of uncertainty for different market levels Mo. It shows that as the expected
revenues increase, the relative flexibility value decreases. This effect was already noticed in
section 4.2.2 for the simple option on life extension. It is due to the fact that the higher
the expected revenues, the lower the probability that the mission will be abandoned, and
therefore the less interesting the ability to abandon.
Sensitivity to interest and appreciation rates It is interesting to test on this simple
example the importance of using the appropriate discount rates. Figure 5-6 shows that the
relative abandon option value is sensitive both to the risk-free interest rate r and to the
difference 6 between the internal rate of return on the mission and the discount rate r.
The risk-free interest rate r captures the concept of time-value of money. As it increases,
what happens later in the mission is deemed less and less important. This reduces the
potential losses incurred if not being able to abandon, which in turn reduces the value of
the abandon option.
The difference 6 is the effective internal rate of return of the market relative to the risk-
free interest rate. 6 > 0 represents an exponential market increase; since it corresponds to
a higher market, it reduces the relative option value. On the other hand, 6 < 0 represents
a risk-premium, corresponding to discounting the risky revenues at a higher rate than the
(riskless) operations costs; it is equivalent to a exponential market decrease, which increases
the relative option value.
The sensitivity of the option value to these rates becomes more serious as longer mission
horizons are considered. A careful estimate of r and 6 is required for an accurate option
valuation.
Irrevocable versus Temporary
On figures 5-5 and 5-6, the value of the temporary option to abandon is indicated in dotted
lines. As could be expected, the temporary option has a more value than the irrevocable
option, since it provides more flexibility. However, the difference is of only of a few percent.
Since these two values can be seen as a lower and an upper bound on the value of realistic
options to abandon, there is not need to model the abandon option further: the estimate
can be deemed precise enough.
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Figure 5-6: Sensitivity of the Abandon Option Value to r and a in the case Mo/o,= 2,
or a = 200%
In the rest of this chapter, we will be interested in comparing systems with various design
lifetimes. A system designed for a shorter life always has the option to abandon at the end
of this lifetime. In order to compare it on a fair basis with a system designed for a longer
lifetime, we will assume that all missions have a periodic abandon option with the same
period. An appropriate choice for this period is 1 year. This compound abandon option
will represent additional decision points.
5.2.4 Conclusions
These results show that traditional valuation methods have been significantly underestimat-
ing the value of all missions with uncertain revenues, creating a bias in favor of conservative
projects. By recognizing the flexibility of decision makers to shut off an unsuccessful mis-
sion, the proposed valuation framework shows that some projects that would be deemed
uninteresting by traditional valuation can actually have significant value.
Thus, the application of the proposed framework proves useful even in the simple case
of the option to abandon a space mission, which is a limited form of flexibility. It should
prove even more interesting in studying the value of on-orbit servicing for space missions,
which is the focus of the rest of this thesis.
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5.3 Optimal Design Life under Market Uncertainty
This section considers servicing as an option on life extension for commercial satellites with
uncertain market.
Satellites are typically designed for the longest possible lifetime. This not only leads to
high mass and cost due to the requirement for large design margins, especially for power,
propulsion and redundancy [SHN01]; it also corresponds to a design lifetime that is often
longer than the characteristic market and technological life cycles. Thus there is a fair risk
that satellites will be obsolete and/or not respond to any actual market before their end
of life. If on-orbit servicing were available, satellites could be designed for a period of time
closer to the market dynamics, with the option to extend their life, abandon the mission or
upgrade their payload according to the market and technological conditions at a later time.
Is there sufficient value in this added flexibility to make servicing a commercial space
mission interesting? The framework we developed and its application to commercial mis-
sions are ideal to address this question.
Section 5.3.1 explains how to use this model for two types of study. For a given servicing
price and servicing interval, it yields the optimal design lifetime as a function of market
level and market volatility. Then for a given uncertainty level, it identifies the maximum
price that a space mission would be willing to pay for each on-orbit servicing operation, by
considering the conditions under which the optimal design life is shorter than the mission
horizon.
Section 5.3.4 applies these results to two examples of commercial missions with highly
uncertain market: the Iridium and Globalstar low-Earth orbit constellations of communi-
cation satellites.
5.3.1 Towards a New Decision Making Approach
Traditional Decision Making
With the traditional way of designing satellite systems, there is a strong incentive to design
for the longest possible lifetime. In the absence of uncertainty, a longer lifetime indeed
means a smaller cost per operational day [SHN01]. The typical traditional decision making
process is illustrated on figure 5-7. The net present value of the project is estimated without
taking into account the uncertainty in the revenues and the possible options to react to it.
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Figure 5-7: Traditional Decision Making
Two attitudes are then possible depending on the level of awareness of the decision makers
regarding uncertainty:
* Risk-neutral decision makers would simply not take uncertainty into account. They
would approve the project if its net present value is above a given threshold (it should
at least be positive), and design it for the longest possible lifetime TH to minimize its
cost-per-operational-day.
* Being concerned about uncertainty but lacking a way to quantify its effects, risk-averse
decision makers would simply reject any project whose uncertainty is higher than a
subjective threshold. This greatly limits the space of possible projects.
Towards a New Decision Making Approach
The framework proposed is chapter 4 can represent a useful tool to define a new decision
making process as illustrated on figure 5-8. By providing a means of quantifying the effects
of uncertainty and the value of managerial flexibility, it can make it possible to draw two
new decision boundaries:
Minimum market level: effect of the abandon option As seen in section 5.2, for
missions with a compound option to abandon and a low market level, mission value in-
creases significantly as uncertainty increases. Even if the net present value is negative, the
actual value can be positive because there is some probability that the revenues will rise
unexpectedly. Therefore, the minimum market level over which the mission is worthwhile
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Figure 5-8: Decision Making with Options
decreases with increasing uncertainty. This explains the shape of the left boundary on figure
5-8.
Minimum uncertainty level: effect of the servicing option We saw that the cost to
produce and launch a space system increases almost linearly with increasing design lifetime
requirement. This leads to a decreasing cost-per-operational day if replacement is the only
solution for life extension. But life extension through servicing has the potential to be
much cheaper than life extension through replacement. Therefore on-orbit servicing would
make possible a trade-off between the cost to design for a given lifetime and the price to
service for life extension. This trade-off could lead to an optimal design lifetime TD shorter
than the mission horizon TH. As uncertainty increases, the value of the option on life
extension increases as seen in section 4.2.2. Thus we can expect the existence of a minimum
uncertainty level over which the optimal design is serviceable. This explains the shape of
the right boundary on figure 5-8.
Through this new decision making approach, the proposed framework would provide
decision makers with the tools to fully understand the effects of external sources of uncer-
tainty and take their future options into account when deciding on a design-and-maintenance
strategy.
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The next sections will show how to use the framework to quantify the boundaries in the
above decision diagram, and to determine the maximum servicing price that a commercial
space mission would be willing to pay for each servicing operation.
5.3.2 Modeling the Irrevocable Service or Abandon Option
The option to service for life extension corresponds to a service-or-abandon option. Section
5.2 showed that there is little difference between the values of the irrevocable and of the
temporary options to abandon. When considering the option to service for life extension, it
can therefore be assumed, without loosing much generality, that abandoning is irrevocable.
This will at least give a lower bound on the option value.
Building Blocks
Consider a space system designed for a time TD with the option to be serviced in increments
of the service interval T up to the mission horizon TH: the decision points are Tk = TD +
(k - 1)r. At each decision point there is a choice between two modes of operation: (0)
abandoned and (1) operational in the initial design. The utility in mode (0) is zero, so that
there is only one uncertain parameter X(1) = X = M(t)/Mth(t).
The value at Tk of the expected revenues during the kth period if X(Tk) = x is observed
is:
EU(O)(x) =0 (5.23)
(1)()=~EUk (x = x R
Let CIOC(TD) be the cost to initial operating capability as a function of the design life
TD; this function is described in sections 2.2.1 and 3.2.1. For the purpose of this study, it
is sufficient to use a linear cost model and a linear fit to the mass penalty as given by 3.1:
CIOC= 1 + (TD - 3 yr) (5.24)
C3
where C3 is the cost to initial operating capability for a arbitrary reference design lifetime
requirement of 3 years. This corresponds to defining a percentage cost penalty K per unit
time of design life.
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The initial matrix of switching costs at To = 0 is then:
Co= (0
Coo
C10c(TD)+op.cd(TDr)
00
At each following decision point, the situation it is very similar to the irrevocable option
to abandon studied in the previous section. The only difference is that at each potential
service time Tk+1 = TD + kr, the cost to stay operational is now the sum of the operations
cost and the servicing price. Let Cs be the price of each servicing operation. The matrix
of switching costs is then:
for the yearly option to abandon, at T # Tk,
for the service-or-abandon option, at T = Tk
0 o
Ci 0 op .cd(r, r)
0 oo
0 Cs +op.cd(,r,r)
Decision model
The total option value is determined from the following backwards iterative process:
(5.25)
It is convenient here to define all costs as percentages of the cost to design for 3 years,
CIoc( 3 ) = C3 . The present value of the mission at time To = 0 is finally a function of the
design life TD, the cost penalty per unit design time n, the servicing price Cs, the service
interval r, the market forecast Mth(t), the market volatility o, the operations cost op, the
mission horizon TH, the risk-free interest rate r and the rate of return a:
V =, fnTD C3  Mth OP TH, r, a (5.26)C3 \ C3 C3 IC3) /)
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EV>k(x) = x Rk - Cs - op .cd(r,r) + e-" f EV>k+l(y) p(yjx) dy
U~k+1
EV>k(Uk) = 0 defines Ulk
V =EV>o(1)
Optimal design life
For a given servicing price and service interval, the optimal design life TD is the design life
that gives the maximum expected mission value Vs.
Cs Mth Op
TD = C3 ) ' C3 , , TH, r, a (5.27)
In particular, for a given mission and market forecast, the valuation process will yield the
optimal design life as a function of the market uncertainty and the servicing price. A
serviceable design will be chosen only if the optimal design life is shorter that the mission
horizon TH:
Serviceable -> TD < TH
Comparison with the option to replace The replace-or-abandon option can be studied
in exactly the same way as the service-or-abandon option, simply using Cs ~ CIoc. An
optimal design life TD,R giving the maximum value VR can also be determined for the
replacement case. This adds an additional condition on the choice for serviceability:
Serviceable 4=>, TD < TH and VS
Maximum Servicing Price
For a given service interval, the maximum servicing price T can finally be defined as the
price under which the optimal design life is shorter than the mission horizon:
TD ,- - < TH -4~~~C < T
C 3 C3 ..
T = f" ;- M ; , TH, r, a (5.28)
Lower Bound on the Servicing Price
Whatever the choice of servicing infrastructure, it will be necessary to launch the mass that
has to be delivered to the serviceable spacecraft. Therefore the cost to produce and launch
this mass can be considered as a lower bound on the marginal cost of servicing, and hence
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Table 5.2: Irrevocable Service-or-Abandon Option: Constant Assumptions
Parameter Notation Baseline Value Source
Mission horizon TH 15 yr Typical GEO
Risk-free interest rate r 7.9 %/yr Adapted from [HJJKOO]
Rate of return a 4.2 %/yr Adapted from [HJJKOO]
Penalty rate KLEO 2.75 %/yr Adapted from [SHN01]
Operations cost OP 5 %C3 /yr Typical [WL99]
a lower bound on the servicing price. The cost relationship 5.24 suggests that this lower
bound be approximated by:
Cs > r r = Tmin (5.29)
C3
5.3.3 Results in the General Case
Three of the eight parameters that set the value of the maximum servicing price are par-
ticularly interesting to study:
" The service interval r, which is a free variable. In particular, the variation of the
maximum servicing price T as a function of -r can be compared to the linear variation
of the lower bound on the servicing price Tmin = K T,
" The market forecast Mth/C3 and its volatility, which are the two parameters that can
vary widely among space missions. For this very general study, we will consider only
constant market forecasts: Mth(t) = MO.
The five remaining parameters will be held constant as indicated in table 5.2. The value
for the interest and return rates in this table were obtained by considering current industry
data. We remember from section 2.3 that under the capital asset pricing method (CAPM)
assumptions, the rate of return on an asset should be of the form:
a = r + p = r + E{rm - r} (5.30)
Harbison & al [HJJKOO] plot the observed value of 13 and a for a variety of major industries,
including the aerospace industry. A fit to the equation 5.30 gives the risk-free interest rate
r ~ 7.9% and the overall market trend E{rm - r} ~ 8.3%. The Aerospace & Defense
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Decision Making Map as a Function of Servicing Price (c = 1 yr)
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Figure 5-9: Maximum Servicing Price for the Option on Life Extension: a Map in a Market
Level / Uncertainty Space as a New Tool to Decision Making. Case r = 1 yr.
industry as a whole (A&D) has a, ~ 10% and # 0.7, which corresponds to:
aA&D = ap - p = a, -E{rm - r}3# 4.2%
SA&D = aA&D - r -- 3. 7%
Quantifying the Boundaries in the New Decision Making Map
Expressing the resulting maximum servicing price T in units of its lower bound Tmin = nT
makes the results almost independent of the service interval 7r. This results from the fact
that the cost savings to design for a shorter lifetime are also proportional to . r. Figures
5-9 and 5-10 show that even the two extreme cases r = 1 yr and -r = 7 yr present indeed
very similar features.
These plots provide an estimate of the numerical values for the boundaries in the decision
making map envisioned in the previous section, in the most general case possible. They
constitute therefore a very valuable, directly applicable tool for decision making regarding
the design of serviceable spacecraft. The position of the left boundary is determined by
the option to abandon; it is a function of the operations cost only. The position of the
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Decision Making Map as a Function of Servicing Price (T = 7 yr)
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Figure 5-10: Maximum Servicing Price for the Option on Life Extension: a Map in a Market
Level / Uncertainty Space as a New Tool to Decision Making. Case r = 7 yr
right boundary, which determines when a design should be made serviceable, depends on
the price of on-orbit servicing. The lower the servicing price, the more interesting it is to
design for servicing for a given uncertainty.
These maps confirm that in the absence of uncertainty (o = 0), it is always optimal
to design for the longest possible lifetime. Thus, traditional valuation underestimates the
value of on-orbit servicing for commercial space missions by not taking into account the
effects of uncertainty. Only by taking the value of flexibility into account can the trade
between the cost to design for a given lifetime requirement and the price to service for life
extension be captured.
Furthermore, figure 5-9 shows that as soon as there is significant uncertainty (o >
40%.yr- ), the maximum servicing price is an order of magnitude greater than the cost to
produce and launch the serviceable mass. Thus, the value of on-orbit servicing for commer-
cial missions with high uncertainty is likely to be significant compared to the marginal cost
of servicing.
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Figure 5-11: Maximum Servicing Price as a Function of Servicing Interval: General Case
with Mo/C 3 = 10%/yr
Maximum Servicing Price as a Function of Service Interval
Figure 5-11 shows how the maximum servicing price T varies with the servicing interval r
and compares it with the minimum servicing price Tmin, for two values of the volatility and
for the example Mo/C 3 = 10%/yr. This type of plot could prove useful as a guide for future
technology development as to what servicing price a space mission can be charged: the price
should be higher than the cost Tmin to produce and launch the serviceable mass, but lower
than the maximum servicing price T that the mission is willing to afford. This figure shows
that the lower the service interval, the greater the range of possible servicing prices. This
result is in agreement with [Wal93}, which also identified shorter service intervals as more
interesting.
Maximum Flexibility Value as a Function of Volatility
Figure 5-12 plots the ratio of the expanded net present value (eNPV) over the traditional
NPV, and the relative value of the flexibility provided by on-orbit servicing as a function
of volatility. This plot corresponds to the case of free servicing: Cs = 0; it is therefore
the maximum flexibility value. This value not only increases as expected with increasing
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Figure 5-12: Expanded Net Present Value and Maximum Flexibility Value as a Function of
Volatility: General Case with r = 1 yr.
volatility, but is also much greater than in the case of the option to abandon. Even for high
market forecasts, the value of flexibility can make up as much as 50% of the total eNPV
of the mission. This amount represents by how much traditional valuation underestimates
the value of a serviceable mission.
The above results accomplish the goal of the section: they quantify the boundaries on the
decision making diagram envisioned on figure 5-8, show that on-orbit servicing is of great
value to commercial missions with highly uncertain markets, and estimate the corresponding
flexibility value. In doing so, they demonstrate the significance and many uses of the
proposed framework.
An additional piece of information would however be interesting. On the maps 5-9 and
5-10, the broad area labeled design for servicing corresponds to any design life shorter
than the mission horizon. How does the optimal design life actually behave as uncertainty
increases? Let us further explore this question by considering a realistic numerical example.
5.3.4 Application to Two LEO Communications Missions
Iridium and Globalstar
Iridium and Globalstar were two of the big LEO constellations of satellites conceived in the
early 1990's to address the great potential market of mobile telephony. By the time the
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systems were launched, the market they had been expecting had shrinked significantly due
to the advent and rapid evolution of cellular telephony networks. As a result, Iridium soon
filed for bankruptcy, and the same end may be awaiting Globalstar. The great uncertainty
in their market make these two constellation a perfect case-study for our valuation model.
Table 5.3: Approximate Parameters for Iridium and Globalstar
Parameter Name [ Iridium Globalstar
Cost to IOC Croc $3B $2B
Design life TD 5 yr 7.5 yr
Operations cost o, $245 M/qt $125 M/qt
Operational satellites Nsats 66 52
A Highly Uncertain Market
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Figure 5-13: LE066 Market Forecast [GVH+97} with a Reference Cone of Uncertainty
1
o-= 30%.yr-2
Market forecast The expected market for these missions as forecast in 1997 is the same
as used in chapter 3 when studying an Iridium-like case from a traditional point of view.
The new approach requires to study not only the magnitude, but also the volatility of this
market. The market magnitude can be found in [GVH+97] in terms of number of billable
minutes per year for various assumptions of market penetration. This market is reproduced
on figure 5-13, where a cone of uncertainty corresponding to a = 30 % yr-2 is represented
for reference. The average price per minute around was $3/min for Iridium and $1/min
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Figure 5-14: Time Variation of the Globalstar Stock (GSTRF) (Source
http://finance.yahoo.com/)
for Globalstar. Combining these numbers with a typical market penetration of 10% gives
the market forecast in terms of revenues: Mth(t).
Market volatility A major practical difficulty with any option valuation is the estimation
of the volatility of the market. While a market forecast is a necessary part of a business plan,
the uncertainty in the forecast is by definition unknown. The situation is made easier when
as in this case, historical data about the projects is available. We will therefore perform an
a posteriori volatility estimate.
A first, very crude, method of estimation consists in considering the actual number of
users. Six months after it started operating, Iridium had only 10000 customers instead of
the 52000 expected. This corresponds to an approximate volatility of o- ~ 1.2 yr-1 / 2 .
The method most widely used by financial experts however, is historical regression on
the value of a twin security traded on the stock exchange. This type of estimation is possible
for the case of the Globalstar mission, whose stock (GSTRF) is still traded. Figure 5-14
shows the five-year evolution of the Globalstar stock. It is obvious from this plot that the
volatility of GSTRF has not been constant as models always assume. Rather, figure 5-15
plots its evolution with time over the last four years: fairly high before 2000, the volatility
exploded as the stock price shrank after Iridium's failure. Thus, while o = 30 %.yrA2 could
have been estimated at the start of the mission, a more realistic value given recent history
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Figure 5-15: Estimation of the Volatility of the Globalstar Stock (GSTRF)
would be a = 90%.yr-2.
Given the uncertainty on the volatility, we shall keep it as a parameter as long as
possible.
Risk premium In the absence of any more information, a reasonable approximation is to
assume the same discount rate and internal rate of return as for the Aerospace and Defense
industry as a whole: r = 7.9% and 6 = -3.7%.
Optimal Design Life
Figure 5-16 maps the regions of different optimal design lifetimes for the parameters of the
Globalstar case, in a servicing price/volatility space. Expressing the servicing price in units
of its lower bound rs r 03 makes the optimal design lifetime approximately the same for the
two missions. As expected, the optimal design life decreases with decreasing servicing price
and increasing uncertainty. This map reveals the existence of two very different situations:
Although from this plot the shrinking of the stock value seems to show a deterministic trend, in the first
quarter of 2001 the Globalstar customer base has been growing significantly. The assumption of symmetric
uncertainty is thus not that bad.
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Figure 5-16: Globalstar: Optimal Design Life as a Function of Servicing Price for r = 2 yr
" If servicing is very cheap (below two times the lower bound), then the servicing price
is the main driver for the optimal design lifetime, whatever the uncertainty. But the
optimal design lifetime is so sensitive to the servicing price that it is not a good guide
for decision making.
" When the servicing price is significant on the other hand, uncertainty becomes the
main driver for the optimal design lifetime. The regions of different optimal design
lifetimes become large enough to represent a significant tool for decision making.
However, an accurate estimation of the market uncertainty would be required to make
the right decision. For example, the Globalstar volatility a estimated at the start of
the mission (o = 30 %.yr-i) would recommend the longest possible lifetime. However,
the actual stock volatility as observed after five years (o- = 90 %.yr-i) corresponds
on the map to a shorter design lifetime with the option to service.
Flexibility Value
Figure 5-17 plots the relative value of flexibility for the two missions as a function of volatil-
ity. The results are very similar to those obtained in the general case. The relative flexibility
value of Globalstar is higher for the same volatility because its cost per minute is lower,
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Figure 5-17: Iridium and Globalstar: Flexibility Value as a Function of Volatility
I
making its overall market lower for the same penetration. If o- = 90 %.yr-2 is assumed
for Globalstar, then the flexibility value is 40% of the NPV, which represents $1.5B. If
o- = 120 %.yr-2 is assumed for Iridium, then the relative flexibility is 30%, which corre-
sponds to almost $6B. These cases thus confirm once more the importance of accounting
for flexibility when evaluating the advantages of on-orbit servicing.
5.3.5 Conclusions
This section proposed a new approach to decision making regarding the choice of a design
lifetime requirement and a maintenance strategy. The option valuation framework can
provide decision makers with two types of tools to strategically manage the uncertainty in
their revenues:
" If the price of on-orbit servicing is known, then the optimal design choice can be
plotted in a market level/volatility map such as figure 5-8. Provided that the uncer-
tainty is not close to the decision boundary, then broad estimations of market forecast
and volatility suffice to decide between designing for the longest possible lifetime and
designing for servicing.
* If accurate estimates of the market forecast and market volatility are developed, then
the optimal design life can be plotted in a servicing price/volatility map such as 5-16.
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Then only a broad estimation of the servicing price suffices to decide on a design
lifetime requirement.
Using these tools on the most general case possible, we showed that the maximum
servicing price that commercial space missions should be willing to pay for on-orbit servicing
is an order of magnitude higher than the cost to produce and launch the serviceable mass,
as soon as the volatility in their revenues is higher than about 40%.yr-2. This proves not
only that on-orbit servicing has significant value for commercial space missions, but also
that this conclusion can be reached only by accounting for the value of the flexibility it
provides them with.
Finally, theses results show how the valuation framework can be used as a guide for future
on-orbit servicing technology development, by defining the range of possible servicing prices
that a space mission can be charged (figure 5-11).
Note The above results suggest that the optimal design lifetime can be as long as 16
years, whereas the lifetime actually chosen by both missions was shorter than 8 years. This
is due to the simplifying assumptions made here that the cost to IOC is a linear function
of the design lifetime. In practice, there are technological limits to the design lifetime.
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Chapter 6
Towards a Value of Servicing for
Military Missions
For a significant proportion of space missions, value is not monetary and the linear valuation
model described in the previous chapter is not valid. This chapter proposes to tackle the
problem of non-commercial on-orbit servicing valuation by choosing the example of military
space missions.
The decision process for a military mission differs greatly from what happens in the
commercial world. First, mission value is not a measure of revenues minus cost, but rather
takes the form of a complex utility function divided by cost. Thus, value does not have
the same linear properties as for the cases studied by real options theory. But even more
importantly, there exists two possible decision processes. When designing a space mission
during a peaceful time, the optimal design is taken to be the one the maximizes utility
per cost under certain constraints. But when making a decision about an operational
space mission involved in contingencies, the cost factor becomes much less critical than the
performance. The alternative that maximizes utility is generally chosen.
This chapter proposes a way to adapt the options valuation framework to the special
case of military missions faced with uncertainty in the location of contingencies over the
world. The value of refueling as a way to make satellites maneuverable will be explored
in two cases. Section 6.1 considers the potential for reducing the number of satellites in a
LEO radar constellation. Section 6.2 studies the potential improvement in capacity when
optimizing the distribution in longitude of a GEO fleet of communication satellites.
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6.1 A Thin Radar Constellation
This section is interested in the potential offered by on-orbit servicing to enable new ways of
designing space systems. It addresses the example of maneuverable satellites, which would
be made possible by a refueling capability. In particular, using maneuverable spacecraft
could help reduce the number of satellites in a low Earth orbit (LEO) radar constellation.
6.1.1 Problem Statement
Discoverer II The Discoverer II (DII) program* was an Air Force, Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) joint ini-
tiative to develop and demonstrate revolutionary capabilities for space-based radar. The
program was based on DARPA's work on a new lightweight satellite called STARLITE.
Its goal was to develop, design, fabricate and launch two research and development satel-
lites capable of detecting and tracking moving targets on the Earth's surface, producing
high-resolution imagery and collecting high-resolution, digital terrain mapping data. If full
funding had been approved, deployment of additional 22 satellites was projected by DARPA
for 2003-2005. The resulting Discoverer II constellation would consists of 24 low cost satel-
lites, placed at 770 km altitude in 8 orbital planes in a Walker Delta-pattern t with a phase
value of 4 and an orbital inclination of 530; this constellation was designed to meet a com-
mander's requirement for an imaging operation within 15 min after receiving tasking, 90%
of the time, averaged across 650 north and south latitude. The Discoverer II program also
intended to show how individual satellite costs could be cut to less than $100M , reducing
the 20-year life-cycle cost of a large operational system to less than $10B. Despite these
efforts, the project was judged too expensive and was canceled.
The Idea of a Thin Constellation Space-base radar requirements are usually focused
around a few critical theaters. However, the location of these theaters cannot be predicted
at the time of mission design and can be expected to change several times over a mission
lifetime of more than a decade. Therefore, space-based radar missions need to be designed
with the flexibility to adapt to any possible theater location. Traditionally, this flexibility is
build up in the system by designing the constellation for global coverage over the range of
*http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/imint/starlight.htm
fSee next section for a definition
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possible theater latitudes, as was the case for the Discoverer II constellation. Space-based
radar systems need to be implemented in low-Earth orbit (LEO) in order to meet their
resolution requirement. Therefore global coverage requires many satellites, much more than
would be necessary for coverage of the current critical theater only. Radar constellations
are thus over-designed for instantaneous requirements.
This over-design for flexibility leads to high costs. The existence of a refueling capability
in space could offer an alternative to global coverage for flexibility to theater location. Mak-
ing satellites refuelable increases their maneuver capabilities. A constellation designed for
coverage over one location could therefore maneuver to optimize its orbital characteristics
for coverage over any new theater. Since it would be designed for instantaneous local cov-
erage, such a constellation would require fewer satellites, hence the name thin constellation.
A thin constellation offers the potential to reduce the lifetime cost of a radar constellation.
Maneuvering could also enable the constellation to focus its coverage over one theater,
improving its utility for the same cost. Thus there are at least two ways in which a refu-
eling capability could improve a mission's cost-effectiveness. But this maneuver-and-refuel
capability will of course come at an additional cost.
Goal of the Study The goal of this section is to evaluate the value of servicing to
reduce the number of satellites in a space-based radar constellation. For this purpose two
definitions of value are interesting:
9 Value can be the lifetime utility per cost, which we will define in the next section,
e Or it can refer to mission's lifetime cost only, because systems with high utility per
cost are unrealistic if their cost is higher than what decision makers are willing to
spend.
Mission Value
Four Capability Metrics The mission requirements for a radar constellation can be
expressed in terms of four GINA-type capability metrics as follows [Sha99]:
Isolation Isolation measures the ability to identify a target from the ground clutter. It is
expressed in terms of three numbers: ground resolution (cell size; 200 m), minimum
detectable velocity (MDV; lm/s), and velocity precision.
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Integrity Integrity measures the probability of an error in the information transferred.
It is here expressed in terms of the probability of false alarm and the probability of
detection.
Rate There are two important rates for a radar mission.
1. The first is the area search rate of a ground cell within a theater, omitting times
when the theater is not being searched. It measures how much territory can be
surveyed per unit time during the times in view.
2. The second is linked to the gap times between coverage of an area by successive
satellites. Discoverer II requirements are expressed in terms of what we will
called a reaction time. Reaction time is defined as the time it takes from a
request to observe an area to the actual collection of data over this area.
Availability In the GINA framework, availability is the probability to meet the mission's
requirements for isolation, rate, and integrity. It can be measured as a function of
any of these variables.
This study focuses on the trade between number of satellites and their maneuverability.
For this trade to remain unbiased, the satellites altitude and payload design will be held
constant. Under these conditions, isolation and integrity will be approximately the same
for all designs, because they are only function of the radar signal link budget. The theater
area search rate will also be constant at constant payload design.
In the framework of this study, availability is therefore a function of reaction time. The
requirements must specify a minimum availability for a minimum reaction time:
7 = (Av, Rxn)
The baseline requirements specified for Discoverer II are lZb = (90%, 15 min).
Function, Cost per Function; Utility and Value In the initial work by Shaw [Sha99],
Function was defined for a radar constellation as the total number of km 2 protected over
the lifetime of the mission. This definition holds when the constellation is designed for
global coverage and the actual target locations are unknown. In that case, coverage is
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indeed approximately uniform and the total number of km 2 protected can be considered to
be proportional to the number of critical km 2 protected.
But at any instant in time, a user can actually be satisfied only by observations of
the current critical theater. Therefore, we will define utility as the total time in view
of the instantaneous theater of interest. This theater has a probabilistic time and space
distribution, which must be taken into account.
6.1.2 Number of Satellites versus Maneuverability
Instead of designing a constellation for global coverage within a latitude band, we thus
propose to design a thin constellation using a distinct orbital configuration for each theater
location; the satellites would maneuver between each orbital configuration as the theater
location changes. This corresponds to carrying out a trade-off between the number of
satellites and their maneuverability. The more satellites can maneuver, the better they can
optimize their coverage over the current critical theater, and therefore the fewer the required
number of satellites for a given coverage requirement. On the other hand, there is a cost to
design satellites for maneuverability. This section proposes a simple maneuverability model
to help quantify this trade-off.
Reminder: Walker Delta patterns [Wal7l] are a family of configurations for constel-
lations of satellites in circular orbits at a given altitude and inclination. They are defined
by three numbers T/P/F:
" T is the total number of satellites
* P is the number of orbital planes; P can be any divisor of T
" F is the angle past its ascending node at which a satellite is when the satellite in the
neighboring plane to its East reaches its node; it has units of 2 ir/T and can take any
integer value in {0, 1,...T - 1}
A Simplified Model of Maneuverability
Maneuverability Aimax A good metric for maneuverability is the maximum incremen-
tal velocity that a satellite is designed to perform before it needs to be refueled. With this
incremental velocity AVmax, each satellite could a priori change any or all of its six orbital
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elements. In order to keep isolation and integrity constant without changing the payload de-
sign, we will consider a constant altitude and therefore constant eccentricity. The longitude
of the ascending node has little impact on the average coverage for circular low-Earth orbits.
Therefore inclination and phase between satellites in adjacent planes are the two orbital el-
ements that are interesting to change. In order to gain some insight about maneuverability
while keeping the study simple, let's further limit ourselves to Walker Delta-patterns with
a constant number of satellites placed into a constant number of planes. Then AVmax can
be used only for uniform inclination change, and change of Walker phase number.
The incremental velocity required for a change in phase, which is to first order inversely
proportional to the time allowed (equation 3.10), can safely be considered negligible com-
pared to the incremental velocity required for an inclination change. Therefore in this
simplified model, the maneuverability AVmax can simply be expressed in terms of a maxi-
mum inclination change before running out of fuel: Aimax.
As more satellites are available, mission requirements can be met at orbital inclinations
that are further and further away from the target's latitude, and at more diverse Walker
phases. Therefore increasing the number of satellites decreases their required inclination
change capability.
Viewing angle conditions Three viewing angle conditions must be met for a target to
be considered in view of the satellite, as illustrated by figure 6-1:
" A minimum grazing angle emin; the is the angle from the user's horizon to the target-
satellite line-of-sight.
" A minimum nadir hole angle rimin; this is the angle from the sub-satellite radial vector
to the satellite-target line-of-sight.
* A minimum cone angle #min; this is the angle from the satellite velocity vector to the
target-sub-satellite-point vector.
Meeting the requirements over a target Due to the rotation of the Earth below
satellites in LEO, the availability of a constellation over a location is a function of the
location latitude only. We will say that a constellation configuration meets the requirements
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Target
Figure 6-1: Definition of Viewing Angles: Satellite / Target Configuration and Satellite
Footprint
R = (Av, Rxn) over a target at latitude 9 if its reaction time for observing this target is
smaller than Rxn, Av% of the time.
Minimum number of satellites for a maneuverability For a constellation with a
fixed number of satellites T and a fixed number of orbital planes P, an orbital configuration
C is defined by two numbers, namely its inclination and its Walker phase number: C = (i, F).
Consider a target at a latitude 9. The orbital inclination i is possible if there exists
a phase F for which the configuration (i, F) meets the requirements over the target. Let
1(9) = [imin(0), imax(0)] be the range of possible orbital inclinations. In order to be able to
meet the requirements over any hot spot, it must have the maneuverability:
Aireq(T, P) = max 0, max(imin) - min(imax)
The minimum number of satellites Tmin for a maneuverability Aimax is.the minimum num-
ber of satellites T for which there exists a number of planes P such that Aireq(T, P) 5
Aimax. The function Tmin(Aimax) is illustrated on figure 6-2 for various requirements.
This estimate was obtained by numerically simulating all possible Walker Delta-patterns as
Keplerian orbits perturbed only by the oblateness of the Earth (J 2 -effect).
Ratio of time in view The ratio of time in view ( (9, C) of a given target latitude 9
is the average percentage time that the spot is viewed by a satellite in the constellation C
with the required viewing angle conditions. By convention, a constellation that does not
meet the (Av, Rxn) requirement for a target will be defined as having a null ratio of time
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Figure 6-2: Minimum Number of Satellites as a Function of Maneuverability. Ground moving
target indication (GMTI) viewing angle conditions (emin = 60, rin = 200 and # min = 00) and 10
possible targets between 0 = 0* and 0 = 48.50 are assumed.
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in view over this location. The optimal orbital configuration C(6) = (T(9), JF(6)) is the
configuration giving the maximum ratio C.
Optimal number of planes Suppose we have a finite number of possible theaters and
let PHn be the probability that the critical theater be number n. The expected utility rate
for a maneuverable constellation with T satellites in P planes is then:
NHS
U(T,P) = E PHn C (n,C(On))
n=1
Among the possible number of orbital planes P for a given number of satellites Nat = T >
Tmin(Ai), the optimal number of orbital planes P(T, Ai) is the one that yield the maximum
expected utility rate u(T) = U(T, P). If costs do not depend on the number of planes, then
this is also the number of planes that maximizes value.
Capturing the main trade With the above definitions, the number of orbital planes
and the optimal orbital configurations over each possible target are set once the number
of satellites and their maneuverability are chosen. Thus the cost as well as the utility
rate of a constellation depend only on two parameters: its number of satellites T and its
maneuverability Aimax. This is the level of simplification that we wanted to reach.
6.1.3 Maneuverable Satellite Propulsion System
Modeling the effect of maneuverability on the satellite cost is key to capturing the trade
between the number of satellites and their maneuverability. This effect is mainly dependent
on the design of a propulsion system.
This section considers the effect of choosing between two very different types of propul-
sion systems: chemical propulsion, which is very fuel consuming but allows for quasi-
instantaneous maneuvers; and electric propulsion, which requires long maneuvering times
but leads to much lighter spacecraft.
Chemical Propulsion
An example of a baseline chemical propulsion system that was designed for refueling is the
Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) Propulsion Subsystem [WCH88]. It could carry up to
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Table 6.1: Selection of Representative Electric Propulsion Systems from [WL99]
Concept I[s] Pin[kW] Tp[mN/kW] Mp[kg/kW] Propellant
Resistojet 299 0.9 905 1 N 2H 4
Arcjet 580 2.17 113 2.5 N 2 H4
Pulsed Plasma Thruster (PPT) 1200 0.02 16.1 85 Teflon
Hall Effect Thruster (HET) 2042 4.5 54.3 6 Xenon
Ion Thruster 3400 0.6 25.6 23.7 Xenon
1800 kg of hydrazine.
If the maneuverable spacecraft use several times the same tank as for the GRO, or tanks
designed with the same sizing proportions, then the ratio of the total tank mass over the
usable fuel mass remains constant. It is then a fair approximation to define as in chapter 3
a constant propulsion subsystem mass factor f, such that:
dry - pfue
For the GRO, this factor is found to be fz~ 15%.
Chemical maneuvers are well modeled as impulsive burns, which means that the change
in inclination can be considered to be instantaneous. The incremental velocity and time
required to perform an inclination change Aimax are therefore:
AVm"em = 2 Vo sin (2a) (6.1)
ATcax" =0
where V is the orbital velocity at the satellite's altitude ao.
Electric Propulsion
Unlike chemical impulses, electric propulsion maneuvers consist of low-thrust, continuous
burns over long periods of time.
[WL99] gives the input power Pi7 , the thrust/power ratio Tp, the specific impulse Isp
and the specific mass Mp for various existing electric propulsion systems. A representative
selection of these systems is reproduced in table 6.1. The thrust available from NT thrusters
is:
F = NT Tp Pn = T Pinput (6.2)
142
where Pinput = NT Pin is the total input power to the propulsion system.
Vo
6i Vo
Figure 6-3: Low-Thrust Inclination Change
Since the maneuver is not instantaneous, the formula for inclination change 6V =
2 Vo sin(6i/2) is valid for short time scales only. Making the approximation that the orbit
remains circular at all points during the low-thrust maneuver, this gives:
di 1 dV
dt Vo dt
If the thrust F and the exhaust velocity g I1, are constant, then the mass flow rate M =
F/g Is, is constant and the total time for the maneuver can be estimated from the rocket
equation:
Vo As Minit
9 13P Mint - AT/g 1sp)
which finally yields:
AV e I = Vo jAimax|
ATelec = 1 - e 9 ISe I nmax Tp Pinput
(6.4)
Thus the time to maneuver is proportional to the spacecraft wet mass Minit and inversely
proportional to the power Pinput available for propulsion.
Spacecraft Mass Budget
The spacecraft mass budget is then the same as described in chapter 3. Recalling equation
3.5:
Mdry,tot = A
1-(f+ tfi+Efst) (e 7P -1)
Mlaunch = Mdrytot ( 1 + e - 1
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Figure 6-4 compares the mass increase, and the time for a given inclination change per
kg/kW of spacecraft, for the electric propulsion systems given in table 6.1 and for chemical
propulsion.
Figure 6-5 plots the total spacecraft dry mass versus the time to maneuver for a space-
craft similar to the Discoverer II baseline satellites, which had Mbase = 4, 400kg
payload radiating 4 kW of power, hence Pinpt ~ 10 kW. A spacecraft with chemical
propulsion would accomplish a = 200 change in less than a day and have a dry
mass of 6000 kg; a spacecraft with arcjets would maneuver in 195 days and have a dry mass
of 5000 kg; and a spacecraft with ion thrusters would maneuver in 571 days and have a dry
mass of 4470 kg. Thus without any increase in available power, the mass savings allowed
by electric propulsion come at the expense of very long maneuver times.
6.1.4 Modeling Utility per Cost
Building Blocks
The basic elements of the flexibility valuation take a special form here for two reasons: on-
demand refueling requires continuous decision points, and the decision model is to maximize
current utility instead of maximizing future value.
Uncertain parameter: theater dynamics The uncertain parameter is the latitude X =
0 of the current critical theater of action.
Bonds & al show that the historical occurrence of world conflicts has been similar to
a Poisson process, i.e. the probability that a contingency appears between the times
t and t + dt is of the form vc dt. Here we are interested in a radar constellation that
must constantly cover the most critical theater of action. A reasonable assumption
is that any new contingency has a certain probability to become the new theater of
action, so that the probability that the theater changes between t and t + dt is of the
form v dt where we will can v the hot spot frequency.
A new theater is relevant for the radar constellation only if it appears at a significantly
different latitude. Thus it is sufficient to define a finite number NH of hot spots,
each spot n representing a different region around the latitude On, and having the
probability PHn to contain the most critical theater. For the purpose of this study,
we will assume that the PHn are constant. If the theater is in spot n at t, then at t+dt
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Dry Mass as a Function of Maneuverability
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Figure 6-4: Spacecraft Mass and Time for Inclination Change for Selected Electric Propul-
sion Systems. To know the number of days for a given aimax, multiply the value read on the plot
by the total mass of the spacecraft in kg and divide it by the power available for propulsion in kW.
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Figure 6-5: Spacecraft Mass versus Time for Inclination Change for Selected Electric Propul-
sion Systems in the Case Mbse = 4400 kg and Pp 1 t = 10 kW.
it has the probability (1 - v dt) to still be in n, and the probability v dt P/(1 - PHn)
to be in any other spot 1.
Modes of operation The possible modes of operation are the NH constellation configu-
rations Cn = (%n, Fn) optimized over each hot spot n.
Utility rate The utility rate is the ratio of time in view of the current configuration (n)
over the current theater latitude X:
u(")(X) X ,C
Decision points The decision points are here continuous: at each time t, the decision can
be made whether to maneuver to a new configuration (n). If the decision is to not
maneuver, then the next decision point occurs at t + dt. However, if the decision is to
maneuver and the time to perform a maneuver TM is finite, then there won't be any
other decision point until t + TM. This makes the system dependent on history, which
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is contrary to one of the framework assumptions made in chapter 4 (Markov process
assumption). This contradiction can be leveraged, and the system made dependent
on the current state of nature only, by defining a maneuver rate pu = 1/TM: the
probability to finish the maneuver between t and t + dt verifies dP = PyM dt.
Matrix of switching costs We saw that the main impact of maneuverability was mass.
Since the added mass is primarily made up a fuel and structures to support the
fuel, a reasonable approximation is to assume that the development and production
cost do not depend on maneuverability. The cost to initial operating capability is a
function of the number of satellites in the constellation and their maneuverability:
CIoc = f" (Nsat, Aimax). The dependence of the satellite mass on maneuverability
is given by equation 3.5. The dependence on number of satellites is made up of
three terms: constant development costs, launch costs proportional to the number of
satellites, and production costs subject to a learning curve factor B. So that finally:
A Vd
1 + e (e 9IsP - 1i
CIOC = CD + Nt C + Nsat Mbase CL (6.5)
1 - (efst + fp + fpfst) (e a - r
where CL is the launch cost per unit mass.
Switching modes of operation requires refueling. The servicing price is likely to depend
on the mass to be delivered, which is a function of the inclination change to be
performed. Let us assume that there is a constant servicing price Csm per unit
mass delivered. Then any result on servicing price per unit mass will be directly
comparable to launch prices per unit mass. The incremental velocity to maneuver
between configurations (m) and (n) is a function of their difference in inclination:
A V(mn) - 2 Vo sin (|Tm - Ta l/2) with chemical propulsion,
V ITM -YnlI with electric propulsion.
The mass of fuel to be delivered is then M 4J-3) = Mdry (enV/IsPg - 1), so that the
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servicing price to switch modes is of the form:
exp (AV(m-n)) _ 1
CA) V * Csm (6.6)
1-(Efst + fp + fp fst) (e gp -)
Decision model It makes sense that the initial decision between different designs be made
on a utility per cost basis. However, in a military framework it also makes sense that
as a theater location changes, the decision be to maximize the performance achievable
with the current system. The decision model therefore dictates to maneuver on-
demand to the new optimal configuration C = (i; F).
Value model
In this study the decision model thus takes of new form, which is to continuously optimize
performance instead of periodically maximize future value. Thus the decision depends on the
uncertain parameter and the current mode of operation, but not on the decision time. The
best method to estimate value in this case is therefore not a backwards iterative process.
A Markov model is more appropriate. Such a model presents the further advantage of
facilitating the introduction of a servicing rate ps and a probability of a crash PC.
At least five states are necessary to describe the constellation behavior:
1. The satellites have enough fuel for a maneuver and the constellation is optimized over
the current theater.
2. The satellites do not have enough fuel for a maneuver but the constellation is optimized
over the current theater.
3. The satellites have enough fuel for a maneuver and the constellation is not optimized
over the current theater.
4. The satellite do not have enough fuel for a maneuver and the constellation is not
optimized over the current theater.
5. Some satellites are failed, so that the constellation cannot meet the requirements.
The Markov process is illustrated on figure 6-6: the constellation stops being optimized
at a rate v, at which point it must maneuver with a rate pm, then be refueled with a rate
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Figure 6-6: Markov Model for a Maneuverable Radar Constellation
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the risk of a failure with rate Pc /.s. Finally, failed satellites
If desired, it is also easy at this point to model the aging of
A; however this captures no fundamental difference between a
and a baseline constellations. The resulting Markov matrix is:
(1 - Pc )s
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0
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0
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0
0
ps(-A)
Pc As (+A)
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0
0
0
-A)
(6.7)
The vector of probabilities (Pi)i to be in each state i is given by solving the differential
equation:
P(0) = [1 0 0 0 0]; (6.8)
P(t) = Am P(t)
The final calculation of the mission value is summarized on table 6.2.
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Table 6.2: Summary of Thin Constellation Valuation Process
E{U}
E{C}
T+ To
TH
JMR e-' P5(t) dt
0
TH
pS e 2 4t +P( ) ) di
0
z HnPHm P(n+m)
n=1 nm PHn
NH
( -q(On)
n=1
NH
E (on, Cm)
n=1 mon
T H
(P1 (t) + P2(t)) dt
0
TH
J(P 3(t) + P4 (t)) dt
0
where:
Discounted number of replacements
Discounted number of servicings
Average cost to change configuration
Average utility rate if optimized configuration
Average utility rate if non-optimized configuration
Time spent with optimized configuration
Time spent with non-optimized configuration
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E{U} =
E{C} = CI0C(Nsat + NR, Aimax) + Ns C
NR =
6.1.5 Results for the Baseline Case
Numerical Assumptions
Distribution of Potential Hot Spots Let us assume that there are ten hot spots around
the world, as shown in table 6.3. These hot spots are representative of any set of locations
within 0' and 48' latitude: the limitation to ten spots thus simplifies the study without
sacrificing any generality.
Table 6.3: Latitude of Hot Spots
Hot Spot Number n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Latitude On 48.510 450 420 40.50 33.50 320 31.90 300 13.8* 00
Probability Pn 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Table 6.4: Baseline Assumptions
Parameter Symbol Nominal Value Source
Mission horizon TH 20 yr Discoverer II
Required reaction time Rxn 15 min Discoverer II
Required availability Av 90% Discoverer II
Altitude ho 770 km Discoverer II
Min. grazing angle Emin 120(SAR)/ 60 (GMTI) Discoverer II
Min. nadir angle 77min 200 Discoverer II
Min. cone angle Omin 450 (SAR)/ 00 (GMTI) Discoverer II
Hot spot frequency v lyr- Adapted from [BMH+ 00]
Mean time to refuel pS 1 week Estimate from lit.
Mean time to maneuver m [1 day; 2 months] Parameter
Satellite's specific impulse sPC 320 s Chemical [WL99]
IspE 299 - 3400 s Electric [WL99]
Structures mass factor fst 0.2 Robust design
Propulsion dry mass factor f, 0.15 GRO [WCH88]
Learning curve factor B 0.926 95% slope
The satellites are launched with fuel for orbit insertion, station-keeping and de-orbiting
as if they where not to maneuver. Fuel for maneuver (maximum load) is filled right after
orbit insertion. After each maneuver the amount of fuel that has been used is refilled.
Chemical Propulsion: Instant Maneuver but Prohibitive Mass
If the location of the main theater of action change, it is critical that the radar satellite
be able to observe the new theater as fast as possible. Chemical propulsion offers the great
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Figure 6-7: Chemical Propulsion: IOC Cost as Function of Maneuverability
advantage of minimizing the time for an inclination change. This however comes at the
expense of an exponential mass increase.
Figure 6-7 shows the minimum cost of a constellation to IOC as a function of its maneu-
verability, assuming that the optimal number of satellites is chosen. This optimal happens
to be the minimum number of satellites required for each maneuverability, so that the
production costs are as expected a decreasing function of maneuverability. But while pro-
duction costs decrease linearly, launch costs increase exponentially with maneuverability as
a results of the exponential mass increase.
A very slight minimum of cost and maximum of utility per cost (see figure 6-8) is
observed for a maneuverability Aimax = 100. But the difference with zero maneuverability
is so slight that it allows no room for servicing price: whatever the price of servicing,
chemical maneuverability cannot be interesting for this radar constellation.
It is interesting to note that in this case, there is no value to refueling whatever the design
of a servicing infrastructure. This proves the interest of studying the value of servicing before
even attempting to model its cost.
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Figure 6-8: Chemical Propulsion: Mission Value for Null Servicing Price
Electric Propulsion: High Maneuverability and but Very Long Maneuver
The exponential mass increase observed in the previous section is the direct effect of the
low specific impulse of chemical propulsion. With electric propulsion, the propulsion system
mass can stay within reasonable bounds, as we saw on figure 6-4. This cost advantage
however comes at the expense of a very long time to maneuver. Though a long maneuver
time is unacceptable in the context of war, it may be acceptable in the context of peacetime
surveillance. An upper bound on the value of servicing can be found by assuming that there
is no limit on the allowed time to maneuver and considering the various propulsion schemes
given in table 6.1.
Figure 6-9 shows that for a sufficiently high specific impulse, the impact of maneuver-
ability on spacecraft mass becomes negligible, so that the sum of production and launch
costs decreases with increasing maneuverability. In the case of free servicing, the optimal
design would be the highest possible maneuverability, Ajmax = 400. However, the higher
the maneuverability, the higher the total mass that must be delivered to the constellation
over the lifetime of the mission. As soon as servicing has a price, the optimal maneuverabil-
ity is thus lower. Considering the difference in cost and in utility between the maneuverable
cases and the non-maneuverable case, one can determine the maximum servicing price per
unit mass under which the optimal design is maneuverable.
This maximum is illustrated on figure 6.1.5 as a function of time allowed to maneuver,
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taking into account the different types of electric propulsion systems. Approximately the
same results are obtained whether considering utility per cost or cost alone. The maximum
servicing price is greater than five times the cost to launch to LEO (which is approximately
$10 K/kg) for any electric propulsion system but arcjets and resistojets. Thus, if the price of
servicing is kept close to the marginal servicing cost, an electric thin constellation is more
cost-effective than a global coverage, non-maneuverable constellation. In the case of ion
thrusters, the maximum servicing price is even an order of magnitude higher than typical
launch costs. However, this must be traded against maneuver time. The maneuver time
that makes electric propulsion optimal is of the order of a year for the baseline satellite's
mass and power. Given that no power is available for the payload during a maneuver, such
a long time is unacceptable in the critical context of radar coverage of a military theater of
action.
6.1.6 Conclusions
By introducing a Markov model of the dynamics of contingencies, this section successfully
expanded the framework to account for continuous decision times in the special case when
the decision is to always optimize performance. The trade of number of satellites versus
maneuverability was explored for a radar constellation for two types of propulsion systems.
While chemical propulsion offers the fastest maneuverability, its exponential mass increase
outweighs the advantages of servicing. Refueling proves much more promising for electric
propulsion systems, for which the maximum servicing price per unit mass can be as high
as an order of magnitude greater than launch costs to LEO. However, electric propulsion
systems require unacceptable times for a change in inclination.
These results suggest that refueling would have no value for a LEO radar constellation
unless revolutionary propulsion technologies, offering fast maneuver and high specific im-
pulse, were developed. Before drawing definitive conclusions, other options should of course
be explored, such as other types of maneuverability (not limited to inclination change of a
Walker Delta-pattern) or step-wise chemical inclination change (refueling after each step).
These studies are however outside the bounds of this research effort.
Instead, let us use this generalization of the framework to study another military case,
for which the incremental velocity for maneuvering is less problematic.
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6.2 Military Communications under Uncertain Contingency
Locations
The uncertainty in the occurrence and location of contingencies does not affect only radar
satellites. As the military deploy troops, their communications needs over the longitude of
the theater increase significantly. An answer to these needs is to lease capacity on available
commercial geostationary satellites [BMH+00]. However, commercial satellites can be used
only for information that requires a low level of security.
There is therefore a need for flexibility in the distribution of the capacity provided
by military satellites. This flexibility could be achieved by making geostationary military
satellites maneuverable, so that their distribution in longitude as a function of the distribu-
tion of contingencies. Changes in longitude require only small incremental velocities even
for a short allowed maneuvering time, thus solving the problem faced in the previous sec-
tion. Is this enough to make refueling of significant value ? This section proposes a basic,
first-order-of-magnitude model to estimate the maximum servicing price that would make
on-orbit servicing interesting for this case.
6.2.1 Satellite Design: Design-AV
Incremental Velocity for Phasing Maneuvers
Changing longitude by an angle Azb corresponds to a phasing maneuver, which can be
accomplished by altering the apogee of the orbit so that the slightly different period cancels
out the difference in phase. The required incremental velocity depends on the time ATmax
allowed to perform the maneuver and was given in chapter 3 t:
AVph (Ab, ATmax) = 2
V= 2 2- -4D2r 1
(ATmax A4'b
where 1 = Integer part of To + 27r
Figure 6-11 illustrates this function. It shows in particular that the velocity increment
is proportional to A-b/ATmax for ATmax > 7 days.
$And more details are provided in appendix B.1.2
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Figure 6-11: AV to Change the Longitude of a GEO Satellite as a Function of Time Allowed
to Maneuver
Fleet Maneuver Scheme
Suppose that capacity is required to be moved between two regions separated in longitude
by an angle nAo. There are two ways to maneuver the fleet of satellites, as illustrated on
figure 16:
1. Move one satellite by an angle not so as to minimize the number of satellites to be
refueled, or
2. Move each satellite to the nearest slot in the direction of the capacity move; the
satellites replace each other in a row so that each of them maneuvers the least far
possible. If satellites are placed every A4, this corresponds to moving n satellites by
an angle AD.
Previous results suggest that it is important to minimize spacecraft design-AV. However,
the incremental velocity required for station keeping of a GEO satellite with a design life
or 10 years is of the order of 500 m/s. Figure 6-11 shows that as soon as two days are
allowed for the maneuver, the incremental velocity for any longitude change is smaller than
700 m/s. It is therefore reasonable to design the satellites for A~max = -r and choose
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Figure 6-12: Possible Maneuver Schemes for a Military Communications GEO Fleet
maneuver scheme (1), which maximizes the communications availability during the time of
the maneuver.
The satellites can be assumed to be refueled after each maneuver, as well as every time
they have performed AVmax for station keeping. Their design-AV is therefore:
A V = max {AVn8 , A V (7r, ATmax)}
where AVinS is the incremental velocity required for orbit insertion if the satellites are
launched into geostationary transfer orbit. The mass budget is then the same as for the
chemical radar constellation considered in section 6.1.
6.2.2 Modeling Value
Building Blocks
The building blocks for the valuation process are very similar to the previous case. In
particular, on-demand maneuvering requires continuous decision points, and the decision
model is to maximize current performance instead of maximizing future value; the same
baseline principles lead to the same valuation method.
Uncertain parameter Assume that the total number of contingencies to be covered
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around the world is a constant No. The uncertainty lies in the distribution of these
contingencies as a function of longitude. It is practical to divide the globe in NR re-
gions and define the uncertain parameter as the vector X = (X 1 , ..., XNR) describing
the number of contingencies that lie in each region. We note that ENi Xk = Nc;
there are therefore NR - 1 independent random variables Xk. If at time t contingen-
cies have the same probability p = 1/NR to occur in each region, then the probability
that the distribution of contingencies be C = (X 1 , X 2 ... , XNR) is:
P { (X1, X 2 ..., XNR) pa (_ P)b Nc! (6.9)NR
rl Xj!
NR-1
wherequad = Z Xi
k=1
Nr-1
and b = (NR-1)NC- Z kXNR-k
k=1
Modes of operation The fleet is made up of Nat military GEO satellites whose only
degree on freedom is their longitude. The possible modes of operation are the distri-
butions of the fleet over the NR regions: C = (ni, n2 ..., nNR) where nk is the number
of satellites attributed to region k.
Decision model As for the thin constellation case, the decision model is independent
of time: it says to maximize the achievable performance of the current system.
This is achieved by maneuvering into the optimal distribution of satellites nk =
I (Xk Nsat/NC) as soon as demand moves, under the constraint NRi nk = Nsat.
Decision times The decision process is continuous. This requires the definition of a ma-
neuver rate LM = 1/ATmax; and a contingency frequency ve as the rate at which
contingencies move; in other words, between t and t + dt there is a probability vc dt
that a contingency will move to a different region.
Utility The demand is expressed in terms of total capacity (data rate) required over the
world. The part of the demand that is not met by the maneuverable fleet will be met
by commercial satellite leases or use of other military systems. Therefore, the utility
of the system can be defined as the percentage of data transfer required that has been
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met over the lifetime of the mission. The utility rate at t is thus the percentage of the
data rate R(t) required that is provided at t.
Let R be the data rate provided by each satellite, and assume that several satellites
above the same region can be used at full capacity. The required capacity over a
region k is R(t) Xk /Nc. Therefore the utility rate of configuration C is:
1 NR R l(t) Xk
u(X, t) = min nk R, (6.10)
RZ(t) E mnNck=1
For a maneuverable constellation, nk = I (Xk Nat/Nc) as soon as the maneuver is
performed, so that:
U(X, t) = Vi(t) Po(t) + Un-(t) Pno(t) (6.11)
where Po(t) is the probability to be in an optimized configuration, which at t has the
expected utility rate:
V= P { (X1, ...XNR) min (X sat) ) (6.12)
Xk>O k=1
Z Xk=NC
and Pno(t) is the probability to be in a non-optimized configuration, which corresponds
to missing one satellite over one region:
__ R
uno(t) = U(t) - R (6.13)
Switching costs Is is convenient to assume as previously that the price to service is pro-
portional to the mass to be delivered, and look for a maximum in terms service price
per serviced kg. In this case the price to refuel after a change of longitude AD is:
exp (AV(A<bATma) _ IC(AIG) = ""Mba sm = z(Ac) Mba"* Cs
1 - (efst + fp + fpfst) (e "I - )
(6.14)
where Csm is the servicing price per unit mass.
Contingencies that require a satellite in a region k to maneuver have equal probability
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Figure 6-13: Possible and Equally Likely Maneuvers
1/(NR - 1) to appear in any of the NR - 1 other regions. A satellite will always take
the shortest past to maneuver, so that the possible maneuvers are illustrated on figure
6-13. Given the choice of maneuver scheme, this means that the average fuel cost for
a maneuver is:
Cs = js Miase (6.15)
i x(kA+l) if NR=21±1
21-21 Zx(kA4) + 21 1 x(lA() if NR-=21
k=1
Markov model
The continuous decision process can be described by a Markov process very similar to the
one proposed in section 6.1. Thanks to the symmetry of the regions, the performance of the
fleet can be described by two states: (o) optimized configuration and (no) non-optimized
configuration. On average, a satellite will need to maneuver only every Nat/Nc changes in a
contingency location. Therefore transitions from (o) to (no) occur with rate v = Nsat Ic/Nc,
while satellites maneuver with rate pm from state (no) to state (o).
Satellites will maneuver one at a time. In order to take into account the effect of the
servicing rate ps, each state must be divided into (Nsat + 1) sub-states, where sub-state k
means k satellites need to be refueled. Finally, the failed state (f ) and the replacement rate
yR must be considered to account for a non-zero probability of catastrophic event PC.
The transitions in the Markov model are illustrated on figure 6-14, where Nsat = 2 for
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Figure 6-14: Markov Model for Maneuverable Milcom GEO fleet
the sake of clarity. The corresponding Markov matrix is finally (with p' = (1 - Pc)ps):
p'S
0
0 0
-v-ps Ms
0
pM 0
0 pl
0 0
Am =
0 0 -- ps 0 pM 0 0
v 0
0 v
0 0
0 -P.
0 0
v 0
p's 0 0
S- -M I's
0
\ 0 PC /s PC PS 0 Pc As PC [s
The discounted number of attempted servicings is:
TH N.,at
Nserv = Is J ert dt (Po,k(t) - Pno,k(t))
0 k=1
The discounted number of satellite replacements due to servicing catastrophic events is:
TH
Nrep = AR J
0
e-rt Pf(t) dt
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(6.16)
0
-ps 0
(6.17)
(6.18)
Sats needing refuel: 2
The final value is given by:
E{U}
E{C}
V
- fT P(t) f(t) dt + fT" Pno (t);U(t) dt
= C10 (Nsat + Nrep, A Vd) + Nserv CS (6.19)
Comparison with the Baseline Fleet
For a baseline constellation, which cannot maneuver, nk = Nsat/NR satellites are attributed
to each region permanently, so that the utility rate for a contingency distribution X is:
1
u6 (X,t) =R(t)
Nsat R
mn(NR
Xk R(t)
Nc)
The expected utility rate at t is:
Ub(t) =
Xk =O
ZXk=NC
P {(X1, 
... XNR) I
NRE
k=1
mi NsatR
The value of this baseline mission is finally
E{U} =
E{Cb} =
Vb
Maximum Servicing Price
(6.21)Cloc(Nsat, AVd,b)
The maximum servicing price per unit mass T is the servicing price under which the value
of the maneuverable fleet is greater than the value of the baseline fleet:
V > Vb
E{U}
+=> E{C} < E{Cb}
{Ub}
+=> CIC(Nsat + Nrep, AVd) + Nserv TS M Cms < E{Ub} E{Cb}
hence:
(6.22)
163
NRE
k=1
Xk ) (6.20)
- E{U} E{Cb}/E{U} - COC(Nat + Nrep, AVd)
Nserv Is MaseNsr Sdry
Mission value
fT"W
6.2.3 Results
Numerical Assumptions
Baseline fleet of satellites Let us consider as our baseline satellite fleet the Defense
Satellite Communication System (DSCS) satellites 5. The Air Force Space Command (AFSC)
currently operates Nat = 9 Phase III DSCS satellites in geostationary orbit, over NR = 5
main areas of coverage. The system is used for high priority command and control communi-
cations such as the exchange of wartime information between defense officials and battlefield
commanders. Each satellite is designed for 10 years, has a lift-off weight Mlaunch = 2615 kg
and an on-orbit weight Mbase = 1170 kg, from which we can infer that an upper stage
is used for orbit insertion, so that the design-AV of the baseline satellites is to provide
station keeping and end-of-life disposal only; for baseline satellites this is approximately
AVd,b = 600 m/s with a 20% margin. The cost of each unit is approximately C = $ 200 M,
which we can approximate as being equal to:
CU CP
1 - West + fp + fpfst) (e g'e -1
Baseline demand The overall demand is increasing with time at an approximate rate
1 Gbps/yr starting from a current value of 3 Gbps [BMH+00]. Given the definition of utility,
it is sufficient to define the demand in terms of a percentage compared to its present value,
so that:
7Z(t) = 1 + az t
with an = 1/3 yr 1 . We will further assume that the demand is exactly met by the current
satellite fleet, so that Nsat R = 1.
Dynamics of Contingencies Bonds & al [BMH+00] analyze the communications needs
of the military. They note on historical data that on average, 6.5 contingencies are occurring
at any time over the world, among which 2.9 have small communications needs (weight 1),
2.7 have medium communications needs (weight 4) and 0.9 have large communications needs
(weight 10). This corresponds to Nc ~ 10 concurrent small contingencies at any time.
6http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/com/dscs_3.htm
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Table 6.5: Fleet of GEO Military Communication Satellites: Numerical Assumptions
Parameter Name Value Source
Number of contingencies NC 10 Adapted from [BMH+00]
Number of regions NR 5 DSCS satellites coverage
Number of satellites Nsat 9 DSCS satelllites
Contingency frequency vc 3/yr Adapted from [BMH+00]
Max time to maneuver ATmax 2 days Priority estimate
Mission horizon TH 10 yr DSCS design lifetime
Orbit insertion AV AvXs 0 m/s Use upper stage
Specific impulse Is, 320 s Chemical propulsion
Fuel fraction at launch 6 1 Not too heavy
Structures mass factor fat 0.2 Robust design
Propulsion dry mass factor f 1 0.15 GRO [WCH88]
Baseline unit cost Cu $200 M DSCS (web)
Cost of launch CL $ 30K/kg DSCS launchers
Risk-free interest rate r 7% Typical
Baseline satellite mass Mbase 1170 kg DSCS
Servicing rate Is 1/(7 days) Estimate
Probability of crash Pc 0.001 Estimate
Replacement rate sm 3/yr Estimate
They model contingencies as a Poisson process. Each contingency has a probability
p = 0.6 to end after three months (which would correspond to vo = 4) and a probability
1 - p = 0.4 to be extended for three additional months. This would correspond to an
expected contingency frequency:
uo= (- p)k pwo In(p) 3/yrvc o =: = - ~p /y1-pk=1-
Table 6.5 summarizes the other baseline numerical assumptions.
Improvement in Utility
With a maneuverable constellation, the capacity of the fleet is almost fully exploited at
any time. With a baseline fleet on the other hand, some satellites are wasted over areas
with small number of contingencies, while others would be needed where contingencies
concentrate. Therefore the utility of the baseline fleet is smaller than the utility of the
maneuverable fleet.
Figures 6-15 and 6-16 illustrate the function Ub/U as a function of number of satellites,
number of simultaneous contingencies, and contingency frequency. For the baseline case,
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maneuverability enables a 20% improvement in utility. This number increases as the number
of satellites increases, due to the improved flexibility of the fleet. It decreases as contingency
frequency increases, due to finite time necessary to react to a contingency move. However,
these two effects are almost negligible. Much stronger is the sensitivity of the baseline
utility to the number of contingencies: the more numerous the contingencies requiring the
same overall capacity, the smaller the relative deviations from a uniform distribution of
contingencies over longitude, and therefore the smaller the capacity wasted by the baseline
fleet.
Maximum Servicing Price
Figures 6-15 and 6-16 also plot the maximum servicing price as a function of number of
satellites, number of simultaneous contingencies and contingency frequency.
For the baseline values, the maximum servicing price if $220 K/kg, which is more than
seven times the cost to launch to GEO. This shows that servicing would be significantly
interesting for this case as soon as the fleet of satellites pay only the marginal cost of
servicing.
The maximum servicing price T decreases at higher contingency frequencies because of
the increasing number of maneuvers necessary per year. For ve = 12/yr, the maximum
servicing price is of the order of the cost to launch to GEO: following the contingencies
becomes too expensive compared to the increase in utility.
T also decreases with increasing number of contingencies, as a result of the increasing
utility of the baseline constellation. As the distribution of contingencies becomes homoge-
neous, the need for maneuverability decreases. For the baseline vc = 3/yr, the maximum
servicing price remains however always an order of magnitude higher than the launch cost.
Sensitivity Studies
Sensitivity to time allowed to maneuver As more time is allowed to maneuver,
the spacecraft design-AV decreases and the maneuverable satellites become lighter and
therefore less expensive. Figure 6-17 (a) plots the sensitivity of T to ATmax, all other
parameters being equal to their baseline value. Although very interesting from this plot,
longer times to maneuver may not be acceptable from a military point of view, when security
is at stake. This is why A/.Tmax = 2 days was assumed as the baseline requirement.
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Figure 6-17: Sensitivity of T to (a) Time Allowed to Maneuver (b) Demand Growth Rate
and Discount Factor
Sensitivity to demand growth and discount rate The utilities of both the baseline
and the maneuverable fleet are decreasing functions of the overall demand growth rate agz.
Since the utility of the maneuverable fleet is higher, its sensitivity to demand growth rate is
higher, which results in a maximum servicing price that decreases with increasing demand,
as shown by figure 6-17 (b).
This figure also illustrates the effect of the discount rate: as r increases, the cost of the
baseline fleet remains unchanged, while the servicing expenses of the maneuverable fleet,
which occur later in time, become cheaper. Therefore the maximum servicing price is an
increasing function of the discount rate r. However, the order of magnitude of T remains
the same over the range of reasonable risk-free interest rates.
Sensitivity to probability of a catastrophic event Figure 6-18 (a) shows that the
sensitivity of T to the probability of a crash, PC, is very small. This is due to the fact
that PC was taken into account only in the Markov model: the effect of a 1% probability
of crash is simply a 1% increase in costs, to account for replacements. The actual impact
of PC, which would be a temporary loss of communications over a region and the military
consequences thereof, are much more serious than what this figure suggests, but not easily
captured by a simple model.
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Figure 6-18: Sensitivity of T to (a) Probability of a Catastrophic Event (b) Dry Mass
Factors
Sensitivity to mass factors Finally, figure 6-18 (b) shows the sensitivity of T with
respect to the assumed dry mass factors fst and fp. As expected, the cost of maneuverability
increases with increasing dry mass factors, which leads to a decreasing maximum servicing
price. However, the design-AV of the maneuverable satellites is here very close to the
design-AV of the baseline satellites. As a result, baseline and maneuverable satellites are
affected in a similar fashion by the dry mass factors. Thus, the sensitivity of T to fst and
f, is linear and not exponential; the maximum servicing price varies by less than 40% over
the whole range of realistic mass factors.
6.2.4 Conclusions
This section showed that the maneuverability concept is very promising for a fleet of GEO
satellites. The maximum servicing price is an order of magnitude greater than the cost to
launch mass into geostationary orbit, which guarantees that servicing can be interesting for
realistic marginal infrastructure costs.
Sensitivity studies show that whenever broad assumptions on some parameters had to
be made, the same conclusions hold over the whole range of reasonable parameter values.
Only two parameters were shown to make a significant difference in maximum servicing
price. The first is the time allowed for a maneuver: doubling this time roughly doubles the
maximum servicing price. However, this parameter may not be a subject of trade in the
170
framework of responding to military contingencies. The second is the contingency frequency,
which gives a measure of how often a satellite needs to maneuver. As this frequency doubles,
the maximum servicing price is roughly divided by two: when contingencies move too
fast, the costs of maneuverability outweigh its advantages. However, servicing remains
significantly interesting up to twice the baseline estimated contingency frequency.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
7.1 Summary
The goal of this thesis was to develop of general way to estimate the value of on-orbit
servicing for space systems. In the introduction, we defined two possible research directions
to yield general results about the cost-effectiveness of on-orbit servicing and set out to
explore them both.
Expansion of the traditional approach Chapter 3 explored the first direction. It
expanded the traditional approach to on-orbit servicing by defining a method to estimate
servicing cost-effectiveness on a wide trade space of space missions and servicing infrastruc-
tures. It also developed the first equations to model the optimal maneuver scheme for a
fleet a servicer vehicles visiting a constellation of satellites.
A typical application of the model was then presented and used to illustrate the limita-
tions of the traditional approach to on-orbit servicing. This approach tends to underestimate
the value of servicing and to demonstrate cost advantages smaller than the cost uncertainty.
The analysis of these limitations served as a motivation to define a new research direction.
Definition of a new framework for the value of flexibility provided by on-orbit
servicing Chapter 4 laid out the foundations of this new approach. First, the value
of on-orbit servicing for space systems, defined as the maximum price a space mission is
willing to pay for being serviced, should exist independently of the design choices internal
to the servicing infrastructure. Second, on-orbit servicing would provide space systems with
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options to react to the resolution of uncertainty, and the value of this flexibility should be
taken into account.
Building and expanding on decision tree analysis and real options theory, a framework
to embed the value of flexibility into the valuation of space missions faced with uncertainty
was developed. The framework relies on the definition of a few building blocks, the most
important being a model of the uncertainty, a set of reachable operational modes, a sequence
of decision points, and a definition of mission value. Once these building blocks are set up,
the mission value can be obtained from a backwards iterative process similar to a decision
tree with infinite number of branches. This value embeds the value of flexibility by taking
into account the ability of decision makers to always optimize their decision using the latest
available information.
This framework accomplishes the main goal of the thesis: it defines a general method
to estimate the value of on-orbit servicing for space missions, taking the value of flexibility
into account. It also represents a new perspective to space missions decision making, in
which the value of flexibility is estimated as a tool to strategically manage external sources
of uncertainty.
The following chapters proved a solid validation of the framework. They also yielded
interesting information about the value of on-orbit servicing for two types of space systems.
Value of the compound option to abandon The framework was first used in section
5.2 to estimate the value of the option to abandon, which is available to all space missions
but has never yet been accounted for. The results show that traditional valuation methods
have been significantly underestimating the value of all missions with uncertain revenues,
creating a bias in favor of conservative projects. By recognizing the flexibility of decision
makers to shut off an unsuccessful mission, the proposed model shows that some projects
that would be deemed uninteresting by traditional valuation can actually have significant
value.
New decision making maps for the choice of a design lifetime requirement
Building on this case, section 5.3 proposed a new tool to decision making regarding the
choice of a design lifetime requirement when on-orbit servicing is available. It showed how
the option valuation framework can be used to produce two types of maps for commercial
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decision makers to manage the uncertainty in their revenues. If the price of on-orbit ser-
vicing is known, then the optimal design choice can be plotted in a market level/market
volatility map. If accurate estimates of the market forecast and market volatility are devel-
oped, then the optimal design lifetime can be plotted in a servicing price/market volatility
map. The proposed valuation framework can also be used as a guide for future on-orbit
servicing technology development, by defining the range of possible servicing prices that a
space mission should be charged.
Maximum servicing price for commercial space missions with uncertain revenues
The market level/market volatility map in the general case with constant market forecast
showed that the maximum servicing price for a commercial space mission is an order of
magnitude higher than the cost to produce and launch the serviceable mass, as soon as the
volatility in mission revenues is higher than about 40% .yr-4 . This proves not only that
on-orbit servicing has significant value for commercial space missions, but also that much
of this value resides in the flexibility it provides them with.
The servicing price/market volatility map for two realistic examples (Globalstar and
Iridium) showed that as soon as the servicing price is more than five times the cost to
produce and launch the serviceable mass, the main driver for the optimal design lifetime is
the market uncertainty. The optimal choice is the longest possible lifetime up to a minimum
uncertainty, at which serviceable designs become interesting.
Maximum servicing price for military space missions with dynamic distribu-
tion of contingencies By introducing a Markov model of the dynamics of contingencies,
chapter 6 expanded the framework to military missions in the case when the decision is to
continuously optimize performance.
For a low-Earth orbit radar constellation, the trade of number of satellites versus maneu-
verability was explored for two types of propulsion systems: chemical and electric. While
chemical propulsion offers the fastest maneuverability, its exponential mass increase out-
weighs the advantages of refueling. For electric propulsion systems on the other hand, the
maximum servicing price per unit mass can be an order of magnitude greater than the cost
to launch to LEO. However, electric propulsion systems require unacceptable times for a
change in inclination. Thus, the results suggest that refueling would have little value for a
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LEO radar constellation.
On the other hand, the maneuverability concept was shown to be very promising for a
fleet of GEO satellites as a means to continuously optimize their longitude over a dynamic
distribution of contingencies. The maximum servicing price per unit mass is an order of
magnitude greater than the cost to launch into geostationary orbit, which guarantees that
servicing can be interesting for realistic marginal infrastructure costs.
7.2 Recommendations for Future Work
In a way, this work has been the first step into new territory. This means that it is
still very incomplete. But also that it opens up a wealth of new questions and interesting
research directions.
Note on applying the framework This thesis proposed a new valuation process that
takes building blocks as input. We illustrated the use of this process by making assumptions
on the numerical forms of the building blocks. Although the valuation process can be used
as such, the numerical assumptions represent zeroth-order approximations only and would
need refinement. For the sake of generality, linear numerical assumptions were made about
the cost to design for a given lifetime, the cost to operate a system, and the relation between
mass and cost. In the real world, non-linear effects and discontinuities exist, that depend
on the particularities of the design. Using this framework on a real case study, the actual
mass and costs functions should first be derived in order to yield more accurate results.
Expansion to overcome the main limitations Several limitations of the proposed
framework could be the object of future development.
First, all the results we presented here assumed that uncertainty is external, follows a
Markov process, and is symmetric. The generalization to internal sources of uncertainty
is far from trivial. The generalization to non-symmetric sources of uncertainty, such as
revenues having a relatively higher probability to be lower than their forecast, is the easiest
step because it involves only the definition of a different probability density function. More
difficult but very interesting would be the application to processes that are not Markovian.
This would account for the fact that decision makers do not only rely on the latest available
information: they also learn from history.
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Second, while the case of a linear value function has been well defined, there remains
interesting work to do in the area of non-commercial missions. We demonstrated how to
expand the framework to account for continuous decision making in the case of military
space missions which optimize their instantaneous performance; this decision scheme made
it possible to use a Markov model. For scientific missions, which optimize their future utility
per cost ratio, a backwards iterative valuation process would be necessary, but made very
complex if decision points have to be continuous, or if the expected value of the ratio has to
be estimated (instead of the ratio of the expected values). Investigations into new models
and/or new numerical methods to solve this problem would be valuable.
Finally, all the applications studied in this work assumed that there was only one un-
certain parameter. Real space missions are however usually faced with a combination of
uncertain parameters, such as uncertain revenues and uncertain servicing price and random
failures. The generalization to such a case is conceptually easy as soon as theses sources of
uncertainty are independent. It however multiplies the complexity of the numerical analysis.
Further applications Future work should apply the proposed models to other types of
space systems. Of particular interest would be the study of two other important sources of
uncertainty: random satellites failures and technology obsolescence.
Random failures can be modeled by a constant failure rate. They require the definition
of a continuous decision process which will depend on the type of mission.
A typical assumption for the study of technological obsolescence could be that the
potential utility rate achievable with new technology increases as an exponential law (such
as Moore's law) with uncertain rate. This would be a good example of non-symmetric
uncertain parameter. The different modes of operation would correspond to technologies
made available in different years.
Market base for on-orbit servicing Thus, the application of the proposed framework
can be used to estimate the maximum servicing price that various types of space missions
would be willing to pay for the capability to be serviced. Combining this information with
an approximation of the number of space missions of each type that is expected in the
future would yield an estimation of the market base for on-orbit servicing.
This market base would represent valuable information for future technology and policy
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development regarding on-orbit servicing.
7.3 Conclusion
There is value in the options that on-orbit servicing would provide to space systems. By
not accounting for this flexibility, traditional valuation methods have been underestimating
the value of servicing.
This work proposed a general framework to take into account the value of the flexibility
to react to any source of uncertainty that can be modeled as external. It showed that options
can make up a significant fraction of total space mission value as soon as the uncertainty
is significant. Since they do not require to estimate the cost of any on-orbit servicing
infrastructure, these results are not plagued by the high servicing cost uncertainty.
The systematic application of this framework should prove very useful in identifying the
space missions for which on-orbit servicing would offer the most potentials. It should serve
as a guide for future on-orbit servicing technology development as to what maximum price
can be charged to various types of space missions. More generally, it can be used by space
missions as a new tool for decision making, with which the value of flexibility, seen as a
means to actively manage external sources of uncertainty, can be quantified.
The author wishes lots of fun to future graduate students carrying out research in this area.
She can be reached at elisabeth.lamassoure~polytechnique.org for any question.
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Appendix A
The Mathematics of Uncertainty:
Elements of Stochastic Calculus
The information in this appendix was directly adapted from [Shr97].
A.1 Definitions
Stochastic process A stochastic process X is a sequence of random variables. It can be
discrete: Xo, X 1 ,...X, or continuous: X(t).
Martingale property Let X(t) be a stochastic process et let us denote by E {YIZ} the
expectation of any random variable Y knowing the value of the random variable Z.
X is a martingale if
E {X(t + r) IX ([0; t])} = X(t) V t, r > 0 (A.1)
Knowing all the values taken by X during the interval [0; t], the expectation of X at
any later time is simply its latest known value X(t). In other words, martingales tend
to go neither up nor down.
Markov property In this thesis we assumed that uncertain parameters could be modeled
as Markov processes. Here is a reminder of the rigorous definition of a Markov process.
Let X be a stochastic process, h a function, and for 0 < to ti let Etox {h [X(ti)j}
be the expectation of h [X(ti)] given that X(to) = x. The Markov property says that
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Results of tosses: {t,h,h,t,t,h,t,t,h,t,h,h,ht,... }
Figure A-1: Example of Random Walk
whatever the initial condition X(O) = (:
E0' {h [X(ti)] |X(to) = x} = Etox {h [X(ti)J} (A.2)
In other words, if you want to estimate a function of X based on the observation
of the path of X over the interval [0; to], the only relevant information is the last
observed value X(to). The differences with the martingale property are that the
Markov property is valid for any function of X, and that it allows X to move up or
down.
A.2 Random Walks and the Brownian Process
A.2.1 Symmetric Random Walk
Suppose you toss a coin a infinite number of times and define the random variable X such
that:
Xo = 0
Xj+1
Xj + 1 if the result of the jth toss is heads,
Xj - 1 if the result of the jth toss is tails.
(A.3)
Then Xj is called a symmetric random walk process. This notion is illustrated by figure
A-1.
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The central limit theorem states that:
1
7=Xk -- + standard normal variable as k -- oc (A.4)
A.2.2 Brownian Process
Let n be an integer. For t > 0 of the form t = k/n, define
B(n)(t) = Mtn = 1 Mk
and for other values of t 2 0, define B(n)(t) by linear interpolation. The Brownian process
is the limit of B(n)(t) as n -- oc, in other words the limit of a random walk as the step of
the walk tends to zero.
More specifically, a random variable B(t) is called a Brownian motion if it satisfies the
following properties:
1. B() = 0
2. B(t) is a continuous function of t
3. B has independent, normally distributed increments; if you define 0 = to < ti < ... <
tn and Yk = B(tk) - B(tk-1), then:
* Yi, ... Yn are independent
* E{Yk} = 0 V k
e Var{Yk} = tk - tk-1 V k
Two important properties of the Brownian motion are that it is both a martingale and
a Markov process.
A.3 Measures of Uncertainty
A.3.1 First Variation
The first variation is a measure of the ups and downs of a function over an interval. It is
defined as follows. Let H = {to, ...tn} be a partition of the interval [0; T}, i.e. 0 = to < ti <
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= T. The mesh of the partition is defined to be
|TI|| = max (tk+1 - tk)k
Then the first variation of a function f over the interval [0; T] is by definition:
n-1
FVo;T](f) = lim If(tk+1) - f(tk)I (A.5)
|Ull-0 k=O
The link of this definition to the amount f varies is even clearer in the case of a differentiable
function. If f if differentiable, then the first variation reduces to:
T
FV[o;T(f)= If'(t)l dt
0
A.3.2 Quadratic Variation
In a similar fashion, the quadratic variation of f is defined as
n-1
(f)(T) = lim E If(tk+l) - f(tk)12  (A.6)
||||-+0 k=0
It can be shown that for a differentiable function, (f) (T) = 0. But for a Brownian process:
(B)(T) = T (A.7)
The quadratic variation of f is a measure of the randomness in f. The above property
of the Brownian motion proves in particular that the paths of a Brownian motion are not
differentiable. In can be re-written informally:
dB(t) dB(t) = dt
A.3.3 Volatility
The squared sample absolute volatility of f over the interval [T1; T2] partitioned by {tO, ... tn}
is:
T 1  n [f(tk1 - f(tk)]
2
T2 -j T1 f(t+
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In the case of a Brownian motion, this is equal to 1 whatever the choice of the interval
[T1; T2]. This property can be re-written (B)(T) = T = f 1 l dt. In other words, the
volatility of the Brownian motion is the rate at which its quadratic variation accumulates.
A.4 Basics of It6 Calculus
A.4.1 The It6 Integral
Let 6 be a function. Consider the integral I(T) = f6 6(t) dB(t): if B were a differentiable
function, then we would simply have I(T) = f6 6(t) B'(t) dt. This cannot work if B is a
stochastic process, because the paths of a stochastic process are not necessarily differentiable
(i.e., B'(t) is not necessarily defined).
The It6 integral is a generalization of the integral I(T) when B(t) is a Brownian motion.
Itd integral of an elementary process Let 0 = to ti < ... _ tn = T be a partition
of [0; T] and let 6(t) be a function that is constant on each subinterval [tk ; tk+1] ; we call
6(t) an elementary process. The It6 integral of such a process is defined as:
n
I(T) = 6(t ) [B(tk+l) - B(tk)] (A.8)
k=O
It6 integral of a general integrand Now let 6(t) be a process such that E {f6 62 (t) dt} <
oo. There is a sequence of elementary processes {On}ni such that:
T
lim E {J |S(t) - 6(t)|2 dt = 0 (A.9)
n-oo) j
10
The It6 integral of the general process 6(t) is defined by:
t tJ6(t) dB(t) = lim Jn (u)dB(u) (A.10)
0 0
Properties of the It6 integral include:
" Linearity: I(t) is linear with respect to 6(t)
* Continuity: 1(t) is a continuous function of t
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9 Martingale: I(t) is a martingale
R It6 isometry: E {I 2 (t)} = F {f 62(u) du
Quadratic variation of the It6 integral
(I)(t) = J 62 (u) du
0
Which means that the instantaneous absolute volatility of I is 62 (t). Informally, it can be
written as:
dI(t) dI(t) = 62 (t)
Important Example The example of the Brownian process illustrates how It6 calculus
differs from standard calculus:
T
B(t) dB(t) = 2 (T) - T (A.11)
A.4.2 It6's Formula
Let f(x) be a differentiable function. If B(t) were also differentiable, then the ordinary
chain rule would give:
f [B(t)] = f' [B(t)] B'(t)
which in differential notation corresponds to df (B(t)) = f'[B(t)] dB(t)
Since the Brownian process is not differentiable, the actual formula has an extra term,
which gives It6's formulas in differential form:
1
df [B(t)] = f'[B(t)] dB(t) + f"[B(t)] (A.12)2
and in integral form:
f [B(t)] - f [B(O)] = t f' [B(u)] dB(u) + 1 ff" [B(u) du] (A.13)
f0 0
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A.5 Geometric Brownian Motion
The typical assumption for stocks, also used in real options and in chapter 5 of this thesis,
is to model the uncertain parameter as a geometric Brownian motion.
A geometric Brownian motion with drift a and volatility a is a process S(t) of the form:
S(t) = S(O) exp [aB(t) + p + 1 a 2) t] (A.14)
where yL and a > 0 are constant.
We can note that S(t) = f (t, B(t)) with f (t, x) = S(0) exp [a x + (pt + _I 2) t] so that
It6's formula gives:
dS(t) = y S(t) dt + a S(t) dB(t) (A.15)
which is equivalent to say that In [S (t)] is a Brownian process with drift i and volatility a.
Informally:
dS(t) dS(t) = a2 S 2 (t) dt
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Appendix B
Calculations of Velocity Budgets
B.1 Incremental Velocities for Various Maneuvers
B.1.1 Hohmann Transfer
A Hohmann transfer minimizes the incremental velocity to maneuver between two coplanar
circular orbits at the respective altitudes ao and a1 . It consists of two impulsive burns.
The first burn transfers the spacecraft to the elliptical orbit with apocenter and pericenter
distances ao and ai: the semi-major axis of the transfer orbit is at = (ao + ai)/2. The
second burn circularizes the orbit at a1 . The total incremental velocity is (see also [WL99]):
AVH
ao ao+ai a-.O+ ai ao+ai aI
where ya = G MEarth. Defining the ratio of altitude a = ao/ai and the baseline orbital
velocity V = fp/ao, this can be re-written:
A VH
AVH
V
2 2 2
=Vo 2- -iV I +1+a a 1+a a
1+ia ya yli-a
This is the final result used in 3.9.
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-AVi
Initial situation After one transfer orbit After k orbits
Figure B-1: Phasing Maneuver: Example
B.1.2 Incremental Velocity for Phase Change
Now consider a maneuver to a position in the same orbital plane at the same altitude, but
with by a difference in angular phase 4o E [-7r; 7r]. The maneuver must be performed in
less than a maximum allowed time ATma. This can be achieved by altering the orbital
semi-major axis, so that the difference in orbital period cancels out the phase. Four different
situations can be imagined, according to the sign of <bo and of the semi-major axis alteration.
Case 1 Let us first consider <bo > 0 and choose to raise the apocenter. Let the number
of orbits per unit time be no for the baseline altitude ao and nt for the transfer orbit
with semi-major axis at. The change in phase after one period in the transfer orbit is
A# = 21r no T - 27r = 27r (no/nt - 1). A phase change (o will therefore be obtained after k
orbits if:
-- = 1 - --4D + 1 (B.1)
nt k ( 27r)
The time to perform this maneuver is then k T = k To no/nt where To is the baseline orbital
period. The maximum allowed maneuver time therefore requires:
k<ATmax Ch 4oS2-1+--
-- T 2ir
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The maneuver is made up of two opposite, equal-magnitude impulsive burns. The total
incremental velocity is:
V ao at a0
= p 2 2-o 1
Vo at
But:
ao nt3
at no)
The minimal incremental velocity is obtained for at as close as possible to ao, i.e. for the
maximal possible number of orbits:
k I(ATmax +<b
k To 2ir /
where I(x) denotes the integer part of x. This finally gives:
= 2 2 
-
Vo - i-' o/27r
(ATmax <bo
To 27r
Case 2 If the apocenter is raised to obtain <bo < 0, then k is now given by kA# = t<boI so
that equation B.1 becomes:
no I1|<ol
-= -- +1
ni k 27r
Similar calculations then yield:
AVph - 2
=2~~ 2--Vo 2 - - <bo/27r
with the same definition of 1.
Case 3 If the pericenter is lowered to obtain <bo > 0, then A4 = 27r - 27r no/nt so that
equation B.1 becomes:
-=1--
n 1 27r
189
which yields:
2
=2 2- t -i
Vo (1- 4o/27r
Case 4 Finally, if the pericenter is lowered to obtain <ko < 0, then:
no 1 |<o
-=1--1-
nt k 27r
which yields
A_ ( +1 -
= 2 2 - -2 1
Vo 2 - <bo/27r)
The results can finally be summarized as follows:
Vph= 2 2_ -
-2 1 (B.2)
Vo 1 - 4)o/27r)
1= I max + 21r (B.3)
To 27r
-1 if at > ao and <Do > 0
E = 1 if at < ao and <Do < 0 (B.4)
0 otherwise
Note on optimal maneuver For a given allowed time ATmax, the optimal maneuver
scheme is the one that minimizes AVph. For <Do > 0, this is obtained by lowering the
pericenter, while for (Do < 0, raising the apocenter is more interesting. In a real situation
however, the choice between these two options may not exist. For example, a spacecraft in
low-Earth orbit can not lower its pericenter too close to the Earth because of atmospheric
drag.
B.2 Velocity and Mass Budget for a Servicer Vehicle
The servicer maneuver scheme described in chapter 3 is reminded on figure B-2. We consider
a servicer vehicle with total dry mass Mileyrvicer able to carry a maximum cargo mass N Mc.
The servicer loads a cargo N MC at an altitude a1, performs a Hohmann transfer to the
satellites altitude ao to deliver a mass MC to the first satellite, performs phase changes to
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Phasing
Phasing
Loading
N satellites visited during each roundtrip
L roundtrips performed before refueling
Figure B-2: Schematic of Servicer Maneuver Scheme
visit N - 1 other satellites in the same orbital plane, then performs a Hohmann transfer
back to the depot altitude ai, where it loads more cargo and repeats the whole process
L - 1 times. We note h the total velocity increment for the Hohmann transfer and docking,
normalized by the exhaust velocity I8 ,g; and p the normalized total velocity increment for
the phase change, and docking.
The mass budget for such a maneuver scheme is not a direct application of the rocket
equation, because the dry mass of the servicer decreases as it delivers cargo to each satellite.
The following shows how to calculate the total required servicer fuel mass on a maneuver-
per-maneuver basis, staring from the last maneuver.
B.2.1 One Roundtrip to Visit N Co-Planar Satellites
Last Hohmann transfer After the very last Hohmann transfer, which requires the nor-
malized velocity increment h, the final mass is M "vir. Therefore the rocket equationdry
gives the fuel required for this last maneuver in the form:
M (eh - 1) M ** (B.5)
Phasing maneuvers Now consider the phasing maneuvers. The fuel mass Mf" requiredk+i
to visit (k + 1) satellites is the sum of tow terms:
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1. The fuel mass required to visit the next satellite corresponds to a normalized velocity
increment p. The total mass after this maneuver is the sum of the dry mass, the cargo
for the k next satellites, and the fuel mass to visit the k next satellites.
2. The fuel mass required to visit the last k satellites.
Therefore the rocket equation gives:
M **e= (eP - 1) (Msrvicer + k Mc + M[ul + Mf""'
Thus we have the induction relation:
Mue = (e - 1) Msrervicer + (eP - 1) k Mc + ep MfueIk+1 dyk (B.6)
Define ak and bk such that
M = ak + bk MC
Then equations B.5 and B.6 are equivalent to:
ak+1
bk+1
= ePak + (eP - 1) and ao = eh - 1
= ePbk + (k + 1) (eP - 1) and bo = 0
(B.7)
A simple demonstration by induction gives:
ak ekh+h _
k-I
bk =(eP - 1) Z(k - 1) elp
l=1
bk can be expressed without a summation by the following considerations. Define
k--1 k 
_
f(x) = Z X=X
1=0
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Then
k-1
Z(k-l)x = kf(x)-xf'(x)
1=1
xk _1 (k - 1) xk+1 -k xk + x
X -1 (x - 1)2
which finally gives:
a =ekp+h - 1 Vk < N - 1
bk = ek_- ep -k Vk<N-1 
(B.8)
eP-i
First Hohmann transfer The fuel mass Mue required for one whole roundtrip of N
satellites is the sum of tow terms:
1. The fuel mass required to visit the first satellite corresponds to a Hohmann transfer
with normalized velocity increment h. The total mass after this maneuver is the sum
of the dry mass, the cargo for N - 1 satellites, and the fuel mass Mfue to visit theN-i
N - 1 next satellites.
2. The fuel mass M""{ required to visit the last N - 1 satellites.
Therefore the rocket equation gives:
MN" = (e-1 (Mjrvicer+(N- 1)M + M + Mf"_"
This corresponds to:
a=aN =e h aN-1 + (eh _ (N-I)p+2 h _B9
b=bN =eh bN-1 + N (eh - 1) = eNp-1 eh-N
The total fuel mass for one roundtrip is finally:
MRT = M -l = a Mservicer +bMc (B.10)1 N - dry
B.2.2 L Roundtrips
For a final mass Mervicer, the total fuel mass for the last roundtrip is given by equationdry
B. 10. The same relation is valid for any roundtrip, except that the final mass needs to be
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adjusted to include the fuel required for later roundtrips. Thus, the total fuel mass MR+
required for (k + 1) roundtrips is the sum of two terms:
1. The fuel mass required for the next roundtrip, after which the final mass will be the
sum of the dry mass and the fuel mass MRT required for the last k roundtrips.
2. The fuel mass the fuel mass MRT required for the last k roundtrips.
Therefore the rocket equation gives:
MRT = [a ( Mjervcer + MkT ) + b Mc] +Mk±1 -. dryk
which corresponds to the induction relation:
aRT Mservicer (+1) MRT (.1M+i = a dry"'' + b Mc + (a + 1)Mk (B. 11)
Define Ck and dk such that MRT = ck Mservicer + dk MC. Then equations B.11 and B.10
are equivalent to:
Ck+1 =(a-i-1)Ck+a and ci =a (B.12)
dk+1 =(a+1)dk+b and d1 =b
A simple demonstration by induction gives:
Ck = (a+ 1)k _1
(B.13)
k =a [(a +1)k
Using equation B.9 finally gives the total fuel mass MRT = Mservicer required for L
roundtrips:
fuervicer = A .Mdyvicer + B.Mc (B.14)
where A = exp [L(N - 1)p + 2Lh] - 1 (B.15)
exp [L(N - 1)p + 2Lh] - 1 eNp h N
and B = ex[N-1p2] 1Ke -1 (B.16)exp [(N - 1)p + 2h] - 1 eP - 1
This corresponds to the mass budget mentioned in chapter 3 (equation 3.15).
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